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ESSAYS
ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS.
•=\
LONDON :
IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND.
ESSAYS
PERCEPTION OF AN EXTERNAL UNIVERSE,
OTHER SUBJECTS
CONNECTED WITH
THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION,
BY
LADY MARY SHEPHERD,
AUTHOR OF
An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect.
CA
P LONDON: ffiWashl
JOHN HATCH ARD AND SON, PICCADILLY.
1827.
I"
PART I.
AN ESSAY
ON
THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY AS
APPLIED BY MR. HUME TO THE PERCEPTION OF
EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
PART II.
ESSAYS CONTAINING INQUIRIES
RELATING TO
THE BERKELEIAN THEORY;
THE COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL
INDUCTION;
THE UNION OF COLOUR AND EXTENSION ;
THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES ;
THE NATURE OF A FINAL CAUSE AND OF MIND ;
THE REASON OF SINGLE AND ERECT VISION.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page
PREFACE, &c. xi
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
Sec. I. — The Question stated - 1
II. — Sensation a generic term — Question restated
— generally answered and sub-divided into three
parts for further consideration. - C
CHAPTER I.
On Continuous Existence.
Sec, I. — Whence the knowledge of continuous existence
unperceived? - - - - - - - 13
Sec. II. — Several Corollaries with the preceding statement
— The association of the sensible qualities with the ideas
of their unknown causes — The error of Dr. Reid and
others in separating primary and secondary qualities —
The error of Bishop Berkeley — Time, fyc. — The near
union of popular and philosophical notions on the sub-
ject— The nature of dreams, and the difference between
them and realities — The reality of a future life — The
conclusion that the proportions and relations of unper-
ceived things are known from the relation of the cor-
responding sensations they create, and find a fit illus-
tration in the nature of algebraic signs - - '20
IV CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
On External Existence.
Page
Sec. I. — Knowledge of external existence, how gained?
— The nature and differences of external objects, how
known? — Varieties in the sensations which are effects
prove their causes proportionably various, fyc. . 39
Sec. II. — The nature of exteriority further considered —
Wliat the phenomena are which generate the idea of
external existence ------ 49
CHAPTER III.
On Independant Existence.
Sec. I. — The notion of the Independancy of external
objects how gained — The same evidence for the inde-
pendancy as for the exteriority of objects - - 76
Change of Qualities proves them to be independant of
the senses --_____ 77
Home objects appear both like ourselves, and different from
us, Sfc. --.____ 78
CHAPTER IV.
Objection arising to the foregoing doctrines
from the Phenomena of dreams, further con-
sidered AND ANSWERED.
Page
Sec. I.— The Phenomena of dreams do not afford a
valid argument against the proof of independant exist-
ences external to mind - ST
CONTENTS. V
Page
Sec. II. — Remark on Bishop Berkeley s conclusions
from dreams, showing a fallacy in his reasoning there-
on, as affording a doubt concerning the reality of
objects — application of the doctrine of Cause against
Berkeley - - - - - - - 91
Sec. III. — Remarks on Dr. Reid's Neglect of the Con-
sideration of tlw Phenomena of dreams in his notions
of extension, fyc. - - - - - - 109
Sec. IV. — Dreams considered in connection with the
doctrine discussed in the " Essay on the relation of
Cause and Effect " viz. How the mind may form a
judgment antecedently to trial, of future effects from
present appearances _____ 105
CHAPTER V.
On the Nature of Objects when acting as Causes.
Page
The action of cause to be considered as external to mind
— Remark on the vague and popular use of the word
Cause — Sensible qualities not the causes of other sen-
sible qualities - - - - - 125
Two kinds of necessa?y connexion ; that between Cause
and Effect, and that between successive effects aris-
ing from tlie union of a common cause, with various
■senses, SfC ----- 130
VI CONTENTS,
CHAPTER VI.
On the Use of the word Idea in this Treatise,
and cursory observations on its nature and
proper use in general. &c.
Page
Sec. I. — Ideas used as a distinct class of sensations, and
signs in relation to continuous existences, not present
to the mind — Berkeley's ambiguous use of that word —
Objects in the mind — compounded of Sensations (by
means of the organs of sense) and Ideas the result of
their relations perceived by the understanding, thence
the evidence for the existence of the different parts of
the same object unequal — Objects of memory how com-
pounded— The continuous existence of an individual
mind, or self, an inference from the relations which
exist between the idea of remembered existence, and
the sensation of present existence — The idea of exist-
ence in general how found, as an abstraction from each
sensation in particular ----- 133
CHAPTER VII.
Application of the Doctrine contained in the
preceding Essay to the evidence of our be-
lief in several Opinions.
Page
3ec. I. — The foundation of our belief in God - - 150
II. — The knowledge of our own independant ex-
istence - - ------ 152
CONTENTS. Vll
Page
Sec. III. — Observations on the essential difference
between body and mind - - - - -155
Sec. IV. — Cursory Observations on Instincts — pro-
phetic visions ------- 160
Sec. V. — On the knowledge of the nature of unper-
ceived objects - - - - - -162
CHAPTER VIII.
Recapitulation.
The perception of independant, external, and continued
existences, the result of an exercise of the reasoning
powers, or a mixture of the ideas of the understand-
ing with those of sense ----- 168
External objects unknown as to the unperceived qualities
which are capable of affecting the senses, known as
compounds of simple sensations, mixed with ideas of
Reason, or conceptions of the understanding — Reply
to an objection concerning extension — There exists
however one set of exterior qualities, which resemble,
such as are inward; these are Variety — Independancy
— Existence — Continued Existence — Identity, Sfc. —
Exteriorly extended objects cannot be like the idea
of extension — An appeal to the Phenomena of the
Diorama, as an evidence for the truth of these notions.
— The ideas of this Treatise do unintentionally coin-
cide loith some Mysteries of Religion — Conclusion 17 '5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Short Essays on Several Subjects.
ESSAY I.
Page
Sec. I. — Consideration of the erroneous reasoning con-
tained in Bishop Berkeley s Principles of Human
Knowledge ---__-_ 195
Sec. II. - 213
ESSAY II.
Upon the nature of the five organs of sense, and their
manner of action ivith regard to external perception
— against Bp. Berkeley - - - - 221
ESSAY III.
That the external Causes which determine the various
perceptions of sense, are not the immediate actions
of Deity — against Bp. Berkeley - 230
ESSAY IV.
Upon Mr. Dugald Stewarfs, and Dr. Reid's Philosophy,
as it regards the union of colour with extension ; and
the perception of the external primary Qualities of'
matter — against Mr. D. Stewart - 246
CONTENTS. IX
ESSAY V.
Page
That mathematical demonstration and physical induction
are founded upon similar principles of evidence —
against Mr. Dugald Stewart. - - - -271
ESSAY VI.
That sensible qualities cannot be causes — against Mr.
Hume --------296
ESSAY VII.
That children can perceive the relation of cause and
effect, on account of their being capable of a latent
comparison of ideas — against Mr. Hume - - 314
ESSAY VIII.
That human testimony is of sufficient force to establish
the credibility of miracles — against Mr. Hume - 325
ESSAY IX.
On the objection to final causes as ends on account oj
the efficiency of means — Lord Bacon's ideas concern-
ing a final cause noticed - 346
ESSAY X.
On the Eternity of Mind.
Each sensation vanishes in its turn - - 374
Doctrine applied to the immortality of mind - 378
ESSAY XI.
On the Immateriality of Mind.
Sensation itself is inextended, yet has a relation to ex-
tension - - 386
The power of mind as an efficient cause - 388
Application to Deity - - - 389
X CONTENTS.
ESSAY XII.
On the use of organization in animal existence, especially
as it relates to the existence and operation of mental
qualities - - - 393
ESSAY XIII.
On the association of ideas, and the interaction of mind
and body* - 403
ESSAY XIV.
The reason why we see objects single instead of double,
and erect instead of inverted — against Dr. Reid 408
* This and the four preceding essays are against several
modern atheists.
ERRATA.
Page. Line.
36, 26, for " heaven" read u haven."
61, 23, for u unknown causes" read " ideas of the un-
known causes."
87, 5, for " does " read " do."
95, In note,/or " sec. 6, ch. 6," read " sec. 7, ch. 5."
100, After " Recapitulation " read " page 182, and ch. 7,
sec 5.*"
102, 22, "* Seep. 54, 55."
107, 5, " * p. 54, 55, and 'Essay on the Nature of the
Five Organs of Sense.' "
109, 5, " * SeeReid's Inquiry, ch. 5, sec. 7."
126, 12, In the note after " mind " read " Vol. 2, ch. 4."
203, 6, After " objects " read " * See p. 220, &c."
215, 11, for " substance" read " a substance."
229, Last line in note, for " note O " read " note G." f
247, 24, After Mr. Stewart, read " * Essays," and " Ele-
ments of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,
vol. 3, addenda," ref. to p. 92, 1st edit. p. 93,
6th edit.
249, Last line, for " note O" read " note G."
277, 9, for " uuiversalle " read " universelle."
284, 16,/or " whole " read " wholes."
297, 15, After " doctrine " read " of causation."
307, 1 7, for " disceptibility" read " discerptibility."
370, 23, for " consider " read " attribute."
373, 17, for " conducted " read " concluded."— Note, for
" Dr. Stewart " read " Mr. D. Stewart."
f This is an error of consequence as it relates to Mr. D..
Stewart's doctrine of External Perception.
PART I.
AN ESSAY
OX THE
ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY,
Sec.
PREFACE TO THE ESSAY
ON THE
ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
It was my intention in a former publi-
cation * to have introduced an appendix
containing some inquiry into the nature
and proof of the existence of matter,
and of an external universe ; deeming
it necessary in order to the more en-
larged comprehension of that manner of
action exerted in causation which renders
it "a producing principle" to have a
right understanding of the idea of an
external object; but finding the notions
which suggested themselves would ex-
ceed the limits of that work, and of
sufficient interest to be pursued beyond
* An essay upon the relation of cause and effect.
Xll PREFACE.
its immediate purpose, I have ventured
to unfold them in the following essay.
Now the question concerning the
nature and reality of external existence
can only receive a satisfactory answer,
derived from a knowledge of the relation
of Cause and Effect. The conclusions
therefore, deduced from some of the
reasonings used in the former essay
are the instruments employed in con-
ducting the argument in this ; — never-
theless it will not be reasoning in a
circle, if by carefully defining the na-
ture of internal and external existence
of objects 'perceived and unperceived,
we gain thereby clearer ideas of the
method and action of causation. For
in this discussion, taking the two essays
together as one whole, the knowledge
of Cause is supposed to be first, because
previous to any belief in exteriority,
one internal object would appear so ne-
cessary to another, that without its pre-
sence it would not arise ; also every
change of perception would be observed
PREFACE. Xlll
as a change of that being which was
already in existence : — the action of be-
ginning any existence would therefore
appear as a quality of self, or the acci-
dent of a continuing existence ; and
it would be a manifest contradiction,
to predicate of such a quality its
self-existence. Thus, to begin of itself
would appear to every child under the
faintest and most indistinct form of
latent conception, to be a contradiction.
But that one object is necessary to the
existence of another, (by some kind or
manner of action) and that qualities can-
not begin of themselves, are those pri-
maeval elements of the doctrine of
cause, which regulate every opinion
speculative and practical.
Then, secondly, those causes of our
ideas, which are neither our senses nor
our minds, are deduced by inference
from a comparison of the ideas which
experience yields, by that method of ar-
gument which it is the intent of this Essay
to show.
XIV PREFACE.
Whilst thirdly, the manner of the ac-
tion of cause, by which it is a pro-
ducing principle, and has a neces-
sary and invariable connection with its
effects, becomes elicited by a separation
of the ideas of the exterior causes of
our sensations, and the ideas of the
sensations themselves. Thus showing
there are two sets of objects in nature ;
viz. the exterior objects, the acting
causes of nature, independant of the
senses ; the internal objects, the
sensible effects of these, when meeting
with the human senses, and deter-
mining their specific qualities upon the
mind.
The exhibition of the justness of this
last conclusion, although hinted at in
" The essay on cause and effect" p. 42, could
not be fully shown, until all sensations,
all sensible qualities whatever, were ex-
posed as themselves but a series of suc-
cessive effects.
Thus the subjects of the two Essays
are capable of being considered inde-
PREFACE. XV
pendantly, yet of throwing a mutual
light upon each other. To analyse the
operations of our minds in such a man-
ner as shall distinctly show the limit of
u what we know of body," will mate-
rially help the mind in forming an idea
of how it operates when " acting as a
cause;" as also on the other hand,
when the mind perceives by what
passes within itself, that no quality,
idea, or being whatever, can begin its
own existence, it not only perceives the
general necessity of a cause for every
effect, but also thence deduces, that
there must necessarily be a continually
existing cause, for that constantly re-
curring effect, our perception of extension ;*
or in other words, the existence of that,
which though unperceived and indepen-
dent, merits the appellation of " body."
The analysis, therefore, of the operations
of mind from infancy, throws light upon
the knowledge we have of cause and
effect; and the relation of cause and
* " Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 34,
XVI PREFACE.
effect when fully known and established,
affords the only method of proof in our
power, for the knowledge of external
existence.
I propose in this essay as in the
former one, to consider Mr. Hume's no-
tions as expressed first of all in his
" Treatise upon Human Nature" and
afterwards as resumed in his essay en-
titled, " On the Academical or Sceptical
Philosophy ;" yet to conduct the argu-
ment rather by stating what I conceive
to be truth, than by a minute exami-
nation of his reasoning. In doing this
if any thoughts should appear of such
a nature as to afford a prospect that the
doctrine first set up by Bishop Berkeley,
is capable of being modified in such a
manner as not to be at variance with
the common experience of life, much
less to afford a supply of arguments in
favour of atheism, the author will be
rewarded for the labour of thought
which has been found necessary in the
consideration of it.
AN ESSAY,
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
Section I.
The Question stated.
The question intended to be investigated
in the following pages is thus stated in
the " Treatise on Human Nature,"*
" Why we attribute a continued existence
to objects even when they are not present
to the senses ?" And, " why we suppose
them to have an existence distinct from
the mind ; i. e. external in their position,
and independant in their existence and
operation?" Mr. Hume argues at great
length, that it is not by means either of
the " senses, or of reason;" that " we
" are induced to believe in the existence
* Part 4, sec. 2.
B
Z INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
" of body ;" but that we gain the notion
entirely by an operation of the " imagi-
nation" which has "a propensity to
"feignthe continued existence of all sen-
" sible objects, and as this propensity
i( arises from some lively impressions on
" the memory, it bestows a vivacity on
" that fiction, or in other words, makes
" us believe the continued existence of
" body." It is not my intention to analyze
Mr. Hume's reasoning on this subject,
which I conceive to be altogether erro-
neous, and which it would be very tedi-
ous to examine ; I prefer, therefore, an-
swering the question as it stands, ac-
cording to my own views of it, setting
down what experience and reflection
suggest to my mind as the operations
of nature in this matter; and I shall en-
deavour to point out what complication
of objects, and what arrangement of
them is necessary towards that result
which appears to us from its familiarity
and constancy of appearance, perfectly
simple and easy to be understood. But
first, I shall shortly observe, that Mr.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. d
Hume's error in general is similar to that
in the essay on " necessary connexion,"
viz. of substituting " imagination" and
" vivacity of thought" as a ground of
belief, instead of " reason" " An idea,"
says Mr. Hume, " acquires a vivacity by
its relation to some present impression,"
and this at once, according to him,
forms the whole ground upon which our
" belief" rests, of the necessity there
is, that similar effects should flow from
similar causes, and that objects should con- .
tinue to exist unperceived. It is my in-
tention to shew here, as upon a former
occasion, that as the very act of reason-
ing consists in drawing out to observa-
tion the relations of things as they are
included in their juxta-position to each
other ; so upon this question, concerning
our " knowledge of the existence of
"body," it is reason, which taking no-
tice of the whole of our perceptions, and of
their mutual relations, affords those proofs
" of body" which first generate, and after
examination will substantiate, the belief
of its existence.
b 2
4 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
The question proposed in the treatise
is resumed in the essay on " the Aca-
demical or Sceptical Philosophy," thus :
" By what argument can it be proved,
" that the perceptions of the mind must
" be caused by external objects ?" and
" reason'' is there said also, " not to
" have it in her power to find any con-
" vincing argument to prove, that the
" perceptions are connected with any ex-
" ternal objects ;" but that on the con-
trary, " the slightest philosophy teaches
us, that the senses are not able to pro-
duce any immediate intercourse between
the mind and the object ; for that the
table which we see seems to diminish
as we remove further from it, but that
the real table which exists independant
of us suffers no alteration."
It will be seen by any intelligent
reader, accustomed to discussions of
this sort, that the consideration of the
question, as stated in Mr. Hume's trea-
tise, and the notions I have thence de-
duced will contain a doctrine capable
of answering any errors of Dr. Berke-
IXTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. O
ley's* on the same subject, whose
opinions, which originally had been in-
tended as the foundation of the most
secure belief in Deity, Mr. Hume has
endeavoured to convert, by an en-
larged application of them, (by an in-
duction of the non-existence of mind
as well as matter,) into a source of uni-
versal scepticism.
The incompleteness of Dr. Reid's an-
swer to these authors, will also be per-
ceived in the course of the argument
here used against them ; it will be seen
that he cuts the knot instead of untying
it, by referring a belief in the opinion
" there is body1' only to " natural in-
stinct" This notion can never satisfy
us, as affording either the reason for our
belief, or as detailing to us the manner
in which it arises.
* But this part of the subject will be more fully
entered upon in a separate treatise, where it is in-
tended to introduce some extracts from Berkeley's
(t Principles of Human Knowledge," and to apply
the ideas here suggested as an answer to them.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
Section II.
1 . Sensation a generic term, SfC.
2. Question restated.
3. Generally answered and subdivided into three
parts for further consideration.
I. In the discussion of this subject
(il as to our knowledge of the existence of
body,") I mean to follow the example
of Dr. Berkeley in the use of the word
sensation chiefly, instead of perception;
because it is a generic term, compre-
hending every consciousness whatever.
Dr. Reid* is most unphilosophical in
supposing perception to be a power of
the mind independant of sensation,
and that it can be contradistinguished
from it ; whereas, although every sen-
sation may not be the perception of an
exterior object, acting on either of the
five organs of sense, yet there can be
no perception of such objects without
* In the beginning of his argument against Mr.
Hume in his Inquiry of the Human Mind.
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. /
that inward act of consciousness, which,
as a consciousness, is in truth a sensa-
tion of the mind. When it is appre-
hended that all we know must be by
means of consciousnesses, or sensations,
then will be the time to analyze their
various classes, to examine their rela-
tions, to notice their peculiarities, in
order to discover by what means it is
we come to the belief of non-sentient
existences. I know, indeed, that it is
usual to apply the term sensation to
those perceptions only which are un-
accompanied with the notion of their
inhering in an outward object, as the
pain arising from the incision of a
sharp instrument is a sensation, which
is not in the instrument. But in reality
every thought, notion, idea, feeling, and
perception, which distinguishes a sen-
tient nature from unconscious exist-
ence, may be considered generally as
sensation. Whereas perception, as used
by some authors, (especially by Dr.
Reid,) begs the question under debate ;
O INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
i. e. of the existence of objects or
masses of external qualities already per-
ceived. For under any illusion of the
senses, a person would say, (as of sight,
for instance,) " I thought there had
been a bird in this room ; until I per-
ceived it was only a painting :" mean-
ing that he made use of the whole know-
ledge relating to the subject, then in the
mind, as an instrument, an inward eye,
to correct the impressions at first re-
ceived ; and when the doctrine I pro-
pose becomes unfolded, the following is
the conclusion to which I wish it may
lead, viz. That the relations of various
sensations generate conclusions, which be-
come new sensations or perceptions, and
which, as so many inward objects of sense,
afford an evidence of the existence of the
exterior objects to which they refer, equal
to the evidence there is for any existing
sensation whatever, in the mere conscious-
ness of its presence. Mr. Hume uses
the word perception in the sense I do
that of sensation, i. e. for any conscious-
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 9
ness whatever. But on account of the
ambiguity to which that word is ex-
posed, I prefer the latter term. How-
ever, when I occasionally use the word
" perception," I use it in the sense of
a " consciousness of sensation,'" a sensa-
tion TAKEN NOTICE OF BY THE MIND,
and this is the sense in which Mr. Locke
defines the word.
2. Having said thus much for the sake of
clearness, I proceed to state the question
proposed, with some slight variation of
expression, thus : Whence is it, that
many of the sensations with which we are
acquainted are considered as objects con-
tinuous in their existence, outward from.
and independant of our own, when it is
obvious, they are still upon the same
footing as those are allowed to be,
which are considered as interrupted,
inward, and dependant beings ; being
all of them equally perceptions, or feelings
of a mind, which when not perceiving, or
feeling, cannot take notice of any exist-
ence whatever ?
b 5
10 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
3 . I answer that we do not conceive our
sensations so to exist, but by habit asso-
ciate them with the notion of some
sort of corresponding continuous exist-
ences , and that we gain the knowledge
that there must needs be some con-
tinuous ( independant ) existences, beings
that are not sensations, by the means of
reasoning, which reasoning itself consists
of other and superinduced sensations,
arising from the comparison of the re-
lations, of simple sensations among
themselves, thus testifying the existence
of the external objects it represents, as
much as the experience of simple sen-
sations, (of colour, sound, &c.) testifies
the existence of their respective inter-
nal objects ; and that, although we be
only conscious of our sensations, yet
our whole combined sensations include
in their relations the necessity, that there
should be, and the proof that there are,
other existences than the mere sensa-
tions themselves.
In order to discover what these rela-
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 11
tiojis* are, whence this result is de-
duced, let us inquire,
First, By what means it is we ac-
* In dreams and madness the mind is not in a
state to perceive and examine these relations ; for,
First, There is no remembrance of the place the
percipient is in ; therefore, the relation of place in
regard to all those vivacious images which are
moving in the fancy is wanting, which, did it exist,
would show they were merely parcels of sensible
qualities, independant of the action of the senses
on external objects, and thus render the mind con-
scious it was in a delirium ; a very peculiar state of
mind no doubt, but one which experience proves
may take place, and which at once renders futile
that notion of Hume and Berkeley, that the reality
of things consists only in the superior vivacity of
their impressions.
Secondly, The mind is not in a fit state to per-
ceive, that these masses of sensible qualities are
not such as can return upon the sense when
called for ; and so are wanting in that proof of
continuous existence.
Thirdly, The mind is not in a state to combine
with these observations, the knowledge that these
masses of sensible qualities cannot owe their exist-
ence to those methods of formation which in nature
determine objects, independant of each man's
sense in particular, and, therefore, wholly different
12 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.
quire the notion of continuous exist-
ences, in opposition to the interrupted
sensations, by which they appear to the
mind ?
Secondly, Examine the foundations,
for considering such objects external
to, instead of a part of, or included in
the perceiving mind.
Thirdly, Further consider, whence
the notion originates, that such objecfs
are entirely in dependant of our own
existence ; although we can only know
them by our sensations, which them-
selves depend upon our existence ?
In the consideration of these three
branches of the question, I shall take
notice, how far the method nature takes
to generate the notions of independant
existence, proves it, and cursorily ob-
serve on the errors of Mr. Hume and
Bishop Berkeley on these points, &c.
beings from the creatures of one man's fancy in
particular, the result of a lively, or disordered cir-
culation of the blood.
This view of the subject will be further pursued
in the discussion of this essay.
13
CHAPTER I.
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
Section I.
Whence the knowledge of Continuous Existence
unperceived ?
First, I observe, that the method in
which what are called external objects*
introduce themselves to the mind, oc-
casions it to judge, that the cause of
each sensation in particular, is different
from the cause of sensation in general, and
so may continue to exist when unper-
ceived. For by a general sensation pre-
sent to the mind, it always possesses
the notion of the possibility of the exist-
ence of unperceived objects ; and from
the facts which take place, it can only
explain the appearance of objects, by
the supposition that they actually do
exist when unperceived or unfelt. For
the mind perceives that unless they are
* i. e. The object which meeting with any sense
excites its action.
14 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
created purposely, ready to appear, upon
each irregular call of the senses, they
must continue to exist, ready to appear
to them upon such calls.
Also the mind knows there must
necessarily be some sort of continually
existing beings which are not percep-
tions, on account of their successively
vanishing ; for there needs must continue
sufficient objects to cause a renewal of
them; otherwise they would each in
their turn "begin their own existences"
i. e. a relation of ideas would exist,
which by the youngest minds is not
embraced from its involving an intuitive
contradiction.
Such is the latent reasoning silently
generated in the minds of all men, from
infancy; — by re turning on their steps men
can again recover the image of the house,
the tree, they have just passed : Do
these objects continue to exist in them ;
and is the eye put in action ; and does
motion take place in relation only to
the mind ; or more indefinitely to the
object called self? (i. e. an individual
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 15
capacity for sensation in general?"
No, in vain would sight, and motion,
attempt to call up these images, unless
as objects different from the mind, or
object termed self, or simple capacity
for general sensation, they were ready
to appear in relation to those appro-
priate methods for their introduction,
(viz. motion and the use of the eye);
which cannot gain any appearance of
them, by only applying such methods
as call upon the inward sentient prin-
ciple, termed mind. The readiness,
therefore, to appear when called for by the
use of the organs of sense, mixed with
the reasoning, that the organs of sense
and mind being the same, a third set
of objects is needed in order to deter-
mine those perceptions in particular
which are neither the organs of sense
nor mind in general, forms together the
familiar reason, (the superinduced sen-
sation,) which yields to all, — infants,
and peasants, as much as to wise men,
the notion of the continual existence of
objects unperceived. Interrupted sensa-
16 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
tions of mind, when the organs of sense
are not used, are not ready to appear upon
any irregular call of any power we are
possessed of. But the mind is conscious
of the interruptions of its sensations:
therefore, the ultimate causes which exist
ready and capable to renew them, must
be uninterrupted causes, otherwise
they would " begin their own existences ;"
a proposition which has at large been
proved in the former essay to be impos-
sible, for any being, or any affection of
being to be capable of. The more re-
fined kinds of reasoning, I grant, lie
not in the compass of thinking, of which
ordinary minds are capable ; and as this
essay is intended to explain the popular
notion of all men, and to shew exactly
what it is, and how far philosophy will
support it, and how far dissent from it,
so I shall chiefly dwell upon the me-
thod nature takes with all men. And,
therefore, I repeat, that men take notice
from their earliest infancy, that the call
of the organs of sense, and the use of
motion, are related to things constantly
OX CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE,
17
ready to appear in relation to them, and
that the action of the organs of sense,
and motion, have nothing to do with, and
can gain nothing by applying themselves
to that object they consider their minds.
But this may easily be translated into
philosophical language ; and resolves
itself into the consideration, that that
class of sensations, called the use of the
senses, and motion, will by application
however irregular to some sort of exist-
ences, introduce the notice of them to
the mind, and that these existences,
being always ready to appear upon these
irregular calls of the senses, and mo-
tion, must continue to exist when not
called upon, in order to be thus ready to
appear. But the sensations in which
they appear to the mind, are by con-
sciousness known to be interrupted;
therefore, the existences which are u?i-
interrupted and continue to exist, and
which are in relation to the senses and
motion, do not continue to exist perceived
by the mind, but continue to exist un-
perceived by the mind. Moreover, the
18 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
capacity for sensation in general being
given with the use of any particular
organ of sense, certain perceptions be-
longing to that sense do not arise ; there-
fore, when these remain the same, and
the perceptions in question do arise,
they must be occasioned by unperceived
causes affecting it, the existence of
which causes is known, and is demon-
strably proved by these their effects.
These observations and reasonings when
compounded together, give evidence for
the continued and unperceived exist-
ences which are in relation to the
senses, as much as the exhibition of
any simple sensation whatever affords
an evidence of the existence of that
new being in the universe, in which the
sensation consists. For colour, sound,
&c. may be considered as so many be-
ings ; and every variety of them, as so
many various beings, whose existence can-
not be disputed, after a consciousness of
their appearance to the mind. In like man-
ner the relations of the simple sensations
are equally true in their existence.
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 19
The existence of the notion of four units
is not more certain under the immediate
consciousness of it, than all the relations
that are included in that number ; and
if in the examination of these relations,
any negative ideas present themselves,
these negations are upon the same footing
also ; and as non-existences are proved
not to exist, as much as positive ones are
proved to exist. Now the only objec-
tion that can be made to this reasoning,
is the possibility of an imperfect or false
view of the relations in question — and
this I grant. But upon the supposition
that the mind in this matter observes
carefully enough the relation of its simple
sensations, then the evidence for the
existences which depend on them, is
upon the same footing as are the simple
sensations, and must render an equal
confidence in it.
Now all that is wanted for the argu-
ment is to shew, that reason, (or the
observation of the relation of our simple
sensations,) does as a new sensation of
the mind, give evidence of unperceived
20 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
existence, and therefore affords a solu-
tion to the difficulty which appears to
be in the question — Whence we know of
any continued existence, when we can
immediately know nothing but our sensa-
tions, which are obviously only inter-
rupted existences ?
Section IT.
1 . Several corollaries with the 'preceding statement
— The association of the sensible qualities with
the ideas of their unknown causes.
2. The error of Dr. Reid and others in sepa-
rating primary and secondary qualities.
3. The error of Bishop Berkeley.
4. Time, fyc. The near union of popular and phi-
losophical notions on the subject.
5. The nature of dreams, and the difference be-
tween them and realities.
6. The reality of a future life.
7. The conclusion that the proportions and rela-
tions of unperceived things are known from the
relations of the corresponding sensations they
create, and find a fit illustration in the nature of
algebraic signs.
1. Hence it arises first, that it is owing
to the intimate union and association of
the sensible impressions, with the ideas
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 21
of their causes, that these causes, (or
objects,) can never be contemplated,
excepting under' the forms of those unions ;
by which it comes to pass, that the
whole union is considered in a popular
way as existing unperceived : and it re-
quires a philosophical examination to
separate that natural junction of thought.
This explains, I think, by an easier as
well as truer method, than that of the
"feigned imagination" to which Mr.
Hume has recourse, whence it is, that
colour, sound, &c. as well as extension
and solidity ; i. e. all our perceptions of
primary and secondary qualities, are
thought to exist unperceived, when yet
a perception certainly cannot exist unper-
ceived, nor a sensation unfelt. It also
explains why even philosophy does not
readily give up the notion of the separate
existence of primary sensible qualities
unperceived ; for, first, it is too great a
stress for the imagination to separate all
sensible images from the ideas of their
causes ; that which is left seems as
nought, and the mind cannot bear that
22 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
vacuity of thought : and, secondly, a num-
ber of arguments are lost, as men think,
for Creation, for Deity, &c. which is really
not the case ; and if with minds equally
removed from unfounded fears on the
one hand, and insidious intentions on
the other, men would pursue logical
deductions, and rise above the Weakness
of keeping up a false philosophy in or-
der to avoid the consequences of truth,
they would come to clearer notions of all
important truths, and establish them
more firmly than they possibly can do,
by the retention of any popular preju-
dice, however it appears to favour them.
Popular prejudice, it is true, leads
frequently to a belief in those results,
which reason, by different steps, may
assure us to be correct. But the vicious
mixture of philosophical analysis, with
some erroneous notions, only gives birth
to monstrous opinions ; the old and
common habits of thought are disturbed
by it ; the road, which before seemed
so plain and direct, assumes a different
appearance under the partial lights of a
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 23
temporising philosophy, which are only
sufficient to disclose the dangers through
which we managed before to walk,
blindly indeed, but with sufficient se-
curity for every ordinary purpose of life.
2. Dr. Reid's philosophy is not ex-
empt from the fear alluded to, nor, in
consequence, from error. It is the
clearest and most logical reasoning pos-
sible, as long as he descants upon the
nature of the secondary qualities, " ob-
serving, that the causes for them being
named by the sensations they create,
occasions an ambiguity of thought as
well as of expression, and that the na-
ture of the causes is wholly unknown in
their unperceived state."* But he can-
not regard the primary qualities as sub-
ject to the same reasoning ; that there is
an essential difference between them, for
that the mind has clear conceptions of
their external nature,^ and therefore he
* Inquiry into the human mind,
f Essay on the intellectual powers.
24 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
yields in an instant all that would render
his philosophy most valuable, by those
contradictions which would endeavour
to show, that extension, figure, hard-
ness, softness, i. e. all primary qualities
may be known distinctly as they exist
when unperceived ; that these percep-
tions are suggested by sensations; but that
the perceptions themselves are not sen-
sations, and though clearly " conceived of ]"
"do not resemble any sensation whatever;"
thus making the perception of primary
qualities in their independant state, to be
the result of the sensations which those
primary qualities convey to the mind,
whilst the perception itself is not a sensation
of mind : — Considering perception of visible
figure, to be capable of existing without
such conscious vision being either an
idea, impression, or sensation ; conceiving it
possible, " immediately and objectively,'" to
perceive extension, hardness, figure, &c.
when yet the organs of sense are to be used
as a means of perception, and by whose
use, and in whose conscious living feel-
ing, there must be a modification of the
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 25
objects, which must at least add some-
thing unto them, or in some way alter
them from the state in which they were,
when existing unperceived ; overlooking
entirely a certain fact in his appeal to
the notions of the vulgar, concerning
their immediately seeing " the real sun
and rnoon," (and not an image, impres-
sion, or idea of those objects,) namely,
that the sun being blotted from the universe,
would still be seen eight minutes after its
destruction.
3. Hence may be seen the error of
Bishop Berkeley, who perceiving that
the sensations of qualities, (commonly
termed sensible qualities,) could not ex-
ist unfelt, concluded that " nothing ma-
terial could exist unfelt" so that " all the
"furniture of heaven and earth were no-
* ' thing without a mind ; " and as his follow-
ers conceive after him when they say,
"Time is nothing" "extension nothing,
solidity and space equally nothing /" That
such propositions are professed is not
a fancy, for 1 have heard the notions
c
26 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
maintained in the conversations of the
day, especially with regard to time,
which as it was concluded to be only a
quality in reference to a perception of
mind, so it could not, (it was contended,)
be a measure, adequate to the allotment
of any peculiar portion of existence, as
necessary to the attainment of certain
ends ; such as the possibility of the
events of a long life taking place in the
short space of a moment, of that twink-
ling of an eye, in which the eastern
prince, with his head beneath the water,
COULD MARRY, AND BECOME THE
FATHER OF A NUMEROUS FAMILY.
I have heard it maintained by able
men, that this Arabian fable is strictly
philosophical ; and in consequence of
such contradictory ideas, it is supposed
proved, that the author of it perfectly
understood, in that early age, the nature
of time, to be what these philosophers
consider it, a mere succession of ideas in
a mind*
* Bishop Berkeley's doctrine will be spoken of
afterwards.
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 27
4. Hence may be seen, that the popu-
lar and philosophical notions nearly
meet, for there must be a cause for every
effect, and therefore continually existing
causes for all the qualities ready to ap-
pear to the mind, upon the call of the
organs of sense and motion ; and these
causes must have the same proportions,
in relation to each other among themselves,
as the effects have to each other ; for the
senses and mind, (or powers adequate to
sensation in general,) being the same,
the cause for the sense of extension can-
not be the same as for the conception
of inextension. The sense and mind
being the same, the cause for a long
period of time, cannot be the same with
the cause for a short period of time ; and
time must be capable of being measured
externally to the mind, by whatever
could measure equality, such as the
beat of a pendulum, &c. ; and such a
measure in relation to other things, than
the succession of ideas, would measure
off what portions of it were necessary to
the existence of those things, in their
c 2
28 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
formation and continuance, whether
animate or inanimate ; and even were
there no creatures in existence, still this
capacity of admeasurement must exist as
a possible quality, capacity, or object in
nature. Thus the existence of time, like
every other existence in nature, is per-
ceived by some quality it determines to
the mind, but has not its whole exist-
ence merely in that individual perception.
It is the existence of things, and there-
fore of time, which enables them to be
perceived, not the perception of them
which enables them to exist. Never-
theless, it is the latter most absurd and
contrary proposition, (namely, that in
the perception of objects their existence
is contained,) which is the basis of a
modern philosophy ; which, however
contradictory even in its grammatical
statement, does not seem likely to be
overturned by observation and detection
at the present day. The very words,
perception of a thing, state a relation be-
tween two existences : whereas our
modern philosophers consider one exist-
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 29
ence as created in that relation, which
truly is a contradiction in terms ; and
one which Dr. Reid taking notice of,
felt thereby an offence offered to his
common sense; and one which he knew
would have the same effect upon the
minds of others, although he did not
succeed in detecting the fallacy by
which such offence was given.
5. It may here be seen, whence it is
that in dreams, we mistake the qualities
which present themselves for the qualities
belonging to the continuously existing ob-
jects of sense — it is because they are com-
bined in the same forms in which they
appear in a waking hour ; but on account
of our ignorance of remaining in the
same place during the time of the dream,
the relation of place is wanting to enable
us to correct the false inferences from
these vivacious imaginations, and view
them in their true character. They are
considered therefore as owing their ex-
istences to causes, which will respond to
every future call of the senses, A waking
30 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
moment shews, that on account of our
being in the same place during the time of
the dream, these objects will not be able
to fulfil their whole definitions; i. e. be
ready to appear upon the irregular call of
the senses, or be taken notice of by more
minds than one, &c. ; and therefore are
not the same objects which thus appear,
are not the objects of sense, but of
the imagination. The circumstance of
objects fulfilling their definitions, or not,
is what renders them real, or the con-
trary. It is not on account of the su-
perior order, variety, and force in which
they appear to the mind, as Berkeley
and Hume contend to be the case ; for a
real object is that which comprehends
all the qualities for which its name
stands. And dreams do not present
real things, because they cannot answer
all the qualities expected of them after
waking. Now because we perceive,
when awake, that sensible qualities are
no more than one set of the conjoined
effects flowing from exterior objects,
which when meeting with various other cir-
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 31
cumstances, are known to be capable of
determining the remainder of their qua-
lities ; we therefore refer them to such
compound objects as their causes, and
as capable of their further effects ; and
this reasoning is the step the mind takes
in arguing from the present sensible
qualities of things to their future proper-
ties, and that which Hume eagerly en-
quires after,* denying the possibility of
finding it.
It is not as Mr. Hume says, in the
case of bread, that the sensible qualities
of its colour and consistency lead us im-
mediately to expect nourishment, or are
its causes ; sensible qualities are effects,
and are always considered as such, and
antecede, no doubt, other effects, which
invariably follow, when the exterior
causes and objects are put in action to
that end.')' In dreams and insanities,
&c. this reference is made by the mind ;
* See Hume's Essays.
f See Essay on cause and effect, p. 121. Short
Essay, " Sensible Qualities," &c. of this publication.
32 OX CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
tor the sensible appearing qualities, the
vivacious images of things, are considered
to be what they usually are, in a waking
state : i. e. one set of the effects which are
determined by compound objects, equal to
fulfilling the remainder of their defini-
nitions, and therefore real, or usual ob-
jects, for which certain names hrst stood.
At the moment of waking, the under-
standing regains its ascendency ; and,
perceiving that during the time of the
dream, the mind had only been in one
place, it justly concludes, that therefore
the vivacious perceptions of sensible qua-
lities could not be .similar effects from
similar objects or causes, but partial
effects from partial causes, and therefore
must necessarily be mere delusions.
Wherefore new sets of sensible qualities,
which rush in upon the mind, are also
justly considered to be the true effects
from real, usual, continually existing
things, which now shall be capable of
fulfilling their whole definitions ; for they
do not appear to lie open to any objec-
tion to the contrary, whilst also the
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 33
superior accuracy of the whole sensations,
when compared with the former ones,
gives the mind immediate security.
And if in any other state of being than
this, all our knowledge of outward and
independant things could be proved to
have arisen only from an action of the
brain, and so this life should be shewn
to have been but a waking dream, (i. e.
the perceptions to have been in relation
to other causes than those imagined,}
still whatsoever should renew the me-
mory of past life, with the then present
sense, would continue the notion of our
own continuous existence, although we
might require further proof than what
we had enjoyed for the assurance of
the existence of other beings than
ourselves. But I can conceive no me-
thod possible of conveying the assur-
ances of other existences besides our-
selves, than such as is analogous
to what we enjoy ; for such assur-
ances must come through some means,
some notions in the soul, some reason-
ings, some probabilities. And if we will
c 5
34 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
always say, the notions are the things,
and the things separate from the notions
are not proved, it appears to me to ex-
clude the possibility of proof upon the
subject; for I hardly can conceive how
the Deity himself, in granting proofs to
us finite creatures, can go beyond afford-
ing us such sensations, and such relations
of sensations, as are capable of the in-
ference, that " in order to support the phe-
nomena, there must needs be other continuous
existences than ourselves ;" and that there
must necessarily be continually existing
causes, for every variety of sensation, which
continues either to exist or to appear.
Nevertheless, it is clear that objects are
real, or the contrary, independantly of
any speculations concerning the cause of
our perceptions; they are real, if they
fulfil the whole qualities for which their
names first stood — those are delusions,
which fall short of this, but which, on
account of their first appearances, are
taken to be the present qualities of such
objects, as will realize all the others,
upon trial : whilst the mind is in that
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 35
state which prevents it from detecting
the fallacy, by perceiving the circum-
stances are such, that it is utterly im-
possible they can be the original objects
for which certain names were originally
formed. In dreams, we detect these
circumstances on waking — in madness,
after recovery.
Now the qualities wanting for the
proper definitions of the objects, the ab-
sence of which prevents their being
continued, and external existences, may
be many ; but the chief one is, that
those objects called other men, do
not testify to their existence ; therefore
they do not fulfil the quality of out-
wardness, or the capacity of being
taken notice of by more than the per-
ception of one mind; and therefore these
cannot be the same kind of objects as
those deemed real, because they do not
possess all the qualities expected of
them.
6. Sixthly, in religion, those notions
which either alarm or console, are real,
36 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
or the contrary, according to their capa-
city of fulfilling their definitions, and
can only be proved so, when a future life
shall come ; because it is not enough to
prove them false, that their birth and
decay, the vigour, or faintness, depends
upon the organization and action of the
brain. The action of the brain is the
exponent of the powers of the soul ;
but every sensation of the soul is in it-
self simple ; and whatever in futurity
shall be sufficient to unite memory with
the then present sense, will render reality
of objects to its contemplation. It is of
no consequence what are the signs of
our ideas, or what ideas are the signs of
objects, provided they fulfil the qualities
for which their signs stand. The point-
ing of the compass is not itself the north
in the heavens, yet we know which way
to steer the, ship; and there is a real
north if upon the wide ocean, (notwith-
standing the inadequacy of our ideas
upon the subject,) we have so guided
our vessel as to find ourselves at last
" at the heaven where we would be.'
ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. 37
Thus if our notions here shall lead
us to a state of happiness hereafter, it
is immaterial whether the action of the
brain is partly the cause of our notions ;
or whether the future happiness shall be
inspired without a brain.
The objects are real, if they either
fulfil the positive hopes of virtuous
minds ; or inspire happiness by ways,
" such as the heart of man cannot con-
ceive."
7. It may therefore be concluded, in
contradiction to the idealists, who say,
that we can have no notions but of our
sensations or perceptions, and that exte-
rior objects not being sensations, we can
therefore have no notions of them ; that
by our sensations, (i. e. by our reasonings,
which are a certain set of sensations,) we
do have the notions of existences or objects,
which are unperceived or unfelt — nay,
we can have the notions of things which
have it not in their capacity to yield a
sensation ; such as of sound sleep and
death, neither of which was ever felt by
38 ON CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE.
any one ; yet the meaning of which we
perfectly understand, by the negative
ideas which stand as their signs, and by
the words which stand as the signs of
those ideas. And although it be true,
that " nothing can be like a sensation but
a sensation ;" yet by perceiving that ob-
jects unperceived cannot be like perceived
objects, by that very notion we do predicate
something concerning unperceived objects ;
and concerning our knowledge of them in
their unperceived state ; viz. that they are
not similar to our perceptions. And this
knowledge arises from a reflection, which
reflection is itself a sensation : and thus
it may be hereby seen that the whole of
our sensations does include our know-
ledge of continuous existences, which
are unperceived. For all our ideas are as
algebraic signs, which give evidence both
of their own existence, and the quantities
also signified; whose proportions among
themselves are known thereby, as well as
their positive values.
39
CHAPTER II.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
Section I.
1. Knowledge of external existence, how gained, 8fc.
2. The nature and differences of external objects,
how known ?
3. Varieties in the sensations, which are effects,
prove their causes proportionally various, fyc.
L We now enter upon the second
part of the question proposed, viz.
Whence is it that a judgment is formed
by the mind, that some of its sensations
or perceptions are exterior to, instead of
included in the mind, when it is manifest
that sensations are and can be only in
the mind — as for instance, a coloured,
figured, and extended object, is con-
sidered, by the generality of mankind, to
continue to exist after being perceived,
(although it should be obliterated from
40 OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
the memory, or left at a great distance,)
in its coloured, figured, and extended
state — although its colour, figure, and
extension be perceptions, and perception
be the affection of a sentient being?
I answer as before, that by reason
the mind judges that the causes of those
sensations in particular, which come
under the definition of external objects,
must needs be out of, and distinct from
the mind, or the cause of sensation in
general ; for the notion of outward exist-
ence does not suit the definition given to
inward existence : Inward existence is the
capacity for sensation in general; outward
existence is the exciting cause for some
sensation in particular. The one is the
very mind itself, or the power of thought
and feeling; the other is a motive, or
cause for a 'particular kind of it, and
therefore out of, and distinct from, the
continually existing essence of it. That is
inward existence, of which the individual
only is conscious ; that is outward, which
is in relation to the organs of sense,
and to motion, in order to be apprehended,
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 41
and must be met by them before it
becomes inward; and which is so situ-
ated as to meet the organs of sense, and
reply to the motion of others, (others
being supposed possible,) as well as our
own. But the peculiar sensations which
outward existences can create as their
effects, are the only forms under which
the mind can contemplate them in ab-
sence, or expect their reappearance after
separation ; which circumstance forms so
strong and indissoluble a connexion, or as-
sociation, between the ideas of the causes
and their effects, that they cannot be easily
disjoined from the fancy ; and never are
disjoined until philosophy brings in some
new light; shewing, that "perceptions
can only be in a perceiving mind," &c. ;
then an effort is made by the mind ;
and it readily allows, that colour,
warmth, &c. i. e. the secondary qualities
of bodies, cannot be outward', and for
the most part, goes on to a false conclu-
sion, that all for which those words
stand must be only in the mind ; where-
as, there must be causes for them, and
42 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
for every variety of them, exterior to the
mind's essence; and though when unfelt,
or unperceived, not like their sensations,
or perceptions ; yet incapable of being
conceived of, except under the images
of sensations, and as named by the
names given to these appearances. For
that which we call ourselves, and that
which forms any individual mind, is a
continued capacity in nature, which
yields a liability to sensation in general.
Then those we justly deem inward ob-
jects of thought, which are such, as give
no symptoms of being the qualities of
continued existences, capable of yielding
the same images to other minds than our
own, (such being supposed ;) and those
are outward objects, which, having nothing
in common with the capacity to sensa-
tion in general, must be out of, and not
included in it.*
* All these merely consist in being successive
effects; successive consciousnesses, which are but
changes resulting from prior and unconscious ob-
jects, uniting their qualities with those necessary
for sensation, in order to their formation — for inas-
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 43
Inward thoughts are also beings,
which when not thought of, and not
contained in any given state of the mind,
are nought ; but continually existing
much as the changes, must be changes on that
which continues to exist, (for any sensation passed
into oblivion cannot be changed,) so continuous
existence is known by inference, not by sensation ;
for every sensation passes away, and another is
created — but none of these, in its turn, could "be-
gin its own existence ;" therefore they all are but
changes upon the existences which are already in
being — they are effects requiring causes. But as
each mind could not change, unless interfered with,
therefore the interfering object is exterior to the
mind: — I have subjoined this remark, since writing
the above, on account of having met with M. de
Condilliac's et Traite des Sensations," which is at
once, one of the most profound and poetic produc-
tions. Nevertheless, I consider his argument as
not supporting his conclusions — for he supposes,
that during the period in which the statue contem-
plates the first and most simple impressions arising
from successive and various ideas, that the notion
of self will be generated from the perception of the
memory of successive scents merely. Now if the
statue considered self to exist in any memory,
or in any sensation merely, he would consider
self to be capable of being annihilated, and again
44 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
causes, ready to appear, upon the appli-
cation of the organs of sense, efficient
to the production of certain sensations
in particular, when operating upon the
capacity for sensation in general, are out
of, and distinct from, that is to say, not
included in that capacity.
If a mirror were conscious, then it
might know of its own constant exist-
ence, as separate from the objects
brought for reflection on its surface ;
and by comparing the method and order,
the appearance and re-appearance, &c.
of the rays on its surface, might under-
stand well enough, whether or not, they
belonged to continuous outward existences;
although it might argue, that it knew of
nothing but of incident and reflected rays ;
and that incident and reflected rays,
beginning of itself ; which would appear to it a con-
tradiction— for whenever it became capable of
reflecting on its sensations, it would consider self
as continuing to exist, and not to vanish for one
single moment during whatever change might arise,
and therefore as an existence independant of each
scent in particular, and so not included in odour
in general.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 45
were not continued outward existences.
The primary qualites, are subject to the
same reasoning as those which are se-
condary; and cannot be like the sensa-
tions their causes create. Every sen-
sation of mind whatever is an effect,
and may be considered as a quality.
It begins to be, and its cause which is
not a sensation cannot be like it, and
yet can only be conceived of under the
image it creates as its effect, whilst the
cause and effect being united by the
mind, the compound is named as one
object by one name.
Is it matter of surprise, therefore,
that a coloured, figured, extended ob-
ject, is considered as existing out-
wardly ; when the continually existing
causes, which are " ready to appear" to
the mind, under these forms, must in
order to account for certain existing
phoenomena, be judged to exist out-
wardly ? Is it matter of surprise when
the mind discovers, that although the
effects cannot exist outwardly, yet the
causes must, that it should be so startled
46 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
at the discovery as not to know how
to settle and arrange its belief on the
subject, and is filled with a thousand
fears concerning the consequences of
it? Hence various and inconsistent
theories all supported by names of au-
thority.
Thus some philosophers make God
create all the images at the moment they
appear in every mind.* Others conceive
there is a pre-established harmony be-
tween the qualities of the external ob-
ject, and our inward perception of it?f
One considers the sensations arising
from some of the senses, to exist out-
wardly ; but not those of others, arising
from the rest of the senses. J
Another gives up all outward exist-
ence whatever of objects and quali-
ties. § And some suppose that if there
be such things, that unless they be like
our sensations, they are not worth talk-
ing about. ||
* Malebranche. f Leibnitz.
X Reid. § Berkeley.
II Hume.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 47
Whereas it is evident, that in order
to the formation of all the effects pro-
duced on the mind, through the senses,
there must be efficient causes, not in-
cluded in the general essence of the mind ;
and these are " ever ready to appear"
and that in so clear, vigorous, and uni-
form a method, and fashion, as to the
appearances of figure, colour, and resist-
ance; or of sound, and taste; or of
beauty, and deformity; or of warmth,
and cold; or of happiness, and misery ;
or of vice, and virtue; that whatever
they may be, however unknown, they
may well be termed objects, outward ob-
jects, which the organs of sense, and
their associations reveal, according to
their peculiar bearings upon the mind.
I repeat it, therefore, that the unknown
causes of all our perceptions, are as the
unknown quantities in algebra, which
yet may be measured, valued, reasoned
on by their signs ; and the signs of
these outward objects are the sensations
they can create ; and they may always
be spoken of, and compared together,
48 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
as though they did truly exist, in these
forms in which they appear to the mind.
For as the power of sensation is simple,
and yet its kinds and degrees various,
when the kinds and degrees relate to
outward continually existing objects, fitted
to create them, they may be compared
in their bearings to each other, under
the " ideas and sensations" they appear
to the mind. Thus while the sentient
principle observes scarlet, and blue ;
these two colours may be compared
together as existences. Empty space,
and solid extension, are two sensations,
whose causes must have a proportional
variety, and may, therefore, as outward
beings, be examined as space, and so-
lidity. The same with every other
essence in nature ; for the organs of
sense and the mind being always the
same ingredients thrown into the com-
pound qualities presented to it, these
varieties may be argued on as they
appear, and are known to us when joined
with them. The senses and mind, also,
may be considered as measures of the
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 49
proportions of exterior objects, and the
measures being always the same, and
the quantities and proportions being-
considered as measured, the faculties
need not be strained to conceive of them
still as unmeasured. Thus it may be
seen the notions of the vulgar are not
so far removed from truth as it is sup-
posed. All men consider objects, as
continually existing outward beings, ap-
pearing to the mind through the senses.
Their only error is, their considering
them to exist outwardly under the in-
ward forms of the " ideas and sensa-
tions" they create, through the strength
of the associations.
Section II.
The notion of exteriority further considered. What
the phenomena are which generate the idea of
external existence.
But we must examine a little further
in what consists the notion of outward-
ness, how it is generated, and what
are those phenomena, which make us
D
50 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
conclude, that the continually existing
causes of our sensations are outward,
and not included in that object whose
definition we name mind ? Now, I ob-
serve, that having the word " outward"
we must have the ideas the word stands
for; and the ideas are negative ones.
For outward existence means, existence
not contained in the mind ; and nega-
tions of being in any circumstance,
when the relations of existing things
will not admit of the existence of the
being in question, are proved as a conse-
quence from these relations, as much as
the affirmations of the existence of be-
ings, are proved on account of other re-
lations. The sum, or consequence of
5 plus 5, is 0 in the place of the units ;
to shew there are no units expected in
their place ; and the idea of " no being,"
conducts our expectations aright with
respect to the total sum ; and the mark
the zero, conducts our ideas aright
respecting the particular difference, be-
tween this and any other number. In
like manner, from the phenomena it is
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 51
judged, that the continually existing
causes of those sensations called ob-
jects, are not in the mind, and so must
be out of it. But this piece of rea-
soning to justify the phenomena, is an in-
ward sensation, which testifies of the
existence of those things which are not
sensations, viz. " outward beings."
Section III.
The notion of exteriority further considered. The
phenomena which generate the idea of outward-
ness.
1. The consciousness of sensation being uninter-
rupted.
2. The comparison of motion with a state of rest.
3. That tangible objects are beyond the limit of the
skin of the body.
4. Exteriority as a sensation itself requires a cause
of which it is the effect — observations on Berke-
ley, Reid — the application of the doctrine of
cause and effect.
1. But what are the phenomena al-
luded to, which require outward exist-
ence in order to explain them 1
d 2
52 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
First, the consciousness before spoken
of, concerning the interruption in fact of
all the sensations of the mind, and yet
the necessity there should be some conti-
nually existing causes, ready to renew them ;
(else they would begin of themselves ;)
and which must, therefore, be external
to each sensation in particular, and its
cause.*
For although the images produced in
a certain associated train, which do not
require in order to their exhibition the
use of the organs of sense, we deem in
the mind, and present to the mind
during their exhibition ; yet the causes
of each of these previous to their ex-
hibition, are as much exterior to the
sensations themselves, and to the capa-
city of sensation in general, as are the
causes of sensible qualities, previous to
the sensation of sensible qualities. All
things not in any given state of sensa-
* It may be perceived that the notion of exter-
nality is not an hypothesis merely as Priestley sup-
poses, but is a conclusion the result of reasoning.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 53
tion of mind, but capable of having
their appearances determined there,
must truly have their causes exterior
to each sensation in particular, and to
every cause which may be necessary
and efficient to each particular differ-
ence.
The question, therefore, concerning
the reality of things, if put rigidly,
should be : — With respect to those things
which are out of the mind's conscious-
ness, whence is the proof of the con-
tinual rather than of the external exist-
ence of the objects, which are in rela-
tion to the five organs of sense ?
For the causes of the determination
of the illusions of dreams, &c. are out
of the mind, but they do not continue to
exist ; nor after an orderly and regular
manner remain ready to reply upon the
application of any regular instruments
whatever.
Now the organs of sense, (although
these powers should be considered as
merely a class of particular sensations,)
yet are the causes of introducing these
54 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
objects, which consciousness acquaints
us were previously not present to, and
in the mind. Also these externally
existing objects are the same upon com-
parison, as those which must conti-
nually exist on account of their regular
reply to the irregular calls of the organs
of sense, and thus are justly regarded
as continually existing outward objects,
ready to appear and to be introduced by
the organs of sense to the perception of the
mind. Inasmuch also, as the organs of
sense themselves are ready upon the
call of the mind to act as such causes,
so are they regarded as continuous
existences, and justly and reasonably
are so regarded ; and although their
immediate action be perceived, yet they
are known necessarily to continue to
exist unperceived, as instruments fitted
to their office, and ready to answer the
demands of the mind. So that the
whole reasoning of the first chapter in
behalf of continuous unperceived exist-
ences affords a like proof in behalf of
the continuity of the existence of the
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 55
organs of sense themselves ; and so
does the reasoning of this chapter in
behalf of their exteriority.
The organs of sense are by all au-
thors spoken of in a very vague
manner, and their external, continued,
and independant existence taken for
granted.*
Berkeley speaks of the " senses" in
the popular use of that word, and em-
ploys it very conveniently, in a man-
ner calculated to support a theory
contrary to his own ; for it is neces-
sary, indeed, in order to support
any theory whatever, to consider them
as something more than either " im-
pressions or ideas ;" or " ideas and sen-
sations in a mind perceiving them;" for
although their action be perceived, yet it
is not in this consciousness that they
exist as instruments of sense or by
which they act as causes. It is not
the feeling as if we were using the eye
which gives vision. It is the eye as a
mechanical instrument in relation to con-
* See Essay VI.
56 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
tinually existing external objects. The
same with respect to the rest of the
organs of sense as well as motion. It
is not the sensible qualities of any thing
which can be causes.* The sensible
qualities are always effects in the mind,
and cannot, therefore, stand out again,
and intermix with other objects as na-
tural causes ; and if it should be asked,
whence the mind knows itself to be ex-
terior to each sensation in particular,
and continued in its existence, I an-
swer from the same principle which
enables it to judge other things as
exterior to itself; namely, from that
perception of the understanding which
forces upon it the conclusion, that be-
cause each sensation in its turn va-
nishes, and new changes spring up, so
there must necessarily be some conti-
nued existence the subject matter of
these changes ; otherwise, " each change
would begin of itself.'"
Therefore the mind must be a conti-
nued and exterior capacity fitted to each
* See Essay IV.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 57
change, upon any present state being
interfered with by another object; and
thus the pronoun / is ever abstract : and
stands for a being exterior to, and in-
dependant of all the changes of which
it is conscious.
Now the mind always referring the
sensible action of any sense, to the me-
chanical action of its respective organ,
(as an effect to its cause), and consi-
dering this mechanical action as exist-
ing in relation to those other objects, or
causes, which are likewise needful to
introduce the ideas of sensible qualities
into the mind, does thereby truly per-
ceive and detect the presence of such
other objects as are external to, and
independant of mind in general.
It is thus by a union of observation
and reason, coalescing with the con-
scious use of the senses, that we are
enabled justly to affirm, that " outward
objects are perceived immediately by
sense."
Secondly, I consider another (and
that perhaps the chief) method which
d5
58 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
nature takes to impress the notion of
outwardness, to be by means of motion.
For the intimate sentiment of our own
existence, separated from the ideas of
our bodies, (which idea of body, again
includes the idea of motion along its
surface from point to point), has no re-
lation to space, or place ; thought, sensa-
tion merely, never suggests the occupation
of space as essential to its existence ;
the need of room, or of the distinction
of here and there. A dead body and a
living one, take up the same portion of
space. But the very impression of mo-
tion consists in the impression of pass-
ing through extended space, and as a
corollary with it suggests to the mind,
here, and there ; and whilst the mind re-
quires no place, nor space, to comprehend
it, the sensation of passing through
different points of space, suggests the
notion, or rather inspires the immediate
feeling of the extension of space, (or of
an unresisting medium,) but never that
of the extension of the sentient principle,
the self This space or unresisting me-
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 59
dium appears continually to exist, and
to respond regularly to motion, as other
objects do to other senses.* It is hence
the immediate consequence of motion
also to suggest the corollary that must
be included in its essence, that is, the
reality of distance or outwardness from
the sentient being, the self; which has
an equal relation to rest, and motion;
and, therefore, knows of outward exist-
ence, as it does of continued existence, by
a piece of reasoning ; viz. that it needs
must be in order to justify the possi-
bility of motion when in a state of rest,
as well as regularly to respond to its ac-
tion upon demand.
Therefore, the soul has the idea (or
conclusion from reasoning) of distance,
mixed with the sensible impression of
rest; which mixture gives occasion to
that just result and consequence, the
notion of outward and inward existence.
* Kant imagines time and space to be only modes
of the mind, which is mistaking the causes which
determine a mode of the mind with the effect, viz.
the mode of the mind.
60 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
Moreover, motion introduces sensations
of touch concerning objects, only seen
when at rest, and which are the same
as those which " continually exist ready
to appear upon the irregular call of the
senses."
But it must be observed further, that
the cause of motion, or unperceived
motion, is the essence of what motion
is in nature ; and in its unperceived
state, we know that it cannot be like its
effect, a perception ; all we know is,
that it is in its unperceived state, in
which it must act as a cause, and that
the perception of it must be an effect,
and owe its existence to a prior cause ;
because it is a dependant being, and be-
gins to be, even when wwrelated to us ;
for we know our sensation of it does not
cause it, therefore, something else does.
I shall here observe, once for all, that
all sensations, and all their varieties,
must have causes or objects in nature
as various as themselves which are the
effects of those causes, or the qualities
they occasion to the mind's perception.
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 61
Contrary qualities also must have con-
trary causes. Thus the cause for mo-
tion cannot be the same as that for
rest ; nor for one place, (whatever
place may be,) as that for a different
place.
Now the names for the qualities, may
indifferently be applied to the causes, or
external objects, or to the effects the in-
ward perceptions ; or to both together, as
compound beings. It is in the latter
sense they are always popularly applied,
and on account of which circumstance
there has been so much confusion in the
minds of philosophers upon the sub-
ject. Especially as it seems to me in
that of Dr. Reid.
It is, however, unavoidable that it
should be so ; for it is impossible to
name unknown things so well by any
other names, as by those given to their
constant and invariable manifestation.
The constant junction of the unknown
causes, and their known effects, forms the
reason why the compound is supposed
to be placed externally, and distant from
62 OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
the mind, as well as supposed conti-
nually to exist ; and in that compound
state, "to be readytobe called upon;" —
which, although the whole world should
think it, cannot in nature be the case.
For objects are minus the senses and
mind, and cannot be the same with
that state, or sum, in which they exist
when plus the senses and mind.
Thirdly, The notion of outwardness is
gained by the observation, that the
causes of such sensations, as require
the use of the organs of sense in order
to let their specific impressions enter
the mind, are out of, (i. e. not included
in,) the definitions and limitations of our
own bodies : and we consider that as
our own body, which is within a bound,
or certain limit, and is the source of
conscious pleasure and pain, and this
limit we call the skin, within which, is
contained all we call ourselves, and being
summed up, is the notion of the con-
scious sensation of the extension of the
body, and of a sufficient cause for life
and sensation in general. Because
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 63
without any impression from what are
called external things, or the use of the
organs of sense, the general sensation of
life can go on. But for 'particular kinds
of sensation the organs of sense are to
be used ; which organs are in relation
to things that appear beyond the skin of
the body, and which also require motion,
in order to apprehend their tangibility.
Now if the mind does not here reason
amiss, this method which nature takes
to impress the notion of outwardness,
also contains a proof of its reality.
For if a certain number of amassed
causes are sufficient for a portion of
sinsation in general, (say a mere sense
of life,) and some other causes are
wanted in order to excite particular
definite kinds of it, then these become
independant of each other ; and the
use of the organs of sense and the me-
chanical action of motion, being requi-
site to enable them to intermix with
each other, are such circumstances as
place them in that relation to each other,
as may be deemed distance. For it
64 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
must be ever remembered that words are
arbitrary, and we may name distinct
classes of sensations and their causes, and
the apparent limit of their causes, by any
name we please ; and they can be no-
thing else but what we do so name them ;
and such we may say shall be called
inward, and such other outward exist-
ence. Then the whole mass properly
put together again, (after all this excru-
ciating analysis,) becomes our own, and
other existences. It is owing to this
circumstance of the causes of particular
sensations being considered outward,
that we look to them as capable of being
useful or hurtful to us ; that for in-
stance, we consider there is a quality
in water by which we may be drowned,
instead of considering drowning, as only
a sensation of mind, (a necessary con-
sequence of an unmodified ideal system,)
whilst the perception of the mind by
which it fails not to take notice that it
can continue to exist, although this qua-
lity for drowning, which is a quality
tending to death, still continues to exist
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 65
in water, (ready to appear, if called
upon,) proves that the causes or objects
of these two existences must be external
to each other.
Fourthly. Also outwardness is repre-
sented in the mind as a sensation, (a
perception of a quality,) which as a
capacity in nature, admits of motion,
through an unresisting medium, towards
objects at a distance; and a power of
seeing this medium, by the difference of
its colouring in comparison of those ob-
jects. In this sense, it is a quality
common to all continually existing ob-
jects ; and although the inward sense
o£ it be a sensation, yet it must have
its cause ; and if it regularly return up-
on the senses as other qualities do,
must be concluded also like them " con-
tinually to exist " Moreover, things must
appear to the judgment and the senses
as outward, although inwardly conceived
of, and that in respect both of pri-
mary and secondary qualities ; because,
when unperceived, the proportions and
relations of things, must have their own
66 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
position to each other ; and these, when
meeting with a sentient nature, must
inspire the sensation of proportional po-
sitions. Now the limit of the conscious
feelings of pleasure and pain, marked
out by what is termed the skin of the
body, will be taken as a centre, or at
least as a certain defined point or stand-
ard to which other things will foe re-
ferred ; for the sentient nature itself
must, in the perception or imagination
of its own existence, become one of the
objects it surveys ; thus forming an in-
ward perceived knowledge of the relative
position of unperceived things. And
when the unperceived cause of a certain
quality called extension, is combined
with another for hardness, a third for
colour, a fourth for sound, a fifth for a
certain relation deemed distance, in re-
spect to the combined causes, for other
masses of extension, figure, hardness,
and colour ; a sixth, for a different degree
of distance, to what we deem or term
our own body : it necessarily follows,
that all qualities of continually existing
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 67
objects, taken notice of by the senses,
must be perceived outwardly, i. e. com-
bined together in select masses, sur-
rounded by that common quality called
outwardness, which quality continues
to exist, extern ally to the capacity of sen-
sation in general. Now I repeat there is
one sense in which it may be said that ob-
jects are perceived immediately, as ex-
isting outwardly, by the senses. It is this ;
the conscious powers of the understanding,
and the senses, are blended together in
man ; we are analysing them, but in na-
ture they are united as intimately as are
the prismatic colours in one uniform mass
of light. This being the case, they are
acting in concert when any object
affects the senses. Therefore the un-
derstanding knowing the simplicity of
mental sensation, it follows, that the
varieties of the causes, (which create
varieties in the effects,) are instantly
perceived and detected, and that immedi-
ately with the conscious use of the
senses ; whilst also the mind as imme-
diately mixes that idea of which the un-
68 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
derstanding is aware ; viz. that these
varieties, as complex objects, continue
to exist unperceived and independant,
when unnoticed by the senses. The
vulgar also, and all men in a popular
way, unite with these notions, the con-
stant and equally present sentiment,
that the varieties are like what the
senses render them, by a very natural
and almost indissoluble association of
ideas. Berkeley never affixed the names
of objects to any thing, but the com-
bined sensible qualities which the or-
gans of sense helped to form ; omitting
the idea of their constant ability, to
return upon the sense when called for,
and of outwardness being equally a
regular attendant upon their appearance,
and a capacity in nature necessary to
their existence in relation to us, and to
our own in relation to them ; which
circumstances are included in their names.
He wrote his theory of vision to obviate
an objection that might be made on the
score of "visible distance," in order to
prove it to be a sensation of mind only,
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 69
suggested by tangibility, &c. ; but this
would not do to explain away that con-
dition of being, which, when unperceived,
must be a proportional relation and va-
riety amongst unperceived objects, and
capable of affecting the touch, sight,
and other senses in its own way. This
he omitted purposely, in order to have
nothing to do with the causes and objects
which create sensations, until he came to
explain them after his own notions, as
necessarily active, and therefore spirit.
His method of incomplete definition,
and naming only the combined sensible
qualities the effects of things, when all
men name them as united with the per-
ceptions of the understanding, and the
observations of experience, is the reason
why his philosophy seems at once plau-
sible, contradictory, and unanswerable.
Hume denied that " reason" could prove,
by the relation of our ideas, the know-
ledge of continued existences, and re-
solved all into " custom and imagina-
tion." Whilst Dr. Reid, when he
asserted, that the primary qualities are
70 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
conceived by clear ideas of them as they
exist when unperceived, and unlike any
sensation they yield, was not aware that
he explained these conceptions of un-
perceived qualities, by other qualities
which still require the senses, in order
to their formation ; and therefore such as
could only exist in a sentient being.
Thus he explained " hardness," as " a
firm cohesion of parts ;" "figure" as
"the relation of parts to each other;"
— " visible figure," as "the relation of
parts in respect to the eye;" "sound"
by " the vibrations of the air," &c. &c. —
as though these things, after being per-
ceived, could be planted as they appear
to the inward sense and consciousness
of the soul, outwardly again, as inde-
pendant modes of existence, and ob-
jects of contemplation ; as though the
very system he is arguing against does
not suppose cohesion, parts, vibrations,
figure, &c. &c. &c. to be perceptions,
which are inward ; because all percep-
tion is conscious, and all consciousness
is inward and sentient ; thus assuming
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 71
as his premises the very idea which is
in question ; and which premises involve
the difficulty his argument is raised to
answer.
It is matter of surprise to me that
Mr. D. Stewart should call this "lumi-
nous and logical reasoning." Dr. Reid
all along considers " extension, figure,
and motion, as instinctive simple con-
ceptions of understood qualities of ex-
ternal matter."* Now the doctrine of
the relation of cause and effect, as I have
considered it in my former essay, throws
light upon this part of the subject, and
would, I think, if it once became fami-
liar to the mind, explain the whole mys-
tery of external and internal existence.
The union of the three following
things are required to form the prox-
imate cause for that great effect, the
formation and combination of those aggre-
gates of sensible qualities usually called
objects ; namely, first, the unknown,
* See '< the Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 42.
72 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
unnamed circumstances in nature, which
are unperceived by the senses ; secondly,
the organs of sense, whose qualities mix
with these ; and thirdly, the living,
conscious powers necessary to sensation
in general.
In this union, and with it, is the cre-
ation and production of all sensible complex
qualities called objects, such as we know
them. These objects are what Berkeley
calls " ideas," and " sensations in the
mind " what the ancients perhaps called
species or phantasms ; what the moderns
call images, ideas, &c. And they all,
as I think, err in this, in considering
them as first formed, and then contem-
plated, and taken notice of afterwards.
Whereas, the sensible qualities of things
are only formed by being taken notice
of. This is what Berkeley means when
he says, " what are objects but the
things we perceive by sense;" and so
far I perfectly agree with him. But
then he has omitted the consideration of
that circumstance, which is necessary to
OX EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 73
our belief in the existence of objects in-
dependant of ourselves ; and that is the
quick suggestions of the understanding ;
the reasoning, that as sensation does
not itself form the essence of those ex-
istences Which CAUSE PARTICULAR
kinds of sensations ; therefore there
must be existences without it; that
sensation not causing the variety of its
own perceptions, therefore there must
be variety without it; that various ex-
istences must be ready in order to be
perceived, and that these must lie under
various positions in relation to each other,
as well as to the mind ; that sensation
is but as a thin gauze, through which
things are seen in their native propor-
tions, although it imparts to them a
similarity of colouring.
Nor let it be thought that children
and peasants, &c. are not capable of such
observations ; nature translates these
operations of mind into easier language
than I have used, and mixes them from
a very early age, as joint powers with
E
74 ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.
the senses ; by which the practised senses
may perceive, (as I have explained above,)
that objects are not only inward sensible
qualities, but exist unperceived conti-
nuously, outwardly, and independantly
under the imagination of their appearances
to the senses ; — thus forming that com-
plete whole, which is termed the per-
ception of outward and inward existence.
If it be possible indeed that in nature
the causes for sensation in general,
should be mixed up with those parti-
cular kinds of them which yet need the
aid of the organs of sense and of motion
for their exhibition, then indeed, when
that we call ourselves shall fail, the exter-
nal universe shall also fail ; and as such
a proposition is wholly without proof,
so is it beyond the utmost stretch of
imagination to conceive : whilst by
keeping these causes separate and inde-
pendant of each other, the understand-
ing, the senses, and the imagination,
the notions from infancy to age, and
those of all men, without one dissenting
ON EXTERNAL EXISTENCE. 75
voice agree, — philosophy and ignorance
equally agree, — that all objects are to be
considered as outward of, and distinct
from each other, and that they may
indifferently be changed, without effect-
ing the destruction of the whole mass.
e 2
76
CHAPTER III,
THE NOTION OF THE INDEPENDANCY OF
EXTERNAL OBJECTS, HOW GAINED?
1 . The same evidence for the independancy as for
the exteriority of objects.
2. Change of qualities proves them to be inde-
pendant of the senses.
3. Some objects appear both like ourselves and dif-
ferent from us, Sfc.
1. But it is time to enter upon the
third and last member of our question.
Whence is it that we consider objects
as independant of the mind, when we
can only know them by our sensations,
which sensations are beings dependant
upon the mind's capacity ?
I answer, first, That those circum-
stances which go to prove that there
must be truly outward causes, for par-
ticular sensations, prove them to be
independant causes of those sensations.
EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 77
For such causes or objects as are entirely
exterior to the cause or capacity for sen-
sation in general, must be independent
of such capacity.
But, secondly, those objects which are
in relation to the five organs of sense
and to motion, are considered inde-
pendant of each individual capacity for
sensation, because such alter their qua-
lites, and seem some of them to suffer
pleasure and pain without our observa-
tion of the change of qualities, and
without our consciousness of these sen-
sations. If we endeavour to regain a
thought by reflection which has been
out of the mind, such thought never
exhibits any quality which renders it
probable to have existed in an unob-
served state. — But with respect to those
objects which are " ready to appear to
the senses," we observe they have gone
through changes of qualities, the process
of which was not observed by us, and
which changes therefore, must be in-
dependant of any part of ourselves ; and
not being perceived, cannot be caused
78 INDEPENDANCY OF
by our perception, and must therefore,
be wholly independant of it.
Thirdly, Objects are reckoned inde-
dendant of ourselves, because they ap-
pear like ourselves plus or minus the va-
rieties of qualities ;* and we to ourselves
are independant of others, and are
minds, beings, capable of sensations.
And this I consider as the chief
ground of all our belief in a plurality
of minds, as well as other objects from
infancy ; for similar sensations are similar
objects, and the varieties make the va-
rieties; and we, in the sensation of our-
selves perceive continuous existence, that
might exist independant of others : then
we have sensations of other objects like
ourselves, but have not conscious conti-
* Bishop Berkeley has this idea when applied to
the existence of other minds than our own. The
reasoning is equally forcible when applied to any
kinds of beings and their qualities. This shall be
further taken notice of elsewhere. See Essay 1st.
of the shorter essays.
I find an unexpected coincidence of thought
here with Mr. Mill in his pamphlet on Education,
EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 79
tmous sensation of their existence. We
do not feel their pleasure and pain, but
they give symptoms of feeling like our-
selves conscious continuous existence,
pleasure and pain, Sec. Therefore, we
look upon them as masses of qualities
like ourselves, other human beings in
existence, and so on, according to the
varieties of sensation, i. e. various causes,
equal to, and commensurate with various
effects.
If it should be objected, that lost
thoughts which reflection recovers, are
not considered as independant beings ;
I answer, thoughts recovered bv reflec-
tion, are perceived to be in the mind at
the moment they are seeking for ; and
by following a train of associations, we
only clear away any confusion respect-
ing them, and they never indicate by
any circumstance whatever, that they
continue to exist when not perceived by
the mind ; — therefore, they are not like
ourselves, but seem to be only relations
or accidents of others of our thoughts
which are objects within ourselves :
80 INDEPENDANCY OF
So the organs of sense modify objects
continually existent, ready to appear upon
the irregular calls of these organs, and
which are outward from the body, and
whose causes are independant of the cause
for sensation in general : — But reflection
helps to form clearer ideas of confused
thoughts, which are not " ready to ap-
pear upon irregular calls of the organs of
sense" are not exterior to the body, re-
quire not motion to be apprehended as
tangible, and whose causes seem inter-
woven with the general cause for the
associations of our ideas ; which asso-
ciations and their causes, are dependant
upon the whole being deemed ourselves,
ceasing in sound sleep, and reviving
with the waking hour. Thus the in-
struments of the five organs of sense re-
late to outward, independant, continually
existing beings ; but reflection relates to
inward, dependant, interrupted beings.
Fourthly, We gain the notion of the
independancy of objects, from the ob-
servation of one object affecting many
minds in a manner which renders it im-
EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 81
possible there should be as many ob-
jects as minds. If five men see a pond,
and can only walk round one pond, then
there is one pond seen five times over,
not rive ponds ; so the pond whatever
it may be when unperceived, must at least
in its unperceived state, be independant
of, and I may add external to all the
minds ; for if the pond were only in the
mind, there would be five ponds, and
every person who perceived a pond
would create another pond, and yet
this multitude of ponds in perception,
would in many respects but merit the
definition due to one pond. Thus there
would be such a contradiction among
the " ideas and sensations," that the
mind must come to the belief of only
one pond, seen by five persons; that is,
in other words, an independant cause for
particular sensations. This objection to
his doctrine Berkeley answers, in a very
unsatisfactory, hesitating manner in his
dialogues.
Fifthly, The relations of abstract
ideas are upon the same footing as out-
e5
82 INDEPENDANCY OF
ward objects with respect to their re-
maining when unperceived, independant
for their existence, of the existence of
the mind itself. This continuance of
the relations of ideas, ready to be per-
ceived when called upon by the intel-
lect, and independant of its powers for
either forming, or perceiving them, al-
though contained in the juxta-position
of the simple ideas themselves, (whether
perceived or not, or whether called for
or not,) is what must ever render the
pure idealists, most inconsistent in their
doctrine. Because the very position,
" We know nothing but our per-
ceptions," is, if only a truth when per-
ceived, of no force as an axiom that is
to govern our understanding when not
adverted to ; when not a sensation or
perception, it would be nought, — leaving
thereby all objects of the understanding
and the senses equally unproved as
to their existence ; and therefore still
liable to be disputed and argued upon
according to the different impressions
they make in a perpetual circle, with-
EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 83
out the mind ever being able to come
to any settled determination concerning
them. — For we must observe concern-
ing abstract propositions, that we gain
the notion of their truth being inde-
pendant of the immediate perception of
them by observing, that our discovery
of their truth does not cause them ;
they are discovered, and perceived,
because the relations exist ready to be
perceived : It is their existence enables
them to be perceived, not the perception of
them which enables them to exist; and
whenever the relations are as clear as
are the original simple impressions, their
existence is upon the same footing of
certainty, and is demonstratively equal
with them.
It is such a perception of the relation
of ideas as this, which affords us the
abstract notion of existence in general
whether sentient, or insentient ; — for
we knowing that each sensation as it
springs up passes as shortly away, and
being equally convinced that it cannot
have begun its own existence, but must
84 INDEPENDANCY OF
have been a change of some existence
which already is j and yet that each
particular sensation is not always de-
termined to the mind ; we judge rea-
sonably there must needs be some existence
which is ?ieither any sensation in par-
ticular, nor yet a mere capacity for
sensation in general, in order to' be
the cause of each particular sensa-
tion. Therefore, by such comparison
of ideas we gain the notion of indefinite
unknown existence ; whether as a ca-
pacity for sensation in general, (not yet
under a state of sensation,) or as va-
rieties of qualities capable of exciting
that capacity, through the organs of
sense. Indefinite existence, as contrary to
the iston existence of which we have
the notion by our ideas successively
passing away, thence becomes the genus,
of which each class of the sensations we
experience is the species or variety.
This is an observation which to my
mind completely answers the difficulty
some at present make, when they say ;
" that sensation is the only existence
EXTERNAL OBJECTS. 85
of which we have experience, and
therefore we cannot separate any ex-
istence from the idea of sensation"
For we can always separate or abstract
the most general quality of an object from
the rest, whether that quality be sup-
posed among them by the imagination,
known to be among them by the senses,
or concluded to be among them by reason,
as a result from their mutual bearings.
By such means it is, that the idea of
independancy is generated : an idea,
which as a new and superinduced sen-
sation, stands for the thing signified by
it ; and for which we have formed the
word independancy ; and by such means
it is, that the curious workmanship of
nature has enabled us from thoughts
which are necessarily interrupted, in-
ward, and dependant beings, to gain
the knowledge of continued, external,
and independant existences.
Thus, I hope, I have answered satis-
factorily the original question,* by shew -
* " Why we attribute a continued existence
" to objects even when they are not present to the
86 INDEPENDANCY OF OBJECTS.
ing that in the sum of our combined
sensations (viz. the perception of our sim-
ple impressions, and their relations,)
there is contained the knowledge and
proof of the existence of " body" and
of the external universe.
" senses ;" and, " Why we suppose them to have
" an existence distinct from the mind, i. e. exter-
" nal in their position and independant in their
" existence and operation."
87
CHAPTER IV.
OBJECTION ARISING TO THE FOREGO-
ING DOCTRINE FROM THE PHENO-
MENA OF DREAMS, FURTHER CONSI-
DERED AND ANSWERED.
Section I.
The phenomena of dreams does not afford a valid
argument against the proof of independant
existences, external to mind.
If the phenomena of dreams and mad-
ness be objected to the foregoing theory,
on account of their objects being sup-
posed by the mind, to be continuous,
external, independant existences, dur-
ing their exhibition ; let it be remem-
bered, that these objects are not capable
of fulfilling their definitions, and that
the very reason they are considered in
a sane and waking state as delusions,
is, because the mind perceives that its
88 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
powers of comparison were not during
the dream in a state to observe such an
incapacity.
These powers being restored, the
mind immediately takes notice that on
account of several relations of ideas,
which had been obliterated presenting
themselves, these objects must be inca-
pable of shewing all their qualities ; —
they will not affect any more minds
than one with the notions of their ap-
pearance ;— those which are objects of
food will not satisfy hunger ; — of injury,
will do no hurt ; — of good, will afford no
pleasure ; &c. — It is when objects fulfil
their whole definitions, that they are
real; and when they do, it does not
appear to me possible, but that their
causes, (or the objects which are neces-
sary for the formation of those sensations,
and to which the senses and motion are
relative), must be wholly independant of
mind ; — for when similar objects are per-
ceived at the same time by more than
one mind, they must necessarily be ex-
ternal to each. The only difficulty is
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 89
to gain a demonstration, that in our
perception of any of the relations of our
ideas concerning the existence of other
men, their absolute existence is in-
cluded.
I consider however the arguments
I have used, approaching as nearly to
it as possible if rightly understood.
For it is not enough that the causes for
sensation in general, continue to exist
and to be independant of the parti-
cular causes which excite particular
notions; because these latter might ne-
vertheless be dependant on them; and
this is the case in dreams : But the
particular exciting causes, for particular
sensations (termed the perception of
qualities,) must prove themselves ca-
pable of continuing to exist, inde-
pendant of the other powers of sensa-
tion in general.
Now this condition, men as well as
other objects fulfil, by replying to the
irregular calls of the senses and motion ;
and we perceive that such a circum-
stance affords a proof of such indepen-
90 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
dant continuous existence ; because as
the absence of our minds, whether
during sleep, or on a journey, &c. makes
no difference with respect to " the rea-
diness of those objects to appear if called
for ;" so neither could the supposition
of our death. And this relation of our
sensations is so obvious, that all men
perceive it, and act on it from infancy ;
and there is no occasion to have re-
course to " instinct" or " primary laws
of belief/' &c. to account for their faith
in outward continued existences.
The objects therefore (unlike the sensa-
tions they create, whether fitted to ex-
cite the complex ideas of other men, or
any other set of perceptions,) which are
capable of regularly answering to the irre-
gular call of any of the organs of sense,
must continue to exist unperceived,
and independant of the causes of per-
ception in general.
Dr. Berkeley concludes more from
the phenomena of dreams than they will
bear out, and what he says is too re-
markable not to be transcribed. On
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 91
the other hand, Dr. Reid's notion of
extension, seems to me unfounded, am-
biguous, and vague, from apparently
taking no notice of the exact similarity
there may be, (even as to vividness and
every other attendant circumstance,)
between our sleeping and waking per-
ceptions of sensible qualities.
Section II.
1 . Remark on Bishop Berkeley's conclusion from
dreams, shewing a fallacy in his reasoning thereon,
as affording a doubt concerning the reality of
objects,
2. Application of the doctrine of cause.
1. Bishop Berkeley says, (sec. 18.)
" What happens in dreams, frenzies,
" and the like, puts it beyond dis-
" pute, that it is possible we might be
" affected with all the ideas we have
" now, though no bodies existed with-
" out resembling them." " Hence it is
" evident, the supposition of external
" bodies, is not necessary for the pro-
" ducing of our ideas, since it is granted
92 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
' they are produced sometimes, and
( might possibly be produced always
* in the same order we see them in at
' present, without their concurrence."
(Sec. 20.) " Suppose, what no one
' can deny possible, an intelligence
' without the help of external bodies,
' to be affected with the same train of
' sensations and ideas that you are,
' imprinted in the same order, and
' with like vividness in his mind. I
' ask whether that intelligence hath
' not all the reason to believe the
' existence of corporal substances re-
' presented by his ideas, and exciting
*' them in his mind, that you can pos-
f sibly have for believing the same
* thing." I answer to this, that I do
not consider it as possible for a person
to be affected with the same train of
sensations, and in the same order in a
dream, or frenzy, as out of them ; pre-
cisely similar effects must have precisely
similar causes, and in any case where
not only resembling sensible qualities
take place, but an order occurs which
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 93
enables them to return regularly; — and
the mind is in a state to compare and
observe upon the senses, then the ar-
gument holds good, which shows that
^e causes of the sensible qualities exist
independantly of the senses and mind,
and continue to exist nnperceived ; — and
neither such an use of the organs of
sense, nor such returns upon them, nor
such an order, nor such comparison of
ideas takes place in dreams, and fren-
zies. In short, the sensible qualities
form the sensible objects ; but it is a
reasoning arising out of a perception
of the relation of these qualities ; — of
the different position of colours in re-
lation to motion ; — of the knowledge of
the place where we are, &c. by which
external continuous existences are prov-
ed ; a reasoning which Bishop Berkeley
uses in proof of the independant exist-
ence of separate minds, and which rea-
soning and which minds he does not
think can belong to dreams and fren-
zies, &c. It is by unobserved and ap-
parently slight changes of words and
94 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
their meanings, that so great a writer
and reasoner as Berkeley could deceive
either himself or others. — Let us however
analyse a little more accurately the re-
markable sentences above quoted, " It is
possible we might be affected, with all the
ideas we have now, though no bodies ex-
isted without resembling them ; what
happens in dreams and frenzies puts
it beyond dispute."
Now the reason it is put beyond dis-
pute that there are no external bodies
resembling our ideas in dreams and
frenzies, is because what happens in
those states of mind, proves there are
no CONTINUOUS INDEPENDANT Objects,
either resembling, or unresembling the then
ideas of sensible qualities ; and which
can therefore be capable of fulfilling
their definitions. According to Berke-
ley's own theory, they do not arise even
"from the actions of a spirit, according to
that set of rules deemed the laws of nature."
But nevertheless, it does not follow that
even for these ideas, external qualities
must not originally have been in need ;
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 95
a man born blind may never have that
action of the brain and mind deemed
colour ; yet after the use of the eyes,
colour may return, though blindness
take place ; and this would hold, whe-
ther external colour were a resemblance
or a non-resemblance to inward colour.
But Dr. Reid errs on the other side ;
for that all the sensible qualities whe-
ther primary, or secondary, can in
dreams be the exact counterparts of the
sensible qualities in the waking hour is
a circumstance, which to my mind
yields a complete conviction, (and in it-
self contains an absolute proof,) that they
are equally upon the same footing as
being " ideas of sensation ,"* when holding
a place in the mind's consciousness ;
and that our knowledge of their causes
as continually existing as well as our
future expectation arising out of that
knowledge, depends upon a reasoning
which cannot take place in dreams and
frenzies ; for those other ideas such as
place, <§*c. which ought to be compared with
* See Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind,
sec. vi. chap. vi.
96 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
them are not in the mind; they a?\
as it were, J:hey are not in being.' The
sensible qualities are therefore taken for
the real things ; i. e. as some of the
effects arising from such external can
whose aggregates will be capable of de-
termining their remaining qualities.
The phenomena of dreams touch upon
the difficulty there lies in the mind de-
tecting the presence of exactly similar
objects when it perceives only some of
their qualities,* and is not in a state to
unite the ideas of the understanding
with the perception of sensible quali-
ties, which union alone renders objects
worthy of bearing their names. Hence
it is. that if men reasoned as Mr. Hume
says they do from sensible qualil
merely, they would be or maim
Young children, very ignorant perse
men m dreams or frenzies consider the
conscious ^sensible qualities of things, as
effects indicative oi similar objects, be-
cause they have not present in their
minds those notions of the understand-
* See the shorter Essay. " That Sensible Q.
ties cannot be Causes."
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 97
ing, those ideas of their methods of for-
mation, of the place in which they are, &c.
and which being compared with the
consciousness of the sensible qualities,
shew whether they are masses of like
effects from like ultimate causes, or not.
The true reason why external resem-
bling objects cannot be necessary for pro-
ducing ideas, is because it is impossible
that the external object, which is al-
lowed not to be an idea, can resemble an
idea, in that particular quality of its
conscious sensation.
But again, Bishop Berkeley says, —
" Hence, it is evident the supposition of
external bodies is not necessary for
the producing of ideas." This is not
evident, for the word, " resembling "
being dropt, alters this inference from
being &just conclusion from the premises.
Objects — external objects ; i. e. objects
not one with the mind, nor included in
any particular state of its sensation,
may, and according to my theory, must
be necessary for producing those ideas
98 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
which are exhibited as changes upon such
a state. Nay the real, plain, matter of
fact is, that objects external to mind are
needed even for illusory ideas ; for all ideas
whatever, and their causes, are external
toj (i. e. not included in,) any particular
given state of sensation, and its cause.
For any particular given state of sen-
sation, mixed with the consciousness of
our own continued existence, and the idea
of its continually existing cause, forms
the compound idea called self; but the
particular causes for new ideas, are not
contained in these, and so are out, and
distinct from th em .
And hence it appears that the essential
difference between the particular causes
for illusions, and the particular causes
for realities consists only in the latter
being continually existent: for both
must be external, and neither can be re-
sembling.
Therefore it is required that objects
should be not only external, but continu-
ally existent, in order to be in relation
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 99
to the organs of sense, and to produce
such ideas of sensible qualities, as in a
sane and waking state of mind proceed
in a regular " order," and by different
laws than the irregular fancies of dreams
and frenzies. It may thus be demon-
stratively proved, that it is " impossible
to be affected with the same train of
sensations, in the same order as a sane
waking person experiences them, and
yet these be conducted after the same
manner, and by the same causes as
dreams and frenzies are." Like effects
must have like causes ; either the organs
of sense are not wanted, or they are
wanted for the regular exhibition of
qualities ; in dreams and frenzies they
are not wanted for the formation of the
irregular fancies of sensible qualities ;
but upon the supposition that the organs
of sense are used, they must be used in
relation to some objects which are cor-
relative to them, and which Bishop
Berkeley clearly shows cannot be like
the qualities they are the means of form-
f2
100 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
ing.* This answer is further supported
by the following considerations.
1. That it is more than probable that
such dreams, &c. could not exist, unless
outward objects had acted previously
on the senses.
2. Because we cannot imagine, that
to a mere lunatic illusory call of the
organs of sense there could be a regular
reply, unless God were to work a mi-
racle for the purpose, which it is absurd
to suppose.
3. Such an illusive order of ideas in
one man's mind, could not render them
capable of appearing to more minds than
one, if more than one were but supposed in
the universe.
4. Because physically and physiolo-
gically speaking, there is upon the per-
* That they can resemble ideas in some general
qualities, which are independant of the organs of
sense. See Recapitulation.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 101
ception of every lively forcible image,
a peculiar action of the circulation, which
is natural and consistent with health,
when arising from what are called out-
ward objects. Whilst the perceptions
last, their proximate causes may be con-
sidered as a set of temporary, but
strong excitements ; — but when their
ultimate causes are removed, the per-
ceptions vanish, and with them the
excitements. Now if the desires of the
mind which seek their objects irregu-
larly, were during a dream to be an-
swered as vividly, forcibly, and regu-
larly as when awake ; some circum-
stances would be equivalent to the fol-
lowing contradictory action in the sys-
tem ; namely, to an irregular demand of
the organs of sense, and yet the capacity
for a constant ready reply to them ; that
is, a quiet, healthy action of the system,
and an intranquil, inflamed action, both
in unison together.
In other words, it does not seem pos-
sible and consistent with health, that
the circulation should be capable of car-
102 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
rying on such an action of the system,
as should be equal to render life a
waking dream ; i. e. that within its own
powers it should be capable of acting
regularly, as well as vividly; and of
performing without disturbance the
stimulus, of which outward objects are
supposed the occasion.
5. Because it appears impossible in the
way of dreams and frenzies, that "all"
the ideas we have, and all the "order"
of them, could take place ; the appe-
tites of hunger and thirst not being capa-
ble oj satisfaction in this way : — at any
rate, the ideal theory, and its contrary,
are always understood, to be argued
upon the supposition, that the organs of
sense and motion are truly used, and that
they afford by means of their conscious
use, the evidence termed, perception Z>y
sense.
It is not sufficient therefore for the
exhibition of the phenomena of waking
life, that there should merely exist some
irregular sensible qualities, resembling
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 103
those which may result from the action of
the organs of sense and motion. Their ac-
tion must be truly used ; there must be the
true and unperceived mechanical action of
the five organs of sense ; and there must
be a mechanical, unperceived passing of
the sentient principle, the self from
place to place ; and this action of the or-
gans, and this motion must be in rela-
tion to those things which fulfil their
whole definitions. And it is of no conse-
quence what place, space, motion, and
external things are when unperceived ;
they are conditions necessary to a result
— therefore the real action of the organs,
and the true motion of an individual mind
must create a change of self, in relation
to objects which continue to exist as the
exciting causes for certain sensations or
perceptions in particular ; independant
of, and distant from, the powers of sen-
sation in general.
The detection of such an action be-
tween the organs of sense and the objects
of nature, arises from the conscious use
of the organs mixed with the powers of the
104 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
understanding; for a stream of conscious
life, however many, and separate and
independant causes may be necessary
in order to supply it, yet would appear
merely as the idea of self; such causes
would properly and truly determine an
individual self, and the consciousness of
self as their single combined effect. But
whatever conscious applications were
made to any other existence, power, or
quality in nature, as necessary regularly
to introduce new ideas and sensations
upon this conscious self, would prove,
that such qualities, powers, and beings,
were wholly unnecessary to the existence
of, and therefore no part of self. The five
organs of sense, and motion, are such
means of application, and therefore, the
use of them, and regular returns upon
them, afford the criterion of the presence
of other exterior and continuous objects
than self; and is the only way in which
the phrase " evidence of sense," can with
propriety be used. Motion is thus a sort
of sense ; for motion will ever appear from
infancy upwards to be an action in rela-
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 105
tion to that space which is outward; i. e.
an existence not included in the perceiv-
ing mind : the child will consider its arms
and legs as part of self; but the place
in which he moves, the capacity of na-
ture which allows him to move, which
he by consciousness knows is not
always in him, but is always ready to
return upon the use of his arms and
legs, he rightly reasons or perceives is no
part of himself, his mind, or conscious
existence ; but yet must necessarily be
always existing in order to be ever ready
to respond to his motions, and to enable
him to use his members without re-
sistence.* I say, the infant perceives
* Since writing this essay, I find that Mr. Destutt
de Tracy has many ideas which I am happy un-
consciously to have hit upon ; but his argument is
more confined than mine ; — for whereas he consi-
ders body to be known as a result of that sensation
of mind called a judgment, from the comparison of
the ideas of will, and resistance to will; so
I enlarge the number of such sorts of judgments, by
the comparison of many other ideas, which I think
it is clear are made from the earliest infancy,
and even perhaps by the foetus before birth.
FO
106 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
this relation amidst his " ideas and sen-
sations " though he cannot analyse or
express it, any more than some others
who are far removed from infancy.
Therefore, it is the unperceived ac-
tion or use of the organs of sense which
relates to exterior and continually exist-
ing objects, and is the means of deter-
mining their qualities to the sentient
principle ; and it is the consciousness of
their use which forms an argument by
which men justly infer such permanent
existences, and renders valid the phrase,
" perception by sense;' for the conscious
Added to this, none of the notions are the result
of any circumstance which proves the continuity,
and independancy of existences, as well as their
exteriority. The former quality must be blended
with the other two, in order to the formation of
REALITIES.
Condillac and De Gerando fall into the same
mistake ; none of these show any thing beyond the
action of such accidental circumstances as deter-
mine will and its sense of resistance — even in
dreams.
These authors contain therefore no efficient an-
swer to Berkeley.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 107
use of the organs of sense is rightly to be
considered as the effect of their unper-
ceived mechanical action, and this action
as in relation to the appropriate objects
which affect them : Therefore when the
mind is conscious of the use of the eyes,
the hands, &c, and of regular replies to
their use, — it knows that there are other
external continuous existences than it-
self present ; and thus the immediate
action of the understanding uniting with
the conscious use of the organs of sense,
together form " the perception by
sense," and that of a different " order"
of beings from those of dreams and fren-
zies.
If the organs of sense (and motion)
were not truly used, Berkeley's own
theory would fall to the ground, because
they are, according to him, " necessary
for the spirit to work on by set rules and
methods." But if the order could go on
as in dreams, they could not be needed.
" In the manner of dreams and fren-
zies" therefore, there is no use for
organs of sense, neither are they used.
108 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
There exists, indeed, some sensible ap-
pearances upon the mind, as if the
senses had been in use ; but in that
state there is a deficiency of the ideas of
the understanding, so that images of
sense, appear together confusedly with-
out order in the mind, which is not in a
state to perceive that they can be but
fancies.
But in a waking and sane state of
mind, the harmony of its ideas, their
relations and conclusions, force them-
selves upon it with a superior and con-
vincing evidence ; which in ordinary
life is not weakened by those sceptical
suggestions, which a consideration of
the strength of the delusion in dreams,
prompts to the more curious enquirer.
A scepticism only to be corrected by
the reflection, that it is not justified by
reason,, or by that comparison and rela-
tion of our ideas, which of whatever
difficulty in the performance, can but
remain the only method in our power of
finding truth, or of forming any propo-
sition whatever.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 109
Section III.
Remarks on Dr. ReioVs neglect of the consideration
of the phenomena of dreams in notions of ex-
tension, fyc.
Now on the other hand to return to
Dr. Reid, when he asks, " if extension,
" figure, and motion, are ideas of sensa-
" tion" (saying he gives up the material
world, if the question be answered
in the affirmative,) he forgets that in
a vivid dream these ideas may take
place as perfectly as when the mind is
awake ; — he forgets that every percep-
tion of sensible qualities whatever must
be a species, of which sensation is the
genus, and can only be the attribute of
a sentient being. By an illusion arising
from the association of ideas, he joined
the notions of the sensations of the
sensible primary qualities, (of our sense
or consciousness of extension, figure,
and motion,) with the idea of their con-
tinually existing external causes, as ex-
isting together outwardly. For although
110 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
he explains himself in some places as
concerning external objects not to be like
sensations ; — yet he still keeps the notion
by saying, that perceptions, or conceptions
are not sensations ; and that he knows the
external nature of a primary qua-
lity, as well as its inward sensation ; as for
instance, in extension, where the sensa-
tion of moving along a surface, is unlike
" the hard cohesion of parts sticking to-
gether." Now paints, hardness, and
sticking, are three " ideas of sensa-
tion" also, and can never explain
the nature of the external* quality, any
more than does the moving along a sur-
face.
Thus he considers extension, figure,
motion, and solidity, to be qualities of
bodies, which are not sensations; of
whose real nature when unperceived, we
have a distinct and clear conception : —
Now, there are perceptions of sensible
qualities ; and perceptions of their re-
lations by reasoning, yet both ere but
species of sensations. The perceptions
of sense, neither immediately, nor me-
FURTHER CONSIDERED. Ill
diately as signs of conceived qualities,
can ever tell us of their positive nature
when unfelt, whether they be primary
or secondary. The perceptions of reason,
will tell us, that there must necessarily
be exterior objects, and that these must
be as various as the sensations they
create. But this notion was certainly
not that, under which Reid contemplated
extension, figure, and motion; for he
never hints at it. No ; he truly thought
the senses could suggest the conception
of the nature of the real essential pri-
mary qualities of matter, without such
conceptions becoming sensations, whilst
the understanding was satisfied it was
legitimate so to do, because " instinct"
compelled the mind to such a conception,
and resolved the notion into a " pri-
mary law of human belief" which could
not be disputed without disputing a
first principle.* — Yet the material world,
* Against such a doctrine as this, there are few
perhaps who might not find a conclusive argument,
derived from the experience that every quality what-
ever (however considered in a waking state as be-
112 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
the universe need not be annihilated,
although primary qualities {after the
senses have taken notice of them) should
be " ideas of sensation ;" as long as
the whole " furniture of heaven and
earth" (whatever that furniture may be
unperceived,) fits out all its variety of
causes and of unperceived objects, to
coalesce with the organs of sense and
with the powers of sensation in order
to its production.
Thus, what Dr. Reid calls common
sense, and considers erroneously to be a
sense or instinct, is no more than an ob-
servation of the simplest relations of our
ideas. — It is but a simple inference of the
longing to external things,) equally appears in
dreams. There will arise extension, figure, motion,
hardness, and softness ; heat, and cold ; colour, and
sound : Will, and the resistance to will, whether
by the resistance of solidity, or the wills of other
men.
It is this observation which shews that no con-
clusive evidence can arise from the arguments of
M. de Condillac, and M. Destutt de Tracy, De
Gerando, &c. for the reality of an independant, con-
tinually existing universe.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 113
understanding, after the observation that
the use of any organ of sense is needful
to let new ideas into the mind, that the
mind itself was not the object of those new
ideas, and that necessarily a third object
must be the occasion of them. There-
fore, together with the perception of the
coxscious sense, (which takes notice
when it is affected,) there is the percep-
tion of the understanding, which ob-
serving that the sense not being affected
by what is properly termed our mind, or
the mere capacity for sensation in gene-
ral, the things which are affecting it,
must necessarily be some other beings,
extraneous to both : but this inference
which by habit immediately accompa-
nies the conscious use of the senses, is
knowledge rather than instinct.
Now those beings which do not yield
any signs of mind or capacities of sensa-
tion, but exhibit upon our minds solid
extension and other qualities in parti-
cular, are termed material things ; —
whilst such beings as yield the notion
of their possessing life and understand-
114 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
ing, are termed immaterial things. As
far as these conclusions go, philosophy
or the scrutiny of the most rigid analy-
sis will support " common sense," or the
simple relations arising from our original
impressions ; — but since added to these
conclusions, ordinary understandings
conceive by a very natural association
of thought, that the ideas of sensible qua-
lities after the organs of sense have com-
bined with exterior objects to their for-
mation, are the very external material
objects themselves; it is the business of
an analytical philosophy, which intends
to shew the entire method of the gene-
ration of our notions, to break up this
association. For an association of ideas
merely, will never prove the existence
of objects. A notion the fallacy of
which some philosophers seem not to be
sufficiently aware of.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 115
Section IV.
Dreams considered in connexion with the doctrine
discussed in " the Essay on the relation of cause
and effect;" viz. How the mind may form a judg-
ment antecedently to trial of future effects from
present appearances ?
Upon the whole, therefore, although
the appearances in dreams afford a
ground for scepticism concerning the
reality of external objects, yet this is
only on account of the difficulty there
is in answering the question, " By what
" means we can know antecedently to
" trial, how bodies shall fulfil the ex-
" pectations raised by their appear-
" ance." This question is agitated and
answered as well as I found myself
capable of doing, in the Essay on Cau-
sation ; where it is discussed, " by what
" means we can detect the presence
" of like compound causes ?" for the
objects in dreams and madness, appear
the same in all present qualities, as real
ones ; but they will not fulfil the ex-
116 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
pectation of the future qualities their
appearance is calculated to create. The
same difficulty presents itself in all with
which we have to do ; for as truly similar
objects would necessarily appear the
same, so where there is an appearance of
similarity, we always consider it as a
guiding circumstance by which to form a
judgment of the future. In a sane and
waking state, we compare such a cir-
cumstance with many others, of which
when in a dream or frenzy we are in-
capable.* In the forming of our judg-
ments upon this head, there is displayed
every variety of intellect, through every
gradation, from that of an almost total
absence of it, to the wisest determina-
tions, resulting from the soundest under-
standings.
But it is equally left for the idiotcy
which is deficient in ideas, and that
kind of philosophy which purposely sets
them aside, to conceive the sensible qua-
lities of things to be other than " signs
of those secret powers' which may be
* See Essay on Cause and Effect.
FURTHER CONSIDERED, 117
capable of exhibiting their further qua-
lities, provided they appear to have
been formed by such methods, as must
necessarily determine objects similar to
those, which have been heretofore so
formed.
The only notion which can create a
scepticism upon this head when applied
to the objects of our waking ideas, is
the impossibility of knowing by ex-
perience, whether the exterior causes of
our ideas are so completely independant
of our minds, that they will continue
when these fail ; i. e. whether they are
capable of the qualities of such com-
plete exteriority and continuity of exist-
ence, that there be no common bond of
unperceived union in their respective
essences.
And if, indeed, the causes for specific
sensations in particular, were necessarily
mixed up with those which determined
all sensations in general, in any one indi-
vidual, the universe would be dissolved
in the dissolution of such individual,
118 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
which is inconceivable; although I
hardly dare say we can perfectly demon-
strate the contrary.
In that case something would bear
that relation to our waking and sound
state of mind, which the brain does to
a sleeping or insane one. Still we can-
not in the least apprehend it ; and we
are forced upon a dilemma, something
analagous to what the mind frames in
order to judge of the cause for the ro-
tation of the seasons ; either, we say,
" The sun moves round the earth, or,
the earth round the sun;" the mind
chooses to believe in the latter member
of this dilemma, and never doubts
after. So, the universe is contained
in the existence of a single mind, or
there are many minds, and many ob-
jects which form the universe, and
which have means to exhibit their
existences on each other.* The latter
* I find this idea is coincident with one of Priest-
ley's, but I was not aware of his treatise until after
the writing of this.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 119
member of this dilemma, the philoso-
pher chooses equally with the peasant,
and never for one moment conceives,
that on his death, an universal blank
and non-existence will succeed.
Mr. Hume, who perceived that Bishop
Berkeley's doctrine led to so monstrous
a conclusion, owned however that it did
so ; and although he embraced it, yet
he freely confessed that he never acted
as if he believed it, " for that the spe-
culations of the closet were forgotten in
the world, and that he behaved as if he
thought things were truly external to
him." This confession adds no strength
to their doctrine, and may well embolden
one who pretends not to their learning
or genius, to shew where was the omis-
sion unknown to themselves in the
course of their reasoning.
But, however this subtle part of
the question may be answered, it does
not, in any degree, lessen the demon-
strative conclusions of the foregoing ar-
guments, namely,
120 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS
1st. That things must continually
exist in order to be ready constantly to
appear.
2ndly, That the causes for particular
kinds of sensations, must be external
to the causes for its general essence or
power.
3rdly, That what is termed the mind
is a continually existing essence, capa-
city, or power in general.
4thly, That what is deemed in the
mind, is any particular state of sensa-
tion at any given period.
5thly, That the causes of things not
in any given state of the mind, and yet
capable of exhibiting certain qualities
upon it, are out of it, whether fitted to
create ideas of sensible qualities, or any
other ideas.
Gthly, That consideration is the appro-
priate method to regain the ideas of
memory, &c. but
7thly, That the organs of sense are
the instruments by which to regain the
ideas of sensible qualities.
FURTHER CONSIDERED. 121
8thly, That of all those things which
are out of any particular state of mind,
those which regularly exhibit sensible
qualities upon the use of the organs of
sense prove themselves continually exist-
ing, by such exhibitions.
9thly, That in dreams, &c. there are
no such regular returns upon the organs
of sense; therefore, though the proxi-
mate causes of sensible qualities exhi-
bit their effects, yet there is wanting
the proof of the continual existence of
such causes, by which means they are
discovered to be illusions, or objects,
different from those for which their
names were formed.
lOthly, That the independancy which
the causes of the objects of sense have
of the capacity to general sensation, is
proved by their affecting changes of
qualities, of which the mind has no
conscience. — But I shall finish this long
discussion by remarking that this, and
similar essays are not intended to prove,
that there is but one method which God
and Nature could employ, to arrive at
G
122 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS, &C.
the same ends ; but rather to analyse the
complex operations of our minds, with
such care and nicety, as may show what
possibly consistent method has been
used in the generation of our belief of
external nature ; and afterwards to exa-
mine if reason will support the notions,
which have been formed concerning it.
I shall therefore now proceed to draw
that inference from the whole doctrine,
which was originally the foundation of
the observations in this treatise; and
which although so long deferred, must
at length claim that share of our notice
its importance demands.
123
CHAPTER V.
ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS WHEN
ACTING AS CAUSES.
The action of cause to be considered as external to
mind. — Remark on the vague and popular use of
the word Cause. — Sensible qualities not the causes
of other sensible qualities. — Two kinds of neces-
sary connexion.
I resume the subject therefore by call-
ing upon the reader's attention to ob-
serve, that objects, when contemplated
singly as the efficient causes of nature,
are to be considered in their outward
unperceived state, and as yet uncon-
joined with each other.
2. That although numbers of objects
may be needful towards any result, yet
in a popular way, each may be called
g 2
124 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS
the cause of an event, when each is ab-
solutely necessary in order to that result.
Philosophy does not get rid of an incom-
plete manner of thinking on this sub-
ject, and thus talks of cause and effect
following each other, &c. &c. ; whereas it
is the union of all the objects absolutely
necessary to any given end, which forms a
new object, whose new qualities are the
effects, ox properties of those objects when
uncombined ; and which must be syn-
chronous with the existence of the newly-
formed object; and only subsequent to
the existence of the previous objects,
when in their uncombined state. — But
the entire union of the objects, is always
considered, and is the proximate cause of
any event ; and therefore is one with it.
Now all the exterior and uncombined
objects, whose junction is necessary to
an event, may be considered as one
grand compound object ; and may, un-
der that idea, be termed and spoken of
in the singular number : and when con-
templated previously to their union may
also be considered to be prior in the
WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 125
order of time, as the cause of a future
object.*
In all our reasonings, the word cause
is rendered ambiguous, by applying it
equally to a part of what is necessary to
an end, as well as to the whole of what is
necessary ; and to existing objects
united to that end, as well as disunited
to it; a fruitful source of much unsound
reasoning in some of the best authors.
3. The ideas and sensations of the
sensible qualities of things, can never be
the causes of other sensible qualities of
things.-^ It is not the sensible qualities
of fire which burn, of bread which
nourish ; it is not the idea or conception
of the cohesion of parts which cause the
sensation of hardness; — it is a certain
number of amassed, unknown, external
qualities, which determine to the senses
different qualities as conjoined effects —
" The sensation of hardness is not a
" natural sign of an external quality of
* This I do presently, in speaking of identity.
f See Essay VI.
126 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS
" firm cohesion of parts unlike a sensa-
" tion."* — It is a sign only of another
coexistent effect with itself determined
from the same unknown, external object.
This impossibility of sensible qualities,
being the productive principle of sen-
sible qualities, lies at the root of all Mr.
Hume's controversy concerning the man-
ner of causation ;| for he, observing that
such ideas could only follow one another,
resolved causation into the observation of
* See Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, c. 5,
sec. 5, " Let a man press his hand against the
table," &c.
f It is this view of things which explains the
reason of all the difficulty, inconsistency, irresolu-
tion, and unsatisfactory discussions upon cause,
laws of nature, &c. in the writings of Stewart, Reid,
and others — Even Mr. Prevost, who clearly per-
ceives Stewart's ambiguity in assigning the same
meaning to the word cause, as to other antecedents,
fails to perceive wherein lies the true nature of
power ; wherein consists that manner of action be-
tween objects, by which there arises " the producing
principle" of other objects. See Stewart's Philoso-
phy of the Human Mind, c. 4, sec. 1, to p. 333.
Note O, to ditto, vol. 2, Appendix to ditto, art. 2.
Reid's Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 24.
WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 127
the customary antecedency and subsequency
of sensible qualities. But objects, when
spoken of and considered as causes,
should always be considered as those
masses of unknown qualities in nature,
exterior to the organs of sense, whose
determination of sensible qualities to
the senses forms one class of their effects;
whereas philosophers, (with the excep-
tion of Berkeley,) and mankind in
general, look upon the masses of sensi-
ble qualities after determination to
the senses as the causes, the antecedents,
the productive principles of other masses
of sensible qualities, which are their
effects or subsequents ; a notion naturally
arising from the powerful style of the
associations in the mind, and which
our Maker has ordained for practical
purposes ; — but monstrous when held as
an abstract truth in analytical science.
In a loose and popular way, men un-
doubtedly conceive the sensible qualities
of a loaf of bread for instance, which
are determined to the eye and the
touch, (through intimate association,)
128 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS
as existing outwardly, along with the
natural substance or particles of bread ;
and consider, that that whole will nou-
rish them ; but this notion is very dif-
ferent from conceiving that whiteness and
solidity will nourish ; they never do thus
think ; they never consider the sensible
qualities alone as the true causes of
nourishment ; and if allowed to think
and explain themselves upon the sub-
ject, would show that they supposed the
same mass which outwardly determined
by its action on the eye a particular
colour, and to the touch a certain con-
sistency, would, on meeting with the sto-
mach, satisfy hunger :— In short, concomi-
tant, or " successive sensible qualities,"
are considered by all men when they
come to analyse their notions, (and
ought to be so held by philosophers,)
as concomitant or successive effects,
arising from the different actions of an ex-
ternal independant object, meeting either at
the same time, or successively, with different
instruments of sense with which it unites. —
Thus, the antecedency and subsequency
WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 129
of certain respective aggregates of
sensible qualities, must necessarily be
invariable in like circumstances ; for
they are successive and similar effects, from
successive and similar causes, instead
of the succession itself forming essential
cause and effect. Whiteness, consistency,
and nourishment, are as many invariable
and successive effects, arising from an
unknown object, exterior to the instru-
ments of sense, and independant of
mind ; which, formed after a certain
fashion, and meeting successively with
the eye, the touch, and the stomach,
determines its successive sensible qua-
lities.#
Thus it is in like manner through-
out all nature ; — and such a view of the
subject would cure the error, which
has of late crept into the works of sci-
ence ; namely, the considering con-
joined or successive effects from a com-
mon cause, as possessing the nature of
the connection of cause and effect.
" When things are found together, an
* See Locke.
g5
130 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS
" ultimate law of nature is * supposed
"to be found/' and an enquiry after
cause as a productive principle, proves an
ignorance of that new and improved light
which the labours of Mr. Hume, Dr.
Browne, and others, have thrown upon
the doctrine of causation. Whereas,
causes, or objects, previous to their
union with the instruments of sense
and the powers of sensation, from whose
junction are created the very sensible
qualities themselves, must be exterior
to, and independant of both ; whilst
the regular successions of sensible qualities,
are in their turn entirely dependant
upon the regular successions of such
junctions.
4. The necessary connection therefore
of cause and effect, arises from the obli-
gation, that like qualities should arise
from the junction, separation, admix-
ture, &c. of like aggregates of external
qualities. But the necessary connec-
tion of invariable antecedency and subse-
* See Lawrence's Lectures, from p. 80 to 84.
WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 131
quency of successive aggregates of sensi-
ble qualities, arises from the necessity
there is, that there should be invariable
sequences of effects, when one common
cause (or exterior object) mixes suc-
cessively with different organs of sense,
or various parts of the human frame,
&c.
Of this obvious and important distinc-
tion, between these two kinds of neces-
sary connection, the authors alluded to
take no notice.
But I must now advert to an observa-
tion of another description, it being not
only necessary for the sake of clearness,
but also immediately relevant in this
place, where we are speaking of the
different notions we form of objects ;
i. e. when we consider them as masses
of unknown, exterior qualities.
I allude to the proper definition and
use of the word idea — upon which the
whole of the foregoing treatise has an
influence;* and the understanding of
* M. de Condillac most justly observes, " that
" there is a great difficulty in finding a fit place for
132 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS, &C.
which will greatly facilitate the compre-
hension of the mystery intended to be
unfolded to whoever has sufficient zeal,
curiosity, and patience, to undertake a
second perusal of these pages.
" important definitions — If they are entered upon
" too early, it is before their analysis proves their
" propriety — If too late, the just views they may
" include, are wanted in vain for their purpose." —
This is precisely the case in which I find myself
with respect to the definition of the word idea.
133
CHAPTER VI.
OX THE USE OF THE WORD IDEA IN
THIS TREATISE, AND CURSORY OB-
SERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE AND
PROPER USE IN GENERAL, &C.
Section I.
The word idea is used as signifying a distinct class
of sensations ; as a sign in relation to continuous
existences not present to the mind ; — Berkeley's
ambiguous use of the word. — Objects in the mind
compounded of sensations, {by means of the or-
gans of sense,) and Ideas the result of their re-
lationsper xeivedby the understanding. — Evidence
for the existence of the different parts of the same
object unequal. — Objects of memory how com-
pounded.— The continuous existence of an indivi-
dual mind, or self, an inference from the relations
which exist between the idea of remembered exist-
ence, and the sensation of present existence. — The
idea of existence in general, how found as an ab-
straction from each sensation in particular,
I use the word idea, as signifying a distinct
class of sensations, being the result of that
reasoning or observation which shows
134 ON THE USE OF
that under certain conditions, there must
needs be an existence when we cannot
perceive it. In such is included the
evidence for memory of the past ; of such
is compounded expectation of the future.
Thus we have an idea of continual, un-
perceived, independant existence ; — but
only have a consciousness or sensation of
dependant, interrupted, and perceived
existence ; whenever I have used it in
any other sense, it is in a popular man-
ner signifying notion or object of thought,
&c.
Berkeley used the word idea ambigu-
ously, for the perception of combined
sensible qualities called an object; and
for a result of reasoning which yielded
him an idea that there must be causes
for his perceptions ; which causes he con-
sidered the actions of a spirit. Thus the
word idea has been indiscriminately used
both by him and others, for the conscious-
ness of the sensible qualities, which arise
from the use of the organs of sense, in
relation to external beings, and for the
conclusions of the understanding, after
THE WORD IDEA. 135
surveying the various relations and cir-
cumstances, attendant on these sensible
qualities. Now objects in our conscious
apprehensions are compounded of each
of these kinds of ideas; or rather of
sensations of sensible qualities, and sensa-
tions of ideas. — They are not only blue
or red, sweet or sour, hard or soft, beau-
tiful or ugly, warm or cold, loud or low ;
but the ideas of their causes are included
in their names as conti?iually existing, and
that even when the organs of sense are
shut.
Had I not been fearful of interrupting
the main and important object of this
Essay, by diverting, and perhaps en-
grossing the reader's attention in enter-
ing on the scholastic and unsettled dis-
pute concerning the meaning of the word
idea, I should have followed the sug-
gestions of a strict philosophy, by more
fully developing the notion, that all con-
sciousnesses whatever ought to be ranked
under the one generic term, sensation;
and that these should be divided into
the sensations of 'present sensible qualities ;
136 ON THE USE OF
sensations of the ideas of memory, sensa-
tions of the ideas of imagination, sensations
of the ideas of reason, §c.
Thus simple sensation has many vari-
eties of kinds. When it refers to no
other existence than itself, it should be
considered as sensation properly and im-
mediately. In this sense we have the
sensation of an idea; but then idea
refers to an existence always considered
independant of sensation ; which idea is
only its sign, representative, image, or
whatever name it may please philosophy
to term it. Therefore our sensations in-
clude the notion of existences, which
have existed, may exist, will exist, must
needs exist, but whose qualities are not
presently determined upon the mind.*
* A strict Idealist who really will not admit the
knowledge of any thing but his own sensations,
and thus refuses to believe in insentient qualities,
ought, if consistent, to reject memory of the past
and expectation of the future, and to admit nothing
but each sensation as it rises as an existence ; for the
existences (i. e. the sensations) which are past, and
to come, are as much and entirely exterior to, and
independant of, present sensations, as any insen-
THE WORD IDEA. 137
Objects of memory are compounded
of the fainter sensations of sensible qua-
lities, mixed with the idea that the
causes of the original impressions are
removed ; (the which idea is the re-
sult either of observation or reasoning ;)
these again are united with the per-
ception of the lapse of time, or of our
own continuous existence going on be-
tween the original moment of the im-
pressions, and the existence of the pre-
sent faint sensible qualities. Therefore
the objects of memory are, masses of sensible
qualities plus the idea of past time, plus the
idea of having been caused by causes now
removed. And thus the idea of tim e is not
itself a mere sensible quality ; for although
the present moment be but a sensation of
tient existence whatever can be of sensation in
general. Both may be known by receiving the
evidence arising from the comparison of ideas, but
they must stand or fall together. — I insert this note
in consequence of a late conversation with a modern
Idealist, who carries the notion so far as to assert,
that there is no evidence for any existing sensations
but his own.
138 ON THE USE OF
immediate existence ; yet the past mo-
ment is only remembered in the present ;
and the memory of it is its idea, and not
the very sensation itself: and this me-
mory o£ past existence, and this sensation of
present existence, includes in their union a
corollary, which is the result of a relation
that exists between the idea of remem-
bered existence, and the sensation of
present existence ; namely, that there
"must needs be" a continued capacity
in nature, fitted to unite memory to
sense, and fitted to continue existence,
which itself is neither memory nor sense ;
for each particular memory, and each
particular sense passes away — but the
powers of memory and sensation in ge-
neral continue to exist, of which each
particular memory and sense arises as a
change, and " a change could not begin
of itself."* — " Thus the notion of time
* It is this primeval truth, " That no quality
can begin its own existence/' which is the key to
every difficulty that concerns the sources of our
belief or knowledge.
M. de Condillac's system, (which I have read
THE WORD IDEA. 139
is an idea the result of reasoning ; but
time itself is a capacity in nature fitted
to the continuance of any existence."
Again, ideas of imagination are faint
images of sensible qualities unmixed with
any notions concerning time ; whose causes
are considered as at present removed
from their operation on the senses ; and
variously compounded by the influence
of fancy, or rendered more or less viva-
cious by its power.
Thus the objects of memory and
imagination differ as to the nature
of their component parts, and not
since writing these papers,) notwithstanding its
extreme beauty of conception, and close reasoning
in general, falls in my judgment very early to the
ground ; for he supposes the statue " to generate
the idea of self by the perception of the succession
of faint and strong scents only." This is a most
important oversight — Self is always considered
as a continuity, and is generated by the sense of
continuous life, and the idea of its continued object
which is the subject matter of all the changes. — So
well was M. de Condillac aware that this notion
was necessary to prove exteriority, that he shifts his
ground in the chapter upon touch.
140 ON THE USE OF
merely as to the comparatively higher
vivacity of those of imagination: — A
puerile notion, on which however Mr.
Hume has reared the whole fallacy of
his system with respect to that belief
by which expectation of similar future ef-
fects arises upon the presence of similar
causes. — He argues, that because what
are called real things yield vivacious
images, therefore the mind considers all
vivacious images as real ; and thus be-
lieves in those future qualities of things,
which are associated in a lively manner
by memory with present impressions.
Berkeley has also this fallacy in an-
swering the objection made to his doc-
trine when his adversary advances, that
mere ideas cannot be real things, namely,
" That the superior order and vivacity
" of some ideas above others make the
" whole distinction between what the vul-
" gar deem real, or illusory objects"
Now vivacity being one of the qua-
lities usually accompanying the objects
which impress the sense, it must neces-
sarily belong to such, as a component
THE WORD IDEA. 141
part of their whole effects, and there-
fore, other things being equal which
influence the judgment, vivacity of sen-
sible qualities, will as one of their
effects be ever referred to such objects ;
and the remainder of their qualities
will be expected to be fulfilled in con-
sequence. Belief, therefore, (in this
case,) and expectation in consequence,
arises, 1st. From the necessity that like
effects should have like causes ; and
2ndly, From the probability that such
should be conjoined with such apparent
causes as those with which nature usually
unites them ; and therefore will fulfil
the remainder of the definitions, which
the complex exterior objects bear: and
this trust in the regularity of nature in
forming her compound objects alike, is
on account of regularity itself being an
effect which must have its equal cause.
So little is merely a vivacity of image
trusted to in a sane and waking state
of mind, as indicative of the real pre-
sence of the exterior objects which in-
fluence the sense, that the mind, in
142 ON THE USE OF
many cases, perceiving surrounding cir-
cumstances differ, justly doubts upon this
matter.
Then thirdly, the ideas which are the
result of reasoning testify, as mere signs,
the existences of things, which are not
sensations.
Now objects in the mind are aggre-
gates of the sensations of sensible qua-
lities, and of the sensations of the ideas
of memory, reason, imagination, ex-
pectation, &c. variously compounded :
And hence there arises a reason why the
evidence of the certain existence of different
parts of the same object must necessarily
be unequal. For the sensible qualities
have an immediate incontrovertible evi-
dence, from the consciousness of their
immediate presence. — They are felt —
and the feelings are themselves the very
existences. — But the evidence from me-
mory, and reason, can never rise higher
than memory and reason are capable of
testifying.
These sensible qualities equally exist
in an hallucination of mind, as in its
THE WORD IDEA. 143
sane state, and however incongruous
they appear they do and must exist;
but if a conclusion be drawn amiss in
reasoning, if the memory be treacherous,
or the judgment erroneous, then in such
cases, these false ideas being mixed
up and associated even with the most
clear and orderly set of sensible qua-
lities, would render the evidence for the
existence of such an object, (or aggregate of
various qualities,) ambiguous and unequal.
Thus it cannot be denied but that the whole
objects present to our consciousness,
contain parts of unequal evidence as to
their existence; some of which some-
times failing, yield a just ground of
scepticism ; — a scepticism, which how-
ever, should never rise higher nor ex-
tend further than the irregularity of na-
ture justifies ; for as is the effect, so is
the cause — the balance of regularity,
and irregularity, we hold in our hands ;
these are effects, and their causes must
hitherto have been equal to them, and
unless some interference is observed,
or supposed possible, should reason-
144 ON THE USE OF
ably beget in the mind a proportional
reliance for the future. But if in any
instance whatever, there had been hi-
therto perfect regularity, yet it would
not thence follow there were an equal
demonstration for the future ; and that
because we are ignorant of the cause
for the regularity ; and cases might be
supposed in future to occur, where a
difference would be absolutely neces-
sary in the apparent course of nature, or
providence to take place. We have
very strong evidence which goes to
prove that single varieties, to otherwise
universal experience, have taken place
with respect to both kinds. That is,
there have been single exceptions to uni-
versal experience, which seem to have
had no precise end in view, nor to have
contributed to any end whatever; and
THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN OTHERS
WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE USE OF, AS
MEANS TO AN END, AND WHERE MOST
MATERIAL EVENTS HAVE ENSUED IN
CONSEQUENCE.
The former kind, when well attested,
THE WORD IDEA. 145
men seem not to find any difficulty in
believing ; — of the latter they are in-
finitely more incredulous and jealous
in receiving the testimony. — Indeed,
it must be allowed that a marvel-
lous event becomes a very different object
of attention when it presents itself to
our notice, not merely as singular of its
kind, and one whose causes are not obvi-
ous, but, also as one which by its manner
of 'production, forces the mind upon the
inference, that as the apparently imme-
diate cause is inadequate, therefore cer-
tain other alledged causes both adequate
and necessary are the true ones.* In
each of these cases there are true miracles;
i. e. marvellous events, singular exceptions
to nature's course ; but the latter only
affords what ought to be termed mira-
culous evidence to a doctrine ; or in other
words a similarity in the course of nature,
ivith respect to the necessity and action of
efficient cause, but a variety from its ap-
parent regularity, in order to be used as a
means towards a specific end.
* See further, the Essay on Miracles.
H
146 ON THE USE OF
This difference between the singu-
larity of an event and its intention; be-
tween an insulated and surprising fact,
and the object to be gained by it, is
not shown (that I know of) by writers
on this head. That there are such facts
without any doctrine being in question,
which are attested and reasonably be-
lieved in (and that " with full assurance
of faith,") at once dissolves the whole
fabric of Hume's argument on the
matter; and that whether a doctrine
be true or false, — whether there be reli-
gious miracles or not : because he points
his force against the absurdity of ad-
mitting evidence which testifies to the
occurrence of an event, different/to??*
the course of experience ; out of the order
of the apparent train of cause and effect,
and which he terms the course of nature.
Whereas men very well know that
nature, whatever her apparent course
may be, still keeps them (( at a great
" distance from all her secrets ;" from the
knowledge of the precisely efficient cause
acting in any particular case, and there-
THE WORD IDEA. 147
fore, that there is nothing contrary to her
real course, (by means of some secret
efficient cause) that singular varieties
should take place ; and for this reason
they conceive that evidence ought to be
admitted on the subject. The examina-
tion, reception, or rejection of evidence
on it, tries the intellects of men much in
the same way as other things do, but
their hearts still more when it concerns
the subject of religion.
It thence follows that a regularity
with respect to certain events in one
country, does not prove there must be
the same regularity in another. Nor
does that which is a regular appearance
at one age of the world, prove the same
must exist in all ages of the world.
Nor do the usual actions of God's pro-
vidence which are most wise in order to
our reliance on his modes of opera-
tion, prove that he will never alter his
action, if he should intend to convince
us in any case of his immediate pre-
sence. But to return to the more im-
mediate object of this chapter, it follows
ii 2
148 ON THE USE OF
from the reasoning adduced in it, that
both Mr. Hume and Dr. Reid are
wrong in their notions arising from the
observation " that the real table can suffer
" no alteration, as we recede further from
" it, although it appears to diminish"*
Mr. Hume hence argues, that we can-
not see a real table, but the image or
idea of a table only; and that thus
" we can have no absolute communication
" by the senses with external objects"
And Dr. Reid answers, " that we
" have such communication, because a real
" table would by the laws of optics, thus
" diminish upon the sight" Now the
truth is, that no real table is formed,
no image of a table is formed, unless
the whole united mass of the unknown
objects in nature exterior to, and in-
dependant of the instruments of sense,
(not yet worthy of the name of " table,")
unite with the mechanical action of
these, and by their means with the
sentient principle, in order to create in
* See Reid " on the Intellectual Powers/' for
Hume's objection, and Reid's answer.
THE WORD IDEA. 149
such an union that object which alone
can properly be termed " table."
Yet after experience, ^Ae outward ob-
jects, the CONTINUALLY EXISTING
parts of the whole causes necessary
to the creation of a table, must be
named by the name by which the whole
is named ; for there is no other name
whereby they can be called, nor any
other ideas by which the memory of
them can be introduced into the mind,
save by the appearance of " the faint
images of those sensible qualities" which
their presence originally created.*
*See page 137.
150
CHAPTER VII.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE CON-
TAINED IN THE PRECEDING ESSAY
TO THE EVIDENCE OF OUR BELIEF
IN SEVERAL OPINIONS.
Section I.
The foundation of our belief in God.
Assuming I have proved to the satis-
faction of the reader, the existence of
' ' body " and of the " external universe/'
it remains to point out a few inferences
from the doctrine, of sufficient import-
ance to justify a further intrusion upon
the patience of the reader ; and which
have always equally interested the
minds of the learned and the unlearned.
These principally relate, —
1 . To the existence of Deity.
2. To our own identity ; and the na-
ture of body and mind.
BELIEF IN GOD. 151
3. To that intimation which the mind
receives of outward objects not yet sup-
posed to exist, but with respect to
which all ideas of delusion are rejected,
such as prophecies, instincts, &c.
4. To the comprehension of the na-
ture of the unperceived causes of our
sensations.
1. As to the existence of God, let it
be remembered that all our belief con-
cerning every proposition, is the result
of what we conceive to be the consistent
relations of ideas present in the mind.
Now I have shown, that these relations
force our minds to believe in continuous
existences unperceived. It is upon
similar premises that we build the
foundation of our belief in Deity. For
after some contemplation upon the phe-
nomena of nature, we conclude, that in
order to account for the facts we per-
ceive, " there must needs be " one con-
tinuous existence, one uninterrupted
essentially existing cause, one intelli-
gent being, " ever ready to appear" as
the renovating power for all the depend-
152 BELIEF IN GOD.
ant effects, all the secondary causes
beneath our view. To devout minds,
this notion becomes familiar and clear ;
and being mixed with the sensible im-
pressions of goodness, wisdom, and
power, begets those habitual sentiments
of fear, trust, and love, which it is
reasonable to perceive and to enjoy.
Our constantly familiar friend, whose
presence we speak of, and whose qua-
lities we love and admire, affords us no
further proof for his existence and his
qualities, than the reasoning adduced in
this book : — He must needs be another
being than ourselves, having qualities
which are not our own, but his, that are
sufficient to engage our sympathy, or
the relations of our thoughts would be
rendered inconsistent with each other.
Section II.
The knowledge of our own independant existence —
how gained*
Again, the idea of our own independ-
ant existence is generated by observing,
that the compound mass we term self
IDENTITY. 153
can exist when we do not observe
it; and we have thus the idea of our
own existence, in that it needs must
continue to exist when unperceived, as
well as during the sensation of it when
perceived. Besides, on this subject, as
every other, it is to the causes for the
constant effects, (the objects whose union
shall bear out similar results,) to which
there is a tacit reference as the true and
continued existences in nature : — ■
Now the causes for the general powers
of sensation cannot be the same as those
for any particular sensation, and so must
be independant of each ;* and indeed
each sensation is always felt as an effect,
as " beginning to be ;" therefore what we
allude to as self, is a continued ex-
isting capacity in nature, (unknown,
unperceived,) fitted to revive when sus-
pended in sleep, or otherwise, and to
keep up during the periods of watchful-
ness the powers of life and consciousness,
especially those which determine the
union of memory with sense. For as sen-
* See p. 83, 84, " It is such a perception," &c.
H 5
154 IDENTITY.
sation is interrupted, and is an effect ; the
original cause must be uninterrupted ; and
such an uninterrupted cause as is equal
to keep up the life of the body, or mass
deemed our own body, and to unite it
under that form with the powers of me-
mory and sense : Identity, therefore,
has nothing to do with sameness of parti-
cles, but only has relation to those
powers in nature (flowing from that con-
tinuous Being the God of Nature,) which
are capable of giving birth to that con-
stant effect, the sense of continuous exist-
ence ; which sense, when analysed, is
the union of the ideas of memory, with
the impressions of present sense. Should
it be objected that the causes for such
an union might be interrupted ; then
as these would " begin their existences"
and would only be effects, the mind would
go backwards till it reposed in some un-
interrupted cause, and would consider
such, and such only, as an independant
capacity in nature, fitted to excite the
union of memory with present sense,
and as the complicate being self; which
BODY AND MIND. 155
when conscious, could take notice of its
existence, and when unconscious, (as
in sound sleep) could exist independantly
of its own observation.
Section III.
Observations on the essential difference between
body and mind.
Hence also may be seen all the essen-
tial difference between body and mind ; —
Body is the continually exciting cause,
for the exhibition of the perception of
extension and solidity on the mind in par-
ticular; and mind is the capacity or
cause, for sensation in general. And
these two must be different in "then
proportions among themselves," (in
their unperceived state,) as well as in
their "positive values" in their perceived
state.* Now whether these causes or
capacities can exist separate from each
other, is the question which is always
asked, and still remains unanswered in
* See p. 38.
156 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
philosophy. Abstractedly there seems
no hindrance for such separate exist-
ence. Practically, sensation in general
is never known, but in company with that
which excites the sensation of extension
in particular, and which seems so much
a part of the whole causes necessary for
sensation in general, that under the
form and action of the brain, it only
seems capable of being elicited. Still
we know not whether in many other
beings, sensations may not go on with-
out brain, and whether, where ideas
have once been generated through its
means, some other causes in nature may
not be equal to keeping them up — ana-
logous to the power there is in this state
of being, by which we recollect the
images of colours, and sounds ; of be-
ings, or virtues, &c. &c. without the
use of those organs of sense, which were
at first necessary to the formation of
such notions. It is here Mr. Lawrence
is illogical, for he assigns a "false cause,"
an unproved cause as the foundation for
BODY AND MIND. 157
sentiency, when he ascribes it as the
quality of the living nerve only ; for we
do not know by any experience we have,
that all and only, what we mean by
nerve, will elicit sentiency.* We can-
not produce it by any means in our
power ; it has been begun and is con-
tinued, without our having had any part
in the consultation which took place when
God said, " Let us make man in our
image after our likeness."
I confess I think the farther we extend
our views into the regions of metaphysics,
the more possible and probable does the
resurrection from the dead appear ; or at
least an existence analogous to it. For
it is evident, more is wanted for the ca-
pacity for sensation in general, than that
exterior cause which is necessary for
the exhibition of extension in particular ;
which extension in many varieties ap-
pears insentient. Various effects must
have proportional causes, and therefore
* See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding,
b. 4, c. 6, s. 17.
158 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
there must be some extraneous reason
for sentiency, beyond what is absolutely
necessary for mere insentient extension ;
— Yet it has been said, extension seems
to form a part at least of that combina-
tion of powers which elicits sentiency.
Now if the causes for sentiency, minus
the brain, find in the great womb of na-
ture, any other cause equal to the brain,
a finer body, an ethereal stimulus, or
any thing which may help to unite me-
mory with sense, then the difficulty at-
tending the notion of the resurrection
vanishes.
It would appear therefore equally in-
conclusive for man to argue against the
possibility of a future life on account of
the dispersion of the particles of the
present gross body by death, as for the
worm to suppose it could not again live
because its outside crust wholly pe-
rishes : — He might resist every notion
(however prompted by his instinct or
his wishes,) of an existence beyond the
range of his present experience, beyond
the extent of the leaf on which he is
BODY AND MIND. 159
born to die; yet the time would equally
arrive, when as a winged insect he
would roam through boundless space in
comparison of the circumscribed spot to
which his former existence was con-
fined, and chase the brilliant image of
himself, through a live-long summer's
day, amidst the sweets of a thousand
flowers.
Man in his present state, feels occa-
casional aspirations towards another,
prompted by the craving want of some
unknown unimaginable good, of which
he has no intimation but from the con-
sciousness of an unsatisfied capacity : —
Let him not then too easily reject the
belief that this capacity has a corres-
ponding object, that his nature is ca-
pable of a nobler modification, a higher
flight in more exalted regions than this,
and enlarged as to every power of ac-
tion, thought, and enjoyment.
160 INSTINCTS AND
Section IV.
Cursory observations on instincts and prophetic
vision.
Instincts # give notions of real beings,
if the objects to which they point fulfil
their whole qualities. It is consistent
with the previous doctrine, that instinct
be an action of the brain excited inde-
pendant of impression, in the first in-
stance from external objects, but after-
wards capable of being kept up by their
means. For as the brain is the expo-
nent of the soul, so any of its actions
whatever, being either the effect of an
impression from an outward object, or
brought about by any other cause ade-
quate to a given action, would equally
give rise to the idea of the corresponding
object; as in dreams, &c. But in dreams
the objects do not fulfil the whole qua-
* As for instance, the instincts of birds give them
notions of the materials requisite for making1 their
nest previously to a first formation.
PROPHETIC VISION. 161
lities expected of them, from the first
impressions made upon the mind : in
instincts it is otherwise — for after the
first impressions begin to fade, the
images can be renewed by the acquaint-
ance made with those external objects,
which are not only capable of fulfilling
the first expectation formed of them,
but also of affording a regular and con-
stant reply to the demands of the organs
of sense.
In like manner, prophecy is also true
prophecy, if a lively action of the brain,
does through any cause whatever which
produces it, testify the future existence
of such things as do really happen after-
wards, in such fulness, and order, and
perfection as renders it improbable that
the coincidence of the prophecy and
the events which arrive, could take place
by chance. The probable evidence be-
fore the accomplishment of a prophecy
that it will be accomplished, must arise
from a number of collateral circum-
stances, which, after accomplishment,
162 NATURE OF
have much to do in rendering it of inte-
rest, veracity, and importance.
Section V.
On the knowledge of the nature of unperceived
objects.
With respect to the nature of unper-
ceived objects I shall take notice, that
we can form some ideas of their natures
by subtracting from them equally that
which is common to all, viz. the action
of the instruments of sense and the mind.
For although it be true that nothing can
be like any sensation, but a sensation ;
yet it does not follow, but that there
may be qualities connected with our
sensations, and arising out of them,
which we perceive have not sensation
for their essence, and so may belong
to insentient natures. Now it is- by-
separating the idea of sensation in gene-
ral from the ideas of particular sensa-
tions,* that we gain the notion of exist-
* See the short essay, That sensible qualities
cannot be causes.
UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. '163
ence which need not necessarily be
sentient;* for as the capacity for sensa-
tion in general, or mind, cannot be
contained in any one sensation in par-
ticular, so it cannot in all ; and therefore
in like manner, as there is one eye, but
many colours and figures, so there must
be one capacity, but many sensations —
one continually existing power, of which
these are but the changes. f
Again, as variety does not depend
upon sensation as its essence, so we per-
ceive that variety may take place among
any supposed existences whatever; and
not only so, but that the quality itself
of variety when unperceived, will be
like perceived variety, in as far as it is
variety; and that such a quality must
necessarily exist amidst that set of won-
derful objects which is neither contained
* See the note page 42 of the essay on cause and
effect, and pp. 42, 83, 84, 182 of this essay.
f It is supposed here that the reader has acqui-
esced in the Doctrine of the foregoing Essay,
" That qualities cannot begin their own existence,"
and that the union of qualities or objects is neces-
sary to form new existences.
164 NATURE OF
in the uniform capacity called mind, or
the uniform action of the organs of
sense, and which therefore we justly
consider as forming an universe inde-
pendant of both.
Thus the ocean must be vast, in compa-
rison of a drop of water, when both are
unperceived. Time, in union with the
powers of sensation, may be measured by
a succession of ideas in the fancy ; but
time in nature, and unperceived, measures,
and is not measured by, the succession
of events, whether sensations or not;
as the revolution of seasons ; the birth
and fall of empires ; the change of har-
mony to chaos, or of chaos to harmony.
— Again, subtract the organs of sense,
from the most minute divisions of mat-
ter, and they are only little in compa-
rison with what is large ; and the ques-
tion concerning the infinite divisibility
of matter, resolves itself into the impos-
sibility of the imagination conceiving
and not conceiving of a thing at the same
time — -for the conditions of the problem
are, that something is to be imagined
UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 165
too small for the imagination to con-
ceive ; and to imagine it under the forms
of an extension, which extension is
not conceivable when unperceived either
by the senses, or the imagination ;
whereas we know not what extension
unperceived is, although I am willing
to concede a mite cannot be the same as
the globe, not only with respect to that
condition of being which, when exhibited
upon the eye or touch, yields the notion of
extension, but which, when subjected to
calculation, manifests that in its un-
known state, it must be liable to that
variety, which when perceived, is called
size or figure, and becomes altered in
its dimensions : still when that unknown
being matter is in its unperceived state
subject to that condition or state called
divisibility, when fancy has done its ut-
most, and attempted a conception of
inconceivable subdivisions, perhaps such
a portion of matter is a world, and is an
unknown quantity of " something," (as
Hume calls it) supporting the means of
life to millions of beings under no man-
166 NATURE OF
ner of relation either to our senses or
minds.
It is here that it would be proper to
show more fully and distinctly than has
yet been done, what is the error of
Bishop Berkeley's doctrine, concerning
the knowledge we have of external ob-
jects, and to call upon that which has
been laid down in these pages, to point
out where the fallacy lies in his reason-
ing, which at once is considered as
unanswerable, and nevertheless at vari-
ance with the common experience of
life.* But it is impossible to place his
curious system in a proper light, or ren-
der the argument against it apparent,
without some extracts from his Essay
on the Principles of Human Knowledge.
I would rather do this in a detached
manner, than introduce it here, and
then take the opportunity of showing a
little more at length than would now be
convenient, the manner in which the
* Mr. Hume calls it a doctrine which equally
fails to enforce conviction, or to suggest an answer
to its fallacy.
UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 167
foregoing doctrine enables me distinctly
to point out, how obvious an answer
presents itself to those points of his doc-
trine, which from a lapse in the reason-
ing fail to produce conviction ; and how
truly consistent, and philosophical, and
accordant with experience, is the rest of
his matter, however much it may vary
from commonly received notions. I
shall therefore throw these paragraphs,
with the observations annexed to them,
in a short and distinct essay ; and shall
conclude, for the present, this subtle,
complicated, and, I fear, fatiguing sub-
ject, with a concise summary of the
doctrine.
168
CHAPTER VIII.
RECAPITULATION.
The perception of independant, external, and con-
tinued existences, the result of an exercise of the
reasoning powers, or a mixture of the ideas of
the understanding, with those of sense. — Exter-
nal objects unknown as to the qualities which are
capable of affecting the senses. — Known as com-
pounds of simple sensations, mixed with ideas of
reason or conceptions of the understanding . — Re-
ply to an objection concerning extension. — There
exists, however, one set of exterior qualities,
which resemble such as are inward; these are
variety — independancy — existence — continued ex-
istence— identity, SfC- Exteriorly extended ob-
jects, cannot be like the idea of extension. — An
appeal to the phenomena of the diorama as an
evidence for the truth of these 7iotions. The
ideas of this treatise do unintentionally coincide
with some mysteries of religion. — Conclusion.
The perception of external, continually
existing, independant objects, is an
RECAPITULATION. 169
affair of the understanding ; it is a men-
tal vision; the result of some notions
previously in the mind, being mixed
with each sensation as it arises, and
thus enabling it to refer the sensations
to certain reasonable causes, without
resting merely in the contemplation of
the sensations themselves ; by which it
comes to pass, that names stand for
these compound mixtures ; and that
the organs of sense are the instruments
which immediately detect the presence
of those things which are external to,
and independant both of the organs of
sense and the mind.
I consider the chief proposition, thus
used as a mean of quick and constant
reasoning, applicable to, and immediately
associated with, certain exhibited sen-
sations, to be that which comprehends
the relation of cause and effect.
By these means, there is the reference
of similar effects to similar causes, and of
differences of effects, to proportional differ-
ences in causes.
That class of ideas which Dr. Reid
170 RECAPITULATION.
terms instinctive, and Mr. D. Stewart
considers as composed of simple ideas
not formed by the senses, but generated
upon certain jit occasions for their pro-
duction, I consider to be the conclu-
sions of a latent reasoning;* as the
mere results and corollaries, included
in the relation of those ideas and sensa-
tions already existing in the mind, and
which were previously formed by the
senses. The idea is very soon learned,
that it is a contradiction to suppose things
to begin of themselves ; for this idea is
occasioned by the impression, (the ob-
servation,) that the beginning of every
thing is but a change of that which is
already in existence, and so is not the
same idea, (the same quality,) as the
beginning of being, which is independant
of previous being and its changes. The
two ideas are therefore contrary to each
other ; and the meanest understanding-
perceives them to be so, as easily as it
* Since writing the above, I find M. Destutt de
Tracy of my opinion.
RECAPITULATION. 171
perceives that white is not black, &c.
Changes therefore require beings already
in existence, of which they are the
affections or qualities ; and children,
peasants, and brutes know and perceive
these relations, though they cannot
analyse them.* The mind therefore
taking notice of changes, refers them to
objects of which they are the qualities.
Thus a very young and ignorant per-
son will soon perceive, that the various
sensations of which he is conscious, are
mere changes in relation to some other
objects in existence.
Such an one on hearing himself
speak, or sing, will not consider the
sensation of sound apart from its cause,
or the object of which it is a change,
and on hearing another voice than his
own, will refer such variety in the effect,
to a proportional variety in the cause ;
for here his consciousness tells him,
that the sound is not formed by the
* M. D. de Tracy considers children as capable
of perceiving a relation between two ideas, as of
their original perception.
i 2
172 RECAPITULATION.
same means which formed the first
sound, yet it appears in many respects
a similar effect ; therefore, he concludes
that in as many respects there are simi-
lar causes, i. e. similar objects of which
there has been sound as a change :
and in some respects the effects are
diverse, therefore, the causes are equally
diverse ; i.e. are uttered by another be-
ing than himself, thus concluding another
being like himself to be present. The
same method regards the perception of
every sense, and the objects in relation
to it ; and I consider primary qua-
lities of matter, in this respect, to be
upon the same footing as those which
are secondary : Objects are therefore, be-
ings like ourselves, plus or minus the differ-
ences ; in as much as they are the propor-
tional causes of the sensations which they
create. Thus we can but virtually touch
causes, and that is by reasoning. And
as the knowledge of external nature is
but an inference from reason, either
from the relation of cause and effect,
analogies, probabilities, &c. so its abso-
RECAPITULATION. 173
lute independancy of each mind, can
have no further certainty than such in-
ference, however strong it may be, can
afford. Indeed, in one point of view,
such complete independancy as should
suppose the annihilation of any one es-
sence in nature would appear impos-
sible ; one change is independant of
another change, a man may die, and
his child continue to live; but I con-
ceive the frame of nature so completely
one whole, and all its changes but such
constituent parts of it, that either, on
the one hand, it must be wholly impos-
sible for a true annihilation to take
place of the essential and permanent
existence of any part ; or on the other,
that if it were possible, the whole must
be destroyed together.
Now, although the reference of like
effect to like cause be absolute demon-
stration, yet it may be, that in some
instances, we consider effect partially ;
referring some like effects not only to
like causes, but to compound objects
with which they are usually associated ;
174 RECAPITULATION.
and which objects will exhibit other
effects, for which there may not be suf-
ficient proof or likelihood; also the
very comparison of what is like, to like,
supposes an ability to perfect compa-
risons, a subject on which we frequently
make mistakes. Independant existence
is then, however, a conclusion of rea-
soning; an idea in the understanding
in relation to the perception of the ne-
cessity there should be like cause for
like effect, and proportional causes for
proportional effects.
Again, as to the continuation of
the existence of independant objects, the
original causes and capacities for every
thing must be concluded as uninter-
rupted, as long as effects are renewed at
intervals ; it being a contradiction that
such effects should begin their own exist-
ences. Therefore, the perception of the
continued existence of objects is also in
relation to the knowledge of causation,
and is an idea gained by the under-
standing by reference from reason. Out-
ward existence, is the perception of a con-
RECAPITULATION. 175
tinued independant existence in relation to
motion, from our own minds taken as a
centre whence we set out ; the which mo-
tion is a sort of sense, whose sensible
quality merely, could not immediately
yield the notion of unperceived ex-
teriority, unless mixed with the powers
of the understanding, which refer its
sensible quality to an unperceived cause,
in the way that has been described to
be the case both with respect to itself,
and to the other senses ; by which
means they are considered to interact
with those things known by consci-
ousness not to be minds. For motion
is when unperceived a capacity or qua-
lity of being, in relation to those vari-
ous objects which are proved to be con-
tinually existing by their regular reply to
its action.*
And when motion is considered in
relation to empty space merely, it is
also perceived to be in relation to a
mode of existence, proved by the same
* See this Essay, p. 83, 84, and from p. 102 to
107 ; " It is not sufficient therefore ;" also Essay
VI.
176 RECAPITULATION.
process of the understanding to be
continually existing. For as the ex-
teriority of space, or distance between
objects, replies regularly to the sense
and use of motion, so must it be re-
garded as a common quality to all objects,
having its own unperceived essence. Al-
though, therefore, the instruments of
sense, and motion, can only after their
action form sensible qualities, " ideas of
sensation," yet their use immediately
gives notice of outward, insentient, and
unperceived existences ; — because the
understanding being supposed correct
in the notion that such " must needs
exist" in the manner explained at large
in this treatise, informs the mind that it
is with these continuous unperceived
existences, that the organs of sense and
motion themselves also as unperceived
existences interact in order to the per-
ception of their sensible qualities when the
whole union touches the sentient capa-
city.* But it is motion, as first in order,
and first in proof, which is impowered
to detect the outwardness of ob-
* See pp. 54, 55, &c.
RECAPITULATION. 177
jects :* because those things which return
upon the application of motion to the
sense of touch, are by that necessity of
motion in order to apprehend their
tangibility justly defined as distant from
* It is here I differ with several French authors
whose works I have met with since writing this
treatise, with M. Destutt de Tracy, Condillac, de
Gerando, &c.
The sense of the resistence of solidity to the
sense of voluntary motion, no more proves the ex-
teriority, independancy , and continuity of objects,
than the reply of colour to the use of the eye.
The will is no more self, than is the eye, or the
hand. The five organs of sense in their conscious
use, afford by the phenomena which take place in
consequence, an equal proof of these attributes
belonging to those constituent parts of the whole
causes of our sensations, which are by conscious-
ness known not to be contained in the mere pos-
session of the mind itself, and in the motions of
the five instruments of sense. For these latter
can exist and act without certain given ideas, there-
fore the REMAINING NECESSARY PARTS of the
whole cause of such ideas, are independant and
separate from them. Such also regularly reply to
irregular applications, in relation to them, there-
fore, continue in their existence. This is the argu-
ment, and it applies, equally to each of the five
i 5
178 RECAPITULATION.
the mind which apprehends them,* for
every distinct quality may be named
as we please according to its variety of
appearance. But it is these distant con-
tinuous existences, which exhibit their
qualities, one quality, that by the ear
is perceived as sound ; another, by the
palate as taste ; a third, by the nostrils,
as smell ; a fourth and fifth, by the eye,
as figure and colour. Nevertheless
these distant independant beings in re-
lation to motion, are wholly unknown
as to their imperceived qualities, which
yet we immediately perceive must exist
by means of the sensible qualities they
excite, and which are associated with the
ideas of their causes. It is not, therefore,
colour only, but all sensible qualities
whatever, which are carried out by an act
organs of sense, as much as to the sense of touch.
The touch would not prove this point, without a
mixture of reasoning : and which reasoning would
be sufficient to draw the same result from the phe-
nomena of the other senses.
See Destutt de Tracy Ideologic, p. 114, duod.
* See p. 57, &c. of this Essay.
RECAPITULATION. 179
of the mind, and considered as propor-
tionally distant from the mind, as is the
quantity of motion required to attain
them in their tangible form, and as im-
mediately coalescing, and inhering in
and with those independant objects.*
Infants very soon perceive motion to be
in respect to existences, which are not
included in the idea of themselves;
and which they also very soon con-
ceive to continue to exist unperceived, as
they are " ever ready to appear" upon the
caprice of their action ; that is to say,
the influence of thought or conception of
ideas, is soon mixed with simple sensa-
tion, forming thereby those complex
beings called outward objects ; (I may
say, those perplexing beings, at once
ideas of the mind and existences inde-
pendant of it ! ) Now the understand-
ing perceiving that independant con-
tinued existences, are not the same be-
ings as those which are included in our
* See Essay 4th, on the union of colour and ex-
tension.
180 RECAPITULATION.
own sentient natures ; that they are
not merely sound, colour, &c. places them
beyond, (that is, considers them as
existing under a capacity of being in-
dependant of) every source of our own
sensibility ; viz. out of the limit of the
definition of our bodies and minds ; asso-
ciating with the ideas of their distances
their whole sensible qualities.
I now repeat this reasoning is also appli-
cable to the primary as well as the secon-
dary qualities. For what are " parts in
cohesion or extension,"* when separated
from that external independant exist-
ence which the understanding allots to
the unperceived unknown causes of these
ideas in the mind, and from their rela-
tion to motion, (which when unper-
ceived is also unknown as to its nature,)
but " ideas of sensation" exhibitions of
colour and of touch, &c.
Nor will it be a reasonable objection to
say, (as Dr. Reid does) " an idea cannot
be extended and solid," for the proposi-
* See Reid's Inquiry.
RECAPITULATION. 181
tion concerning the perception of external
qualities, intends to assert, that the idea
of extension as a sensation independant
of its cause is not an extended or solid
idea, any more than the idea of a colour
is a coloured idea ; or of a sound a
noisy idea.
For although the qualites are under-
stood to be created by their exterior
causes, yet these qualities are but
effects ; — a certain " idea of sensation "
is not coloured, it is colour — does not
emit a sound, it is sound — does not ex-
hibit extension, it is extension, and so of
the rest. They are all simple sensations,
created by causes which the understand-
ing concludes to be external and inde-
pendant of self; and are in relation to
motion and the five senses, for the ex-
hibition of their appropriate effects,
and having corresponding proportions
among themselves. Parts, therefore, are
unknown powers, save that they exist
in relation to motion, to touch, and
other affections, the which when un-
perceived are still also unknown powers,
save in their existences, their mutual rela-
182 RECAPITULATION.
tions, and their proportional varieties.
For there exists one set of exterior
qualities, which we may know of, as re-
sembling such as are inward* They are
the same as those, which affect the sen-
sations, and which the understanding-
can apply to every kind of existence,
sentient or insentient. Such is that of
variety ; we perceive variety amidst our
sensations ; but other existences might
also be various ; and being so, we in-
timately and immediately know what va-
riety means. The same of independancy ;
one sensation may be independant of
another, so may any other existence,
and we know what quality it is we
speak of, when we predicate independ-
ancy of unperceived existences.
Existence is upon the same footing
also ; existence of a sensation is in the
very exhibition and conscious feeling of
a quality. But the idea of existence
in general is the very being of any qua-
lity whatever, as barely contrary to
non-existence. t This idea of existence
* Seep. 162.
f See p. 42, 162, 163, Essay VI.
RECAPITULATION. 183
is gained by comparing the conscious-
ness of successive sensations with the
idea* of non-existence; which idea is
also generated by the means of their
successive disappearance. Thus, the idea
of existence is a more general idea
than that of the idea of sensation, for as
each sensation in particular successive-
ly ceases to exist, so they all must ;
and as they do not begin their own
existences, so they are but changes
of something which is neither any one9
nor yet the whole of our sensations :
therefore, sensation is not necessarily
existent, but existence is something
which is not included in any conscious-
ness, and is the general quality of which
sensation is the accident, or exponent ;
instead of sensation being a mere sy-
nonymy with existence, as I have heard
contended.
Therefore an unperceived quality may
exist unfelt, and in that quality of exist-
tence, can be conceived of when un-
* See p. 50, concerning negative ideas.
184 RECAPITULATION.
perceived, as similar to perceived exist-
ence : Also in a more popular and
practical way, we judge that another
mind might not perceive our sensations,
nor we the sensations belonging to
another, yet that both would equally
exist in relation to each unperceivedly.
Continued existence is likewise subject
to a similar observation, and signifies
that no interval of time, interrupts the
existence of a particular quality ; such
an affection may belong to unperceived
as to perceived existences.
Identity, or the continued sameness
of a quality, may be predicated of an
unperceived quality, and there may be
other affections liable to similar rea-
soning, which at present do not occur
to my mind, unless it be the relation of
cause and effect, which may equally
exist among insentient as sentient na-
tures. The reason why these unper-
ceived qualities, may resemble those
which are perceived, and not any of
the primary or secondary qualities of
bodies (relating to the five organs of
RECAPITULATION. 185
sense) be resembling in their perceived
and unperceived state, is because the
external qualities which are in relation
to the senses and mind, require their
aid to modify them ; and that which is
altered cannot be the same as when exist-
ing previous to alteration.
Unperceived, unconscious, extended
parts, (whatever parts unperceived may
be,) cannot be like the idea of extension.
But among sensations themselves, after
their determination upon the mind, there
may exist relations which the senses
have nothing to do with, have 7iot altered,
and which may be applicable to any
existence whatever : — Putting all these
things together; the colouring of a scene
in nature or art, is in relation to real or
supposed motion — and motion is con-
ceived in relation to existences inde-
pendant of self; therefore colouring will
always be seen as though it were
outward, and therefore conceived of as
thus by the imagination. The organs
of sense convey sentient existences in-
ternally to the inmost recesses of the
186 RECAPITULATION.
soul : the understanding reacts upon
them, and places all things without it in
similar proportions. If this proposition
were not capable of proof by abstract
reasoning, the exhibition of the Diorama
now before the public (of a scene of
natural size from nature, and another
from art,) would be enough to prove
that colouring is placed in proportion to
the position of things among themselves ;
and such positions are as the capacities
of distance, and the powers of motion in
relation to us, as well as among themselves :
The scene, independant of the under-
standing, is a scene of mental sensation ;
for when the mind is for a moment
deluded, (of which I speak from expe-
rience, knowing that this extraordinary
fac-simile of nature and art has the
power of effecting a complete delusion,)
and forgets the place in which it is — the
relation of place being forgotten, the
scenes are conceived of as real ; i. e.
the colouring is symptomatic as a quality
of beings, which will fulfil the remain-
der of the qualities belonging to their
RECAPITULATION. 187
definitions upon trial, and thus be equal
to their whole definitions. But when
we recollect where we are, the mind
perceives these thoughts to be illusory,
and the colouring is not then conceived
to be a quality of such objects as will
fulfil their whole definitions. I shall
conclude with saying, that as we never
can experience the fulfilment of that
part of the definition of external objects,
viz. their existence after our own ceases ;
so although it be an inference of high
probability, yet it is short of strict de-
monstration. We can indeed by refer-
ring like effects to like causes, and pro-
portional effects to proportional causes,
demonstrate thus far ; but we never
experience this further complete inde-
pendancy of outward object as an effect.
All we can do is to refer compound si-
milar and various effects, to compound
similar and various causes ; which occa-
sions an inference that such causes are
like ourselves, plus or minus the vari-
eties, and we finding ourselves inde-
pendant of them, are led to conclude
188 RECAPITULATION.
they will in like manner be independant
of us.
This statement of the matter imme-
diately touches upon the difficulty there
is in the detection of like compound
objects being present to us. However,
the reasoning on the point is nearly de-
monstrative, and practically is entirely
so — for when we get at objects like
ourselves, which must exist as causes of
the effects we experience, nothing is
perceived capable of making such a
difference, as should prevent them from
existing independant of us were we
no more — yet things are real, if even
this last test of independancy remain
without proof; for they are real which
fulfil the definitions for which their
names were first formed. The being
true to expectations formed of their qua-
lities, is the very criterion of reality ;
and even upon the supposition of a total
independancy being out of contempla-
tion, still all existing things would be
in relation to our senses, and to motion ;
and be independant of our thoughts and
RECAPITULATION. 189
actions. Nor let it be thought that in-
fants, peasants, and brutes, do not
reason ; all of these are capable of per-
ceiving certain relations, included in
the impressions made -upon them, and
of drawing them as occasion requires
into practical results.*
With respect to the nature of God,
(in which all men are so much and
justly interested) his essential existence,
his continued existence is demonstrated,
by the abstract argument used in this
treatise. Whatever variety and changes
of beings there are, all changes must
finally be pushed back to that essence
who began not, and in whom all de-
pendant beings originally resided, and
were put forth as out goings of him-
self in all those varieties of attitudes
which his wisdom and benevolence
thought fit.
And I shall not shrink from saying,,
that such thoughts as these, do unin-
tentionally render the mysteries of re-
* M. de Tracy says, " Un enfant apperc.oit un
rapport cerume il appercoit un couleur."
190 RECAPITULATION.
ligion easier to the comprehension than
otherwise they would appear ; for shall
we limit the capacities and attributes of
Divinity, in his unknown, unperceived
state, by our meagre perceptions ? May
he not to every world that hath come forth
from him, offer a protection, and an in-
terference, in proportion to, and in re-
lation to its wants ? May not some
confined manifestations, of the uni-
versal essence, be sent to different
worlds adapted to their capacity for
moral improvement, to the motives
which may act upon them, and the
uses which result from such a mani-
festation of his presence, in the way
either of action or passion ? Again shall
all things swarm with life, and the
principle which divides animate from
inanimate nature be still undiscovered,
and yet no emanation from the essen-
tial deity, brood over the face of the
deep, or breathe into man the breath
of life ? or finally, shall God be either
limited, or divisible, by senses that
cannot detect his presence, although
RECAPITULATION. 191
known by the understanding that he
" needs must exist," and be in all
times and places " ready to appear"
to his creation, as the continually
existing cause for its support, its life,
its hope, its confidence, and its joy !
ESSAYS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF
THE DOCTRINES
CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING ONE,
AND IN
AN ESSAY
ON THE
RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
K
PART II.
ESSAYS CONTAINING INQUIRIES
RELATIVE TO
THE BERKELEIAN THEORY;
THE COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL
INDUCTION ;
THE UNION OF COLOUR AND EXTENSION;
THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES ;
THE NATURE OF A FINAL CAUSE AND OF MIND;
THE REASON OF SINGLE AND ERECT VISION.
195
ESSAY I.
consideration of the erroneous
reasoning contained in bishop
Berkeley's principles of human
knowledge.
Section I.
" When several ideas," says Bishop
Berkeley (section 1st,) " (imprinted on
" the senses) are observed to accom-
" pany each other, they come to be
" marked by one name ; and so to be
" reputed as one thing, thus a certain
" colour, taste, smell, figure, and con-
" sistence, are accounted one distinct
" thing, signified by the name of apple;
" other collection of ideas form a stone,
" a tree, a book, &c." (Section 3rd,
p. 25,) " For what are objects but the
" things we perceive by sense ? and
k 2.
196 on Berkeley's principles
' what do we perceive but our own
" ideas or sensations ? for, (section 5th,)
:i light and colours, heat and cold, ex-
" tension and figure, in a word, the
" things we see and feel, what are they
" but so many sensations, notions, ideas,
i( impressions on the sense? and is it
' possible to separate even in thought
" any of these from perception."
Sec. 9, p. 27. " Some make a distinc-
" tion between primary and secondary
" qualities ; but extension, figure, and
;' motion, are only ideas existing in the
' ( mind . And an idea can be like nothing
" but an idea, for neither these nor their
" archetypes, can exist in an unper-
" ceiving substance." (Section 15th.)
" It is impossible, therefore, that any
" colour or extension at all, or sensible
" quality whatever, should exist in an
" unthinking subject without the mind,
" or indeed, that there should be any
" such thing as an outward object."
Thus far Bishop Berkeley, on objects
being only ideas, or sensations of sen-
sible qualities, and these ideas as com-
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 197
prehending the primary as well as se-
condary qualities, Many, I conceive*
will think, from what I have said in the
foregoing pages, that there is no mate-
rial difference between my doctrine,
and his. But a careful investigation of
both, will show there is a very consi-
derable one. For although, I agree
with him, I st. That nothing can be like
a sensation, or idea, or perception, but a
sensation, idea, and perception; 2ndly.
That the primary qualities, after the
impressions they make on the senses,
are sensations, or ideas, or perceptions ;
as well as the secondary ones. Yet I
do not agree with him, in stating, that
objects are nothing but what we per-
ceive by sense, or that a complete
enumeration is made of all the ideas
which constitute an apple, a stone, a
tree, or a book ; in the summing up of
their sensible qualities. For I have
made it clear, I trust, by the foregoing
argument, that an object perceived by the
mind is a compound being, consisting
of a certain collection of sensible qua-
198 on Berkeley's principles
lities, " mixed with an idea the result
of reasoning" of such qualities being
formed by a " continually existing out-
ward and independant set of as various
and appropriate causes ;" therefore th^t
there must be " an outward object,"
existing as a cause to excite the inward
feeling. The logical error, therefore,
of Bishop Berkeley on this part of the
subject, is an incomplete definition; for
no definition is good which does not
take notice of all the ideas, under the
term ; and in every object of sense
which the mind perceives, the know-
ledge of its genus, as a general effect
arising from a general cause independant
of mind, is mixed with the sensations or
ideas resulting from its special qualities
affecting the same. The notion of this
genus is omitted in Dr. Berkeley's
definition of an object, by the limiting
words but and only.
2. Bishop Berkeley is guilty of an
ambiguity, when he speaks " of ideas
being imprinted on the senses" " of
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 199
our perceiving" (by sense) "our own
ideas and sensations,' for he appears
to speak of the " senses on which ob-
jects are imprinted, " as if he intended
by them those five organs of sense, viz.
the eye, the ear, &c. vulgarly called the
senses, but which, in truth, have no
sense or feeling in themselves as inde-
pendant of mind ; but are mechanical
instruments ; which as powers modify
exterior existences, ere they reach the
sentient capacity ; the which capacity
as a general power or feeling becomes
modified thereby; for undoubtedly, the
senses as organs cannot perceive what
the senses as organs are required to
form.* ■
When he speaks of " ideas being im-
printed on the senses," the phrase con-
tains the very doctrine he is controvert-
ing.
The ideas of colours cannot be im-
printed on the eye ; nor those of sound
on the ear ; nor those of extension on
* Dr. Reid on visible figure, &c. is guilty of a
like error.
200 on Berkeley's principles
the touch ; for there are no such ideas,
until after the eye, as an instrument,
has been affected by some sorts of out-
ward objects, fitted to convey to the
sentient principle, a sensation of colour,
and so of the rest. Therefore the ob-
jects perceived by the organs of sense
cannot be our ideas, and sensations.
Indeed, he does not take notice that
he uses the notion of perception (which
is that upon which the whole argument
depends) in two different methods, or
meanings. For the term perception,
when applied to those objects for
whose observation the organs of sense
are required, and by which certain
qualities are determined upon the per-
ceiving mind, is used as the notice the
mind takes of the presence of certain
qualities in consequence of the conscious
use of the organs of sense, the use
and action of which must, therefore, be
in relation to some objects which are
not the mind ; but when applied to the
" ideas and sensations of sensible qua-
lites," perception is only used as the
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 201
mental consciousness of those quali-
ties, leaving out the conscious use of
the organs of sense, and the ideas of
the outward objects which must neces-
sarily have acted on them.
Nor is this reasoning I am using, the
mere turning of an expression, for in
this sentence " what are objects but the
things we perceive by sense ?" and " what
do we perceive but our ideas and sen-
sations ?" there is an offence against one
of the plainest and most useful of logi-
cal rules ; for the argument if placed
in a regular syllogism, will be seen to
contain a middle term of two different
and particular significations from which,
therefore, nothing can be concluded.
Let the question be, " Are objects,
ideas and sensations only?" and the
middle term, " The things we perceive "
— be united with the predicate for the
major proposition, and then be altered
to — " the things we perceive by se?ise.':
when joined to the subject, for the
minor ; it will be seen that an incon-
k5
202 on Berkeley's principles
elusive syllogism is thence formed. —
For if the major proposition stands,
"Our ideas and sensations, are the only
things we 'perceive,'" and the minor, " Ob-
jects are the things we perceive by sense,"
the conclusion, viz. " Therefore objects
are only our ideas and sensations," does
not logically follow, because the middle
term would then consist of " two different
parts, or kinds, of the same universal idea,"
i.e. the idea of perception in general;
" and this will never serve to show whether
the subject and predicate agree, or dis-
agree."* For in the general conscious per-
ception of sensible qualities, are included the
knowledge that the organs of sense are used,
as mechanical instruments acted upon by cer-
tain causes, and the ideas of these~causes .
And this conscious use of the mechanical
action of the five senses in relation to other
beings than the mind, is a very different
part, or kind of the universal idea of per-
ception, from the mental consciousness of
PARTICULAR SENSIBLE QUALITIEStfft/z/ ,'
* Watts's Logic.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 203
which is also another part, or kind of
the general notion of perception ; which
general notion includes every species of
consciousness whatever. The conscious-
ness whether the organs of sense be
used or not, in perceiving objects, is the
great criterion of a sane, or insane state
of mind, of its waking or sleeping con-
dition ; the consciousness that the
organs of sense are used, makes all the
difference between objects of sense, or
objects of memory, reason, or imagina-
tion. By the quick and practical use of
the senses subsequent to infancy, the asso-
ciations of ideas, resulting from reason
and experience, are so interwoven and so
immediate with the consciousness of their
use, that they ought always to be consi-
dered as forming a component part of the
whole ideas which lie under the terms, the
objects of sense. The objects of sense,
therefore, (under the conscious use of
the organs of sense,) are known, (ac-
cording to the reasoning used in the
foregoing chapters of this essay,) to be the
continued, exterior, and independant exist-
204 on Berkeley's principles
ences of external nature, exciting ideas,
and determining sensations in the mind
of a sentient being ; but not only to be
ideas and sensations.
In the sentence already commented
on, and which contains the sum of Dr.
Berkeley's doctrine — the word object, as
well as the phrase " perception by sense"
is of ambiguous application; — for in his
use of the word object, he begs the
question ; meaning thereby a collection
of sensible qualities, formed by the
senses and apprehended by the mind ;
whereas the adversary means by that
word, a set of qualities exterior to the
mind, and to which the organs of sense
are in relation as mechanical instru-
ments, and of which they take notice
as those permanent existences, which
the understanding is aware must needs
continue when unperceived, ere they are
transformed by their action into other
beings. Objects before the notice of
the senses, are not the same things as
after their acquaintance with them. All
men mean by objects the things which
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 205
exist previously to their mixture with
the action of the organs of sense, and
Which FROM POWERFUL ASSOCIATION,
they conceive to exist under the forms of
their sensible qualities; — therefore by
feigning the contrary notion there can
arise no convincing argument.
To go on, however, with the argu-
ment, (by which I would show that ob-
jects of sense are not only the ideas of
their sensible qualities,) I observe that
reason discovering these objects to be
in their relation to each other, as va-
rious as the impressions they convey;
also perceives them to be in one respect
like Xh.e ideas they create ; i.e. in the
same proportions and bearings to each
other, outwardly as they are inwardly.
Therefore among the observations we
have of " our ideas and sensations" of
sensible qualities, we do perceive some-
thing else than these mere " ideas or
sensations ;" for we perceive by reason,
that those things which must needs be
present in order as causes to affect the
sense, may on account of their variety,
206 on Berkeley's principles
their similar distinctness, and proportions,
be named, (when considered as existing
exterior to the instruments of sense,)
by the names they bear when inwardly
taken notice of.
Now I consider the observation of
this latter circumstance as containing a
full answer to all the puzzling contra-
dictions of Bishop Berkeley's theory;
for although, in a popular manner, men
consider things are outwardly the coun-
terpart of what they perceive inwardly ;
yet this is not the whole reason of the
difference they make amidst things : for
the soul does truly in a sense perceive
outward things, as they are when exist-
ing outwardly, for after reason shews
that the qualities of things, in a state
of perception, cannot be like them out of
a state of perception, yet being conscious
that sensation is only a simple act, (a
power, a quality,) it perceives by the un-
derstanding thatthe varieties of things are
in relation to each other outwardly in the
same proportion as are the inward sensa-
tions . Thus hard and soft,bitter and sweet,
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 207
heat and cold, round and square,are there-
fore perceived not only to be sensations,
but to be certain unknown qualities of
objects independant of the mind in re-
lation to each other, and in that state " to
continue to exist, ready to appear to the
senses when called for." Popularly, the
sensations these excite, are associated with
the notions of the outward objects, and all
their varieties. But when philosophy
breaks up this association, she should
not take away more than what this na-
tural junction of thought has created;
Bishop Berkeley does not merely sepa-
rate what is mixed, but would destroy
the whole compound together. This
observation, in my opinion, contains a
demonstration against the Berkelean
theory, and restores nature entirely to
her rights again. " Equals taken from
equals the remainders are equal.'" Take
sensation, simple sensation, the power or
capacity of feeling merely, from exten-
sion, from colour, from sound, and from
taste; from heat and cold; from electri-
city or attraction ; from fire, air, water,
.208 on Berkeley's principles
or earth ; from the 'perception of life, or
the idea of death ; from motion or rest.
Is there nothing left ? Every thing is
left that has any variety or difference in
it. " What are objects" (says Bishop
Berkeley) " but the ideas perceived by
sense ?" They are beings perceived by
reason, to be continually, independantly,
outwardly existing, of the same propor-
tions as are the inward sensations of
which they are the effects. Had Bishop
Berkeley allowed of the force of a most
finished piece of reasoning he uses in
respect to the proof of the existence of
other minds than our own, in behalf also
of objects that are not minds, he had
not set before the public, some para-
doxes, unhappily considered as unan-
swerable. In (sect. 195), he says, " From
" what has been said, it is plain that
" we cannot know the existence of other
" spirits otherwise than by their opera-
" tions, or the ideas by them excited in
"us. I perceive several motions,
" changes, and combinations of ideas,
" that inform me there are certain par-
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 209
" ticular agents like myself, which ac-
" company them and concur in their
" production. Hence the knowledge I
" have of other spirits is not immediate
" as is the knowledge of my ideas, but
" depending on the intervention of ideas,
" by me referred to agents or spirits
" distinct from myself, as effects or con-
" comitant signs."
Now my argument (however ill I
may have executed it) intends the whole
way to show " that our knowledge of
other objects" (of any kind) is not im-
mediate as is the knowledge of our ideas,"
but depends " on the intervention of our
ideas," by us referred to " agents or
spirits," (to unknown proportionate causes
distinct from ourselves,) and that the
several " motions, changes, and combina-
" tions of ideas, which we perceive, in-
" form us that there are certain parti-
" cular agents like ourselves" (always like
ourselves as continuing to exist, and in
other qualities, plus or minus ourselves)
" which accompany them, and concur
" in their production."
210 on Berkeley's principles
In order, however, to carry the argu-
ment a little farther on these matters, let
us examine with a greater nicety than
we have yet done this proposition ; —
" figure, extension, and motion are only
" ideas in the perceiving mind," — and
let us select one quality, say figure,
for this examination, in order to sim-
plify the analysis ; then the argument
which applies to figure, will also apply
to the other qualities.
Let the question be ; Is figure an idea
only in the perceiving mind ? Now un-
doubtedly the sense, inward perception,
or notion of figure, (or by whatever word
shall be designated the conscious sensa-
tion of a living being which it has, un-
der the impression of figure,) can only be
in a perceiving mind ; and nothing else
can be like it but such another sensa-
tion : but this sense of figure, is not what
the word figure, only means when ap-
plied to an object which affects either
the sense of sight or touch. It is then
a relative term — a sign of a compound
notion, signifying a particular sensation
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 211
caused by a particular cause, which cause
is not a sensation. Moreover, the word
is also understood to be applicable to the
proportion which that cause (or " outward
continuous object " ) bears to the other out-
ward beings surrounding it; (and this
without supposing they are the least
like our ideas ;) for let us consider a
round figure, for instance, apart from our
perception of it ; the line which bounds
this solid substance outwardly, (whatever
line and solid may be,) and parts it from
the surrounding atmosphere, (whatever
parting or atmosphere may be,) must still
be a variety, or change, or difference, among
these outward things, and this difference
among outward unknown things, not
like sensations, is outward, and is always
meant in that sense by the word, which
signifies, a certain state of continuous ex-
istence, which is independant of mind.
The word and notion are compound, and
each stands for the cause and effect united,
and not only for the effect. Philosophers,
therefore, ought to be capable of per-
ceiving that figure, extension, and mo-
212 on Berkeley's principles
tion, &c. are not only ideas in the mind,
but are capacities, qualities, beings in
nature in relation to each other when
exterior to mind.
It is owing to our ideas being the
counterparts of the proportions of those
things, which our reason teaches us
must be independant of mind, that Dr.
Reid talks of an intuitive conception and
knowledge of the nature of outward
extension, &c. Whereas it is by ob-
serving the relations of our ideas which
are effects, whose causes must be equal
to them, that we have a knowledge of
that relation which the independant and
permanent objects of the universe must
needs bear to each other ; if instinct
only guided us, there would be no more
proof of the external world than of a
dream, where there is an equal instinct
in behalf of what is afterwards acknow-
ledged to be non-existent.
But the perceptions of the relations
which our ideas and sensations bear to
each other, and the results therein de-
duced, put the proof of an external and
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 213
continually existant universe upon the
same footing as the existence of the
sensations themselves, and form a de-
duction as demonstrable, and clear, and
convincing* as any mathematical cer-
tainty whatever.
To go on, Bishop Berkeley however
allows that there are causes for the sen-
sations of sensible qualities ; independ-
ant of the perceiving mind. But it is
in descanting upon their nature that he
is again guilty of as fallacious, and in-
conclusive, and paradoxical reasoning
as that which we have just examined ;
for he uses the very argument of his
adversary, (which he has been indus-
triously endeavouring to destroy,) as an
instrument to prove his own doctrine,
and I shall now proceed to shew that
he does so.
Section II.
(Section 25th and 26th.) " We per-
" ceive," says Bishop Berkeley, " a
" continual succession of ideas ; there
214 on Berkeley's principles
" is therefore some cause of these ideas.
" This cause cannot be any quality or
" idea ; for an idea " (section 25th)
" is an inert being, and cannot be the
" cause of any thing. It must therefore
" be a substance," (section 26th,) " and
" as it has been shown there is no ma-
" terial substance, it remains the cause
" of our ideas, is an incorporeal, active
" substance or spirit." (Section 27th.)
" A spirit is one simple, undivided,
" active being, which hath understand-
* ing and will." (Section 28th.) " My
" own will excites in my mind ideas at
" pleasure, and by the same power they
" are destroyed. This making and un-
" making of ideas, very properly deno-
*' minates the mind active." (Section
29th.) " But the ideas imprinted on
" sense are not the creatures of my
" will, there is therefore some other
" will or spirit which produces them."
(Section 30th.) " Now there are set
" rules, or established methods, where-
" by the mind we depend on excites in
" us the ideas of sense, and these are
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 215
" called the Laws of Nature."* (Section
156th.) " By nature is meant the vi-
" sible series of effects or sensations
" imprinted on our mind." The con-
clusion of the whole matter is, that
there is nothing but two sets of ob-
jects, viz. "spirits" and "ideas;"
" spirits as causes, and ideas as their
effects." Now it is plain we can know
no more of activity, indivisibility, and
simplicity, as applied to substance, called
mind, than of inertness, divisibility, &c.
applied to another sort of substance,
called matter. These are still only ideas
gained in the usual way, rejected when
applied to objects of sense existing with-
out the mind, but made use of by him,
when applied to spirit, existing without
the mind. " Motion" (Bishop Berkeley
distinctly says) " is only an idea existing
in the mind." If so, I ask, what does
he know about activity, as absolutely ne-
cessary to constitute a cause, and which
* The remaining sections are taken up in an-
swering objections, and are quite immaterial to the
subject of these remarks.
216 on Berkeley's principles
cause, he says, cannot be an idea?
because ideas are " visibly zwactive."
Also, what notion can he have of cause
at all, if he knows of " nothing but
ideas ;" and ideas are not causes, and what
too are the rules and methods of the
working of a spirit, which as rules and
methods and laws of nature, cannot
themselves be spirit or substance, yet
are not allowed to be material beings ?
And how can the will at pleasure, call
upon an idea, when before it begins to
call, it must know what it wishes to call,
and so must have consciousness of the
idea in question, which as an object asso-
ciated with another idea, can and does
truly act as a cause in order to introduce
it. But /argue as we can distinguish
between the capacity for sensation in
general, and that for the exciting causes
of extension and other qualities in par-
ticular, so we have a right to name
this mind, and that body, and that
after all the talk of materialists, who
say, " matter cannot act on mind/'
(" they are discordant beings ; so all is
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 217
matter;") And the immaterialists who
say the same things, (" and that all is
mind," for the same reason;) it ap-
pears perfectly easy that such causes
and capacities, such collections of qua-
lities should intermix, and produce
those results, which take place under
different forms of sensible objects ; and
which in my opinion are combined by
the junction of the qualities of matter,
or unknown powers, or qualities in na-
ture ; the senses, or instruments fitted
to act along with these ; and the mind,
or sentient principle and capacity. Na-
ture in her whole works bears witness
such is the case. — Also by keeping
strictly in view, that the power of
sensation is one and simple, ---and that
subtracting it from all the objects with
which we are acquainted, the remain-
ing qualities will bear still to be con-
sidered as worthy of holding the
various names affixed to their appear-
ances upon the sense, and reasoned on
as before; — there will be cause and
effect, extension and space ; time and
L
218 on Berkeley's principles
eternity ; variety of figure and colour ;
heat and cold, merit and demerit;
beauty and deformity, &c. &c.
The proportions of all these beings
among themselves, the external inde-
pendant qualities in nature among
themselves, corresponding to our per-
ceptions, must be as various as they
appear to the mind ; therefore, there is
figure, extension, colour, and all qua-
lities whatever. Nor is it necessary in
order to support the idea of Deity, and
his constant presence and providence,
to have recourse to the ridiculous no-
tion of his activity as a " spirit" upon
our senses in order to change our
ideas; for whilst the perception of sen-
sible qualities immediately informs us of
our own sensations* reason by the in-
tervention of the ideas of their dif-
ferent relations, equally discovers to
us insentient existences, as well as that
of our own, and other minds; whilst
with respect to the being of God, his
essential existence, his continued exist-
* See p. 14, " Also the mind," &c.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 219
ence, is demonstrated, by the abstract
argument used in this treatise. " What-
" ever variety and changes of being
" there are, all changes must finally be
" pushed back to that essence, who be-
" gan not to be, and in whom all de-
" pendant beings originally resided, and
" were first put forth as out- goings of
" himself in all those varieties of atti-
" tudes, wherewith his wisdom and
" benevolence are able to fit out every
" variety and gradation of creature."*
* See p. 189.
L2
220
ESSAY II.
UPON THE NATURE OF THE FIVE OR-
GANS OF SENSE, AND THEIR MANNER
OF ACTION WITH REGARD TO EX-
TERNAL PERCEPTION.
I would here more fully consider a
subject of great importance, upon
which I have but briefly touched in
the larger essay, " on external per-
ception ;" namely, The nature of the Jive
organs of sense, and the manner in which
they are used, with regard to the con-
veyance of the perception of external ob-
jects to the mind. This subject appears
to me but partially analysed by the au-
thors to which I have there alluded.
It is naturally complicated ; embraces
a vast variety of particulars bearing
ON THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 221
upon each other ; — Each of which in order
to be examined aright, must, during
the period of its examination, be equally
considered as unproved, as well as
others which might suffice as proofs,
were they not also involved in the un-
certainty of the point in question.
When this is done, every object what-
ever of supposed existence, independant
of mental consciousness, is found to be
upon an equal footing, and must neces-
sarily be put aside, on account of being
as yet unacknowledged.
What then remains as given data ?
Nothing but our sensations, mental con-
sciousnesses, (simple or complex,) ar-
bitrarily named, and their relations ;
and this seems to leave so frightful a
void ; the analysis of our knowledge
into such materials seems so impossible ;
and the being capable of arriving at
any certain evidence for real things (as
they are called,) by a synthesis formed
of such, seems likewise so impossible,
that the soul starts back with a wise
alarm for fear of venturing too far, and
222 THE NATURE OF
beyond the limits whence it may be able
to retread its steps if such should be
the case ; yet as I have attempted to
question so much, I must in order to be
consistent, push my inquiries still fur-
ther. I must lead on to where this
subject points, and endeavour to make
that theory, which to my own mind
is consistent and luminous, appear so to
others.
Now, that our living conscious sen-
sations, that is, those consciousnesses
which are sufficiently vivid to form
strong impressions ; and long enough in
duration to admit of being compared
together ; with the results of their com-
parisons as again forming a new class
of sensations, (ideas of reason,) are the
only, the original, and immediate ma-
terials of our knowledge, is the chief
feature of the philosophy I would pro-
fess. And I do consider these mate-
rials as sufficient for every useful opi-
nion ; for the proof of every existence
which others refer to " instincts," "pri-
mary laws of belief" " ultimate facts"
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 223
" immediate knowledge by the senses," or
other meatis, the which do truly leave
the objects of which they testify wholly
without any proof whatever ; for, " that
we are incapable of thinking otherwise
than we do" can itself be no reason that
we think rightly. The same instincts,
laws of belief, immediate knowledge
by senses, do, in the course of every
twenty-four hours, afford the same kinds
of proof for the independant existence
of objects which men admit to be non-
existent without a doubt remaining on
the subject; but when our conscious-
nesses of sensation, and the results
arising from the comparison of them
are reposed in, as being the only ori-
ginal materials of our knowledge, and
as therefore containing the proofs of
the existences, with which we are ac-
quainted, then inasmuch as the ori-
ginal sensations are the beings, the
very beings themselves ; so the know-
ledge of their existence is in and with
themselves, as well as of the existences
contained in their relations.
The ideas of reason are thence upon
224 THE NATURE OF
the same footing as to certainty, as are
those of sensation, and are true demon-
strations of existences. The reason,
therefore, for believing in existence,
independant of consciousness, must bear
to be examined and substantiated upon
this foundation; i. e. as being the re-
sult of the comparison of our " ideas of
sensation." The ideas of reason must
be the corollaries included in the
impressions of sense, from whatever
source they may be supposed to arise ;
they must be the conclusions of
the judgment when the faculties are
in a state to exert their power. For
independant existences are, by the very
terms, and supposition of the state-
ment, unconscious ; and, therefore, must
be known of as a result derived from
the comparison and included in the re-
lations of those which are conscious.
In this inquiry all writers I have met
with, (especially Bishop Berkeley, who
professes idealism,) are to be blamed
for an oversight, when they speak of
the senses in such phrases as these,
"objects imprinted on the senses" "the
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 225
perception of external objects by the
senses ;" &c. without even considering
that the whole question is begged by
this use of the word sefises ; an object
imprinted on the eye, for instance, must
mean, (even in Bishop Berkeley's
sense,) an object rendered conscious
by the use of the eye ; but what is the
use of the eye itself, other than a con-
scious sensation, or action, supposed
to involve the knowledge of an object,
EXTERIOR tO, and INDEPENDANT of
that mind, to which it serves as an in-
strument of perception ? For unless
the whole subject in question is
granted, the consciousness of the use
of the organs of sense, can but be con-
sidered as some " sensations and ideas,"*
which introduce into the mind, other
" sensations and ideas." Yet Berkeley
evidently considers the use of the or-
gans of sense, as a circumstance dis-
tinguished and different from " ideas and
* " Sensations and ideas," is the phrase by which
Berkeley always expresses the conscious perception
of any sensible qualities whatever.
L 5
226 THE XATURE OF
sensations;" because he considers that
••' God by set rules and methods, called
" the laws of nature, works upon and
•• with the sensed, in order to create
tc ideas of sensation, objects of sense
" every moment.'" He thus makes an
essential difference between the two
powers in nature, without marking out
any criterion of distinction by which
the mind may recognize any such dif-
ference between them : the senses, there-
fore, in his notion of them, are as ne-
cessary, to be acted upon " by these set
rules and working* of a spirit," as they
are in order to be worked upon by real
extension, kc. in the language of the anti-
idealists. What then, I again ask, are
the so worked upon ? are they
other set rides of the spirit I If so, one
set of rules acts upon another set of
rules, in order, for instance, to give us
ideas of vision : but one set of rules
would seem enough to give us such
ideas. It appears, then, that the
" senses" in relation to the actions of a
spirit, must at any rate be something
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 227
extra to the consciousness of their use.
They are something in Berkeley's sense
by which the spirit we depend upon
introduces " ideas in our minds," but
they are not as yet sensations in a
mind, for it is by them sensations and
ideas are introduced into the mind.
The consciousness of the use of the eye
could not introduce light ; it must be
the eye properly so called, whatever
that organ when unperceived may be :
therefore, the organs of sense are at
least, even in Berkeley's sense, some
objects — not themselves <f the set rules of a
spirit" nor yet " ideas and sensations,"
but, existences independant of either,
which must needs exist as continuous
existences, unknown and unperceived in
their qualities, in order to account for
the creation of sensations and ideas in the
mind. And if so, there may be others
like them, and every variety which may
be unlike them, save in that one quality
of existence.
In Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's *
* There may be some slight shade of difference
between Mr. Stewart's and Dr. Reid's sentiments on
228 THE NATURE OF
sense, the " senses" mean mechanical,
extended, figured, solid existences ; as
means, instruments, and causes, by
which we immediately perceive the exist-
ence of external objects, and to the
use of which there is instinctively an-
nexed, the knowledge of the nature of
their primary qualities, wThen existing
independant of any perception of mind ;
as well as an " ultimate law of belief"
" without any process of reason," by
which there arises the knowledge of
their permanent independant existence.
It is evident, the whole question in
such a doctrine is again taken as
granted. Does the eye, then, tell us
what the eye is made of? or, does it
acquaint us with what is the nature of
touch ? Does the ear tell us of its own
formation ? or, the nostrils prove to us
their solidity and extension ? This ob-
viously cannot be the case. Let then
the organs of sense be set apart as
they ought, (if the argument is to be
logically conducted,) and the knowledge
this head, but if so, it is too indistinctly set forth,
to enable me exactly to descry its boundary.
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 229
of these as external, independant, and
continuous existences be involved in the
general question. In this sense, how
is their existence known ?
I suppose Dr. Reid and his friends
will tell us, that the touch, as a mere
sensation, would be capable of " sug-
gesting" the exteriority and indepen-
dancy of the other organs of sense :
" That the hand might grasp" the eye
"as a ball, and perceive it at once
" hard, figured, and extended :" (( That
" the feeling is very simple, and hath not
" the least resemblance to any quality of
"body:" yet, that it "suggests to us
" three primary qualities perfectly distinct
"from one another, as well as from the
"sensation which indicates them;"* for
* These sentiments Mr. Stewart alludes to in his
essays, as being at once original, and profound ;
logical and luminous ; giving them his warmest
approbation, and supporting them by his sanction ;
therefore, it may perhaps be some error, (for aught
I know,) in my judgment, which makes me conceive
them as unfounded in fact, and contrary to every
principle of correct reasoning. See his Essay on
the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 2, chap. 1,
sec. 3, p. 68, also Essays, note O.
230 THE NATURE OF
" that although the feeling of touch no more
•■ resembles extension than it does justice, or
" courage, yet that every moment it 'presents
" extension to the mind ; and that by it we
" have the notion of " a quality of body ;"
(which, however, is not a notion but a
quality of body.)
But when the eye is in the hand,
what informs the mind by this touch ;
what suggests the independant continuous
existence of its extension, figure, and
hardness, granting these qualities were
proved ? (for this is the material part
of the question :) For when the organs
of sense, both by idealists and anti-
idealists, are spoken of, it is taken for
granted, that as mechanical instruments
they are continued independant existences ;
and are neither sensations of mind, nor
yet the qualities of bodies.
The power of motion, as a sixth or-
gan of sense, (for so it may be re-
garded,) as the method of overcoming
distance, and of becoming acquainted
with tangible extension, is equally taken
for granted, as existing unperceived,
and as an aid to the five organs of sense.
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 231
After perceiving these errors in the
distinct manner I do, I feel anxious in
entering upon a statement which I
would fain believe less open to ob-
jection. I conceive, however, that the
doctrine I have laid down at large in
the essay on external perception, must,
if understood rightly, be so considered,
and I will add thus further to it.
Philosophically, the organs of sense
must be considered as z^zknown exist-
ences in their unperceived state, yet
as yielding their own peculiar and ap-
propriate sensations or ideas to the
mind ; their continued, independant exist-
ence is found as a result, or perceived
by the understanding as a relation of
its simple sensations ; for the mind
perceiving, upon each irregular appli-
cation to some sorts of beings, or qua-
lities, or ideas, which it may call the
organs of sense if it jjlease, that they
regularly reply to that application,
justly concludes them to exist when
unnoticed, in order to be capable of this
readiness to reply. Those objects, also,
232 THE NATURE OF
which do thus reply, yield to the sense
of motion from point to point, an idea
of resistance and extension in parti-
cular; and so are regarded as body;
that is, as essences different from the
mind, or the powers of sensation in ge-
neral; but continually existing objects,
or qualities, which yield ideas of ex-
tension, are not ideas, but continued
existences called bodies.
Thus the organs of sense, are those
independant continuous existences, with
whose ideas the mind associates the sen-
sible qualities their action excites in the
mind ; and which are observed to have
their share in performing the changes,
as well as to detect # the presence of ob-
jects, which are themselves, neither the
organs of sense, nor yet the mind itself.
The foundation of the whole reason-
ing concerning the independancy both
of the organs of sense, as well as of
other objects, arises from the axiom,
" that no idea, or quality, can begin its
* See p. 233, " But again," &c. ; also, p. 102,
" It is not sufficient, therefore," &c.
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 233
own existence." For we perceive that
the sensation as of the use of any organ
of sense, does not alter the mind always
in the same way ; therefore, the mind
and the organs of sense being the same
upon any occasion as on a former one,
when no other object than themselves
were present, a third object is required
to occasion the interruption of its pre-
sent state, which object is to be seen,
or heard, or felt,&c* But again, when
there is the mind, and any other object
known, or supposed present, — if the
eye be shut ; the hand removed, &c.
such object will not appear ; therefore,
to the observance of any particular ob-
ject, there is not only required the
mind, and the object, but also the
organs of sense; those parts of the
* In this inquiry it ought to be unnecessary to
repeat, although I have done it for the sake of
clearness, that no object, or idea, can begin its own
existence, but must appear as a change of those
objects already in being, and as requiring corres-
ponding previous interferences, unions, separations,
&c.
234 THE NATURE OF
human frame, (or ideas, or whatsoever
else they may be called.)
The organs of sense, therefore, when
analysed are continued existences, which
form the media of admixture between
other objects and minds. It is not the
consciousness of their use, however,
which renders them a part of the whole
cause necessary to that end, because that
consciousness is but an effect, or sen-
sible quality ; they must be considered
when they act as causes, as unper-
ceived beings, and so must the minds
also, as well as the other objects in re-
lation to them ; and it is in the co-
alescence of these three, that consci-
ous, complex, sensible qualities,* must
be considered to exist. But to this
day the sensible \ qualities are consi-
dered as fastened upon the objects, which
are neither organs of sense, nor minds,
and to be their own independant qualities
* See 6th Essay, that sensible qualities cannot
be causes.
f The doctrine of Aristotle is the same as this,
which I have found since writing the above.
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 235
on account of the intimate association
between their respective ideas and sen-
sations.*
I have already, perhaps, intruded
upon the patience of the reader too
much, by repeating some things already
said, in order to throw light upon this
intricate part of the subject; I shall
only now add, that the great difficulty
and mystery in the affair, is, that in
dreams, insanities, &c. the organs of
sense are thought to be in use; for
there is a sensation, as though they
must have been in use, on account of a
reference made to them, as the only
instruments capable of having let their
specific objects into the mind's appre-
hension. The memory and understand-
ing are then asleep, and the mind there-
fore cannot take notice of all the ideas
which would otherwise affect it and their
relations. The objects, therefore, which
appear, are considered as those, which
are in relation to the senses, and they
are thence expected to be capable of
* See p. 142, i( Now objects," &c.
236 THE MATURE OF
those further qualities which are ne-
cessary to their definitions. And, in
fact, I perceive not how the proposition
can be refuted, that although there may
be truth in the world, yet the dis-
covery of an absolute criterion of an under-
standing capable of detecting it, does
not seem to be the lot of human nature.
Thus the sensible quality termed the use
of the senses, appears to the mind in
dreams, whilst yet the mind cannot
discover that it is but dreaming ; it
must therefore awake, and be in a state
to find that such senses as these, do
not fulfil their definitions, that their
organs do not continue to exist, and
cannot exert any unperceived action,
ere it is able to discover the delusion.
The reason why the. mind is deluded
in dreams, and other fancies, is on ac-
count of its being known, first, that si-
milar effects must have similar causes,
and secondly, that these causes are usually
found along with other compound objects,
which have further effects, other qualities
when meeting with other objects ; a habit of
THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 237
expectation is thus formed which even in
a disordered fancy leads the mind to
consider similar sensible qualities, as a com-
pound general effect, from such a general
cause * or object, as will fulfil the re-
mainder of its qualities upo?i trial.
In dreams the sensible qualities arising
from what is termed the use of the senses,
is not corrected, by other sensible qualities ;
nor by the reasoning which the mind
when awake is always latently using,
when it draws inferences from certain
consistencies, or inconsistencies, amidst
its ideas ; to the power of such reason-
ing it is restored upon the moment of
awaking, by which it is made aware of
the place where it has long been ; then
the mass of appearances before the
fancy, immediately takes its flight and
the enchantment is dissolved.
Indeed it may be remarked, that in
waking as tvell as in sleeping hours, when
* See essay on causation ; Mr. Hume is so far
from being correct in supposing that regular con-
junction generates the idea of causation, that on
the contrary, it is only itself looked upon as ax
effect of its own regular cause.
238 THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE.
memory is gone, we cannot remember that
we forget, nor perceive relations which do
not 'present themselves to deficient powers of
reasoning ; the want of ideas in those who
think they have sufficient, will ever yield a
ground of scepticism to men of understand-
ing ; lest they should lie under the same pre-
dicament, without having any criterion by
which to detect the difference. It is when
ideas of reason are clearly included in those
of sensation, that I assert, they are upon
the same footing as to certainty. I con-
clude nothing from the want of them.
Bishop Berkeley has been, I think,
much misunderstood on account of his
conceiving that things were created each
time of their appearance ; he only
meant to say, that the formation of the
sensible qualities by the use of the
senses, existed in and by their use,
and that they could not exist thus, (in
that manner and fashion,) except in a
mind perceiving them, and thus far I
perfectly agree with him.
239
ESSAY III.
THAT THE EXTERNAL CAUSES WHICH
DETERMINE THE VARIOUS PERCEP-
TIONS OF SENSE, ARE NOT THE IM-
MEDIATE ACTIONS OF DEITY.
As our perceptions themselves are
allowed on all hands not to be imme-
diate actions of Deity, so their causes
may be equally observed to require
many processes of nature in order to
their production ; of this we may very
well judge by that comparison of ideas
in which all reasoning consists. For
sensation in general being but a simple
power, its particular varieties can be no
other than measures, tests, or examples
of that variety which must necessarily
exist in those things which are not in-
240 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION"
eluded in sensation, - that is, in those
things which are excluded from it, and
are therefore in qualities exterior to it,
but which meeting with the internal
sense, alters it accordingly: thus we
may very well know that vast prepara-
tions go on of unperceived beings, and
of such whose essences are unknown, in
order to accomplish the formation of an
universe, or the growth of the harvest ;
the creation of man, or the flight of a
butterfly ; the developement of the least,
equally with the most magnificent of
nature's works, which requires the pro-
gress arising from successive changes.
For it is manifest, that the external
causes of our sensations must exist
among themselves in the same propor-
tions as do the internal varieties of sen-
sation, their effects ; and this notion
may be expressed after the same man-
ner in which any usual proportion is
stated ; thus, as is the variety of differ-
ent simple or compound sensations, so is
the variety of their causes. Therefore
by examining aright the proportions and
NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 241
relations of our ideas, by perceiving that
some afford evidence that they are
created by living beings ; " beings like
" ourselves (plus or minus their va-
" rieties,") and that others afford evi-
dence that they are created by beings
devoid of life ; still by beings like our-
selves, (" plus or minus the varieties/')
we may arrive at the knowledge of ex-
ternal sentiency and insentiency ; and
thus that all which is external cannot be
of one kind, i.e. mind or sentiency ; nor
yet the conscious actions of a sentient
mind. But if it be said that though
they are not the conscious actions of
mind, yet they are actions which are
the effects of a conscious mind, but
themselves not conscious ; then they are
not immediate acts of Deity, but mediate
acts of Deity, whose varieties meeting
with the human senses, create our
ideas.
And this is the very doctrine for which
I contend, and the elucidation of which
is not unimportant, now that there exists
a disposition among some, to revive a
M
242 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION
rigid Berkeleian philosophy ; admitting
no existence in the universe, excepting
that of the Deity, and the individual
who is reasoning, I divide therefore
with Berkeley, by applying the argu-
ment he himself uses in behalf of the
proof that there are other minds than
his own in the universe, to the proof of
existences which may be other than
mind.
Thus there becomes a real distinction
between the nature of some existences
and that of others, as far as their rela-
tive variety and proportion goes. And
this difference may be known by the
nature of the effects in their varieties :
the one kind of existence may very pro-
perly be termed matter, and the other
mind. And thus the definition of matter
becomes the capacity of exhibiting upon a
sentient nature, the sense of solid exten-
sion in general; and that of mind, a
capacity fitted to be excited to any sensa-
tion in particular.
Therefore as the capacity for exhi-
biting extension, appears not itself to
NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 243
be essentially sentient, and in all cases
fitted to be excited to sensation ; so by
thus differing in its enumeration of qua-
lities, it cannot be mind, or the sentient
actions of Deity.
But although the proportional varieties
of external objects may be known
thus far, nevertheless I consider it
never can be too much insisted on, (in
order to maintain an exact philosophy,)
that the positive nature and essence of
unperceived beings cannot be known ;
feeling, thought, sensation under its
varieties, is the only essence of which
we have absolute consciousness. Other
essences we know, must exist by rea-
soning ; but the reasoning is here the
consciousness, not the other essences.
We have the knowledge there must
necessarily be such beings ; but it is
the knowledge of which we are con-
scious, not the beings themselves. We
have proof by the comparison of our
ideas, that there are unperceived na-
tures ; but it is the proof whose es-
sence we know, not the nature proved.
m2
244 CAUSES OF PERCEPTION
We believe in those things, of the exist-
ence of which there are unequivocal signs ;
but the signs are not the existences.
The real essences of matter and
mind we know not ; we only know our
sensations, as real beings, very essences :
these are the very things themselves.
We know of other things which must
" needs exist" by our sensations, but
cannot conceive the nature of any es-
sence not in our experience.
I trust such ideas will not be thought
tending to a dangerous scepticism. So
different does their tendency appear
to my own mind, that I consider them
as leading to the most solid belief and
conviction, in the existence of every
variety of being which alters the con-
scious sense, and which reason upholds
as exterior to it, and independant of it ;
whether as a perpetual series of
changes flowing from the only origin
of all things; or as that mysterious
being himself, either concealed behind
those mediate acts which screen his
glory from mortal man, or manifesting
NOT IMMEDIATE ACTS OF DEITY. 245
himself in many ways, better suited to
our comprehension, and better fitted by
the qualities contemplated, to be com-
pared to ourselves in their variety ; and
to create trust, esteem, and hope, in
their decided superiority.
246
ESSAY IV.
UPON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. DUGALD
STEWART AND DR. REID, AS IT RE-
GARDS THE UNION OF COLOUR WITH
extension; and the PERCEPTION
OF THE EXTERNAL PRIMARY QUALI-
TIES OF MATTER.
Mr. D. Stewart has the following
passage in the first volume of the Phi-
losophy of the Human Mind.* " I
" formerly had occasion to mention
" several instances of very intimate as-
" sociation formed between two ideas,
" which have no necessary connexion
"with each other; one of the most
66 remarkable is that which exists in
" every person's mind between the no-
" tions of colour and of extension.
* Part 2, ch. 5, p. 1.
ON COLOUR AND EXTENSION. 247
" The former of these words expresses
" a sensation of the mind, the latter de-
" notes a quality of an external object.
"So that there is, in fact, no more
" connexion between the two notions
" than between those of pain and so-
" lidity."
Now, I consider, this passage as con-
taining, in a few lines, a complete ex-
ample of the errors in modern meta-
physics, as to the nature and manner of
external perception. There is here said
to be, an intimate association between
two notions, viz. those of extension and
colour; whilst yet the word extension
is said to express " the quality of an
external object," instead of a notion;
and as such must be incapable of asso-
ciating as an " idea," with the " idea of co-
lour," which is also said to be " a sensation
of the mind" The whole sentence to those
who will examine it accurately, must
appear to involve a contradiction.
Mr. Stewart, by later publications
than this, shows himself the avowed
admirer and supporter of Dr. Reid's
248 THE UNION OF COLOUR
philosophy, which, although he ob-
serves, that it may require some im-
provement in the way of addition, he
conceives to be incontrovertible as far
as it goes, and as not involving obvious
inconsistencies, and contradictions. It
is the philosophy of these authors, that
the primary qualities of bodies are
objects immediately perceived to be
exterior to the mind, whose essences also
may distinctly be conceived of, in their ex-
ternal state ; that the conception of the
nature of these essences is suggested by
means of the sensations these qualities
excite in the mind, through their action
on the senses, but that the conception itself
is not a sensation. These exterior qua-
lities are, therefore, perceived not to be
sensible qualities, but to be totally unlike
them. Along with this perception of
the exteriority, and conception of the
nature of external primary qualities,
instinct affords an aid to the senses;
by which power it is, the mind becomes
acquainted with the fact, that these
exterior qualities continue to exist when
AND EXTENSION. 249
unperceived by the senses, and inde-
pendant of any of its conceptions.*
Thus, the perceptions of extension,
figure, solidity, motion, hardness, and
softness, &c. are not sensations of mind ;
and there is no occasion for any ideas
of reason, or other means than an ar-
bitrary impulsion by which to appre-
hend their situation, as external to
it; we have also a clear conception
of their positive nature, as they exist
when exterior to the mind ; yet this
clear conception of positive natures, is
not an idea in the mind, nor does it
" suggest any thing which, without the
" grossest abuse of language, can be
" called a sensation."
Visible figure is also supposed by Dr.
Reid, to be " immediately perceived, as the
<( position of parts in relation to the eye,
" external to it, and distant from it."
* This is called the doctrine according to com-
mon sense. See Reid's Essay on the intellectual
powers; also Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind,
c. 5, sec. 3 to 7, pp. 73 to 88, duod.
Stewart's Essays, Note O.
M 5
250 THE UNION OF COLOUR
Thus visible Jigure, i. e. vision; i. e. the
conscious sight of an object, involves
u no sensation of mind,'" but simply
there is " the perception of parts, ex-
ternal to the eye;' " so that if no ap-
pearance of colour existed in the mind,
the external position of an object might
be perceived without its intervention."*
When such thoughts as these are
still held as the doctrines of common
sense, how shall there be future im-
provement in any department of phi-
losophy ?
To return to Mr. Stewart, I would
take his own view of the subject with-
out any needless cavil at a mere ex-
pression. " The sensation of colour is
associated with an external quality,
which is not a sensation of mind."
If so the sensation of colour is there
* That visible figure is perceived altogether ex-
ternal to the eye involves to my mind the statement
of a complete contradiction. It is the result, and
sum of our present philosophy, and lays the foun-
dation of many a further error. See Reid's In-
quiry of the Human Mind, c. 6, sec. 8. pp. 132
and 133.
AND EXTENSION. 251
where the extension is; which involves
the absurdity of sensation residing with-
out the mind ; and is an opinion,
which, (however much modern philoso-
phers may pride themselves upon the
discovery of its absurdity) is yet truly
included in the whole doctrine of the
immediate perception by sense, of ex-
terior primary qualities, of whose
nature there is a clear conception.
But should it be retorted,* that by
this phrase is meant that the notion or
perception of extension is united to
the notion or sensation of colour; and
that the association of these thoughts is
in the mind, although the quality of ex-
tension be external to it: to such a
vindication I would answer, that then
the notion, or perception of extension, is
allowed to be in the mind, notwith-
standing the many battles Dr. Reid
has fought to keep it thence. Coloured
extension is at last, therefore, obliged
to be admitted as a compound notion
* I think, however, Mr. D. Stewart could hardly
use such an argument with fairness.
252 THE UNION OF COLOUR
which exists in the perceiving mind ; —
Upon which result arising, I will not be
unfair enough, in my turn again, to retort
with the question, which is tauntingly
asked of the idealists : — Is this notion
of extension, a square, or a round
notion ? how broad, or how long is it?
because such a question is not very
consistent from those, who admitting every
variety of the appearance of colour, or of
other secondary qualities of matter to be a
sensation of mind, (not possible to exist
unperceived,) never consider it necessary
to ask, whether any particular appear-
ance be a scarlet, or green sensation ;
a blue, or yellow thought ? If an idea
be sweet, or sour ; loud, or soft ? &c.
Now, a philosophy which should ex-
plain the circumstance of colour being
still seen as exterior to, and distant
from the mind and body, after so much
has been done to prove it to be a mere
affection of the mind, would go far by
its natural reunion with every abstract
and practical science, to put the method
of our knowledge of an external uni-
AND EXTENSION. 253
verse upon a better footing than it has
hitherto appeared.
I have attempted some ideas of this
kind, which I fear will hardly be ac-
cepted ; and I am aware the abstruse-
ness of their nature, involves me in the
danger of being thought inconsistent.
The notion of perceiving primary qua-
lities immediately by the organs of sense,
and that they possess exteriority, and of
being able to conceive them by suggestion
from sensation, such as they positively
exist, is contradicted by the circum-
stance of EXTENSION, RESISTANCE, SO-
LIDITY, FIGURE, DISTANCE, MOTION,
being perceived as immediately, and as
vividly, as to every circumstance the
same, in dreams, insanities, and hallu-
cinations, as in a waking and sane state
of mind. Individual appearances will
be in every point alike ; thus all con-
scious qualities, however deemed pri-
mary, and conceptions unlike sensa-
tions, are proved to exist as mental
sensations, or perceptions. They are
thus all and equally effects; changes
254 THE UNION OF COLOUR
upon the principle of sentiency ; va-
rious powers of sensation. It is difficult
indeed, to find a phrase at which philo-
sophers will not cavil ; but perceptions
must necessarily be conscious, therefore,
they are affections of an animated na-
ture. For in whatsoever primary and
secondary qualities may differ, yet
there must be one quality in which
they all agree, namely, as being sen-
tient affections, or consciousnesses.
Primary qualities shall be perceptions if
they please, and secondary ones be
only sensations ; but, as far as per-
ceptions are conscious, they are sentient.
The perception, as perception of exter-
nal qualities, must be conscious, there-
fore, perception of extension, must be a
conscious sensation.
I have founded my theory alluded to,
upon the observation and analysis of
certain facts : — For, first, I perceive
there is no difference in a delirium, &c.
and sane state of mind, between the
delusion and the reality, as far as all
notice of sensible qualities is con-
AND EXTENSION. 255
cerned. Again it is a notorious fact, ac-
cording to the laws of light, that were
the sun blotted from the heavens, it
would still continue to be seen eight
minutes after such an event.
Now,accordingtoMr.Stewart,andDr.
Reid, its figure is immediately perceived
altogether external to mind and body ;
for whilst its extension consists in an
exterior, known, positive quality, sug-
gested to the conception, by a SENSATION
of touch, unlike its conception, this
extension is further associated with the
sensation of a brilliant colour, the whole
forming a visible figure ; a relation of
parts to the eye far distant from it.
What becomes of such a theory ?
of so much argument ; of so much
ridicule of others ; of so much com-
mon sense, in support of a doctrine
entirely inconsistent with other disco-
veries much better supported ?
I have endeavoured to inquire into
the mystery of the knowledge of external
nature, and I own it is wonderful ; I
am as much persuaded as any, that the
256 THE UNION OF COLOUR
objects in relation to the senses, form
an independant and external universe ;
that motion is requisite in order to
overcome distance, &c. Yet the argu-
ment is demonstrative that sensible
qualities, both primary and secondary,
are conscious exhibited effects ; sensations
formed by the excitement of unknown
causes, on the sentient powers ; that
motion in this respect is also a sensa-
tion ; distance likewise ; every con-
sciousness, every perception, every no-
tice, is mental.
What, then, is nature ? What, then,
is the universe ? What are our friends
and children ? I answer, a whole set of
corresponding, but unknown, unperceived
qualities, which have a variety in that
proportion and difference among each other,
which their perceived varieties possess, and
that the knowledge of such a fact, comes
by reason, or arises from the perceptions
of the relations of our ideas.
It is, therefore, because in some
cases reason is wanting in its powers
of observation, and comparison ; because
AND EXTENSION. 257
many results and consequences aris-
ing thence, many ideas put in posi-
tion with others are annihilated in
dreams, hallucinations, and insanities ;
that there is a difference of the most
material kind, with respect to our ca-
pacity of forming a right judgment as
to the causes concerned in the exhibi-
tion of sensible qualities. In delusions
the mind cannot take notice that they are
not caused as usual, because the sense of
place is lost ; and the notice of the means
used in the formation of objects by pre-
vious causes, becomes annihilated ; which
formation it is that renders objects truly
similar to others, and not their mere
appearances. In a sane and waking
state of the mind, we can reason
on causes, and can perceive by an
act of the understanding immediately
coalescing with the senses, all the con-
sistencies, or inconsistencies of the re-
lations of the ideas of the sensible qua-
lities. In such a state, we therefore re-
fer sensible qualities to objects per-
manently, and externally existing ; be-
258 THE UNION OF COLOUR
cause we take notice, they have been
for^med in a manner, and appear under
circumstances, which yield the suppo-
sition of being similar to those which
will return upon irregular applications of
the organs of sense, and so " must needs
continue to exist." In delusion there is
no perception of the understanding ; in
sane thoughts there is. In dreams
the understanding sleeps, the fancy
only is awake : — Yet, however vivacious
the images of fancy may be, if the
understanding in any particular case
should chance to be awake, they are
considered by the subject of them as the
qualities of a disordered mind ; not bo-
dies external to it.
I have heard of a conscious delirium,
in which the sensible qualities of ex-
tension, resistance, sound, colour, the
voice of human beings, and animals,
dancing, music, and painting, all, ap-
pear as real, and vivacious as though
they had been external and distant,
which yet the patient knew did not
exist except in his own heated fancy,
AND EXTENSION. 259
so long as he retained the sense of the
place where he lay, and had presence
of mind to reason on that fact; but
when he lost the recollection of place, he
could not put it in relation with the
rest of the ideas or images in his mind ;
and so referred the sensible qualities
to such usual causes as produced such
images ; i. e. he considered that their
causes existed independant of fancy.
Thus coloured extension is a compound
sensation; the sense of motion is another ;
tangibility and resistance are others ;
but their unperceived, continually
existing causes, are independant of sen-
sation, unperceived, and unknown ; and
whilst their positive nature is unknown,
yet their relative value, among them-
selves, is known to be equal to the re-
lative variety of the " ideas and sensa-
tions;" i.e. the effects they determine
on the mind. But lest in this short
exposition I should only by giving a
hasty sketch, mislead the reader, I re-
fer to the larger essay for these ideas in
their fuller detail. Suffice it to keep
260 THE UNION OF COLOUR
to the point in question, and it fol-
lows, that conscious, coloured extension, is
as a picture in the mind, and must be
associated there with ideas of position,
and distance, and direction, in relation to
motion. The understanding knows these
sensible perceptions of motion and dis-
tance, have corresponding exterior qua-
lities which can appear to other minds,
and which would exist were no con-
sciousness present. Now it is unper-
ceived motion which is in relation to
unperceived distance, and unperceived
contact; (whatever such qualities may-
be when unperceived ;) therefore, when
the soul perceives the picture in which
the coloured atmosphere appears, as
well as the objects beyond it ; it places
them all in proportion to its perception
of the motion requisite to attain con-
tact with them ; referring all the per-
ceived qualities, which are effects,
equally to all the unperceived qualities
which are their causes; and which are
in equal mutual relations. Unperceived
motion truly goes forth to unperceived
AND EXTENSION. 261
extension, &c. The perceived quali-
ties are as a landscape, sent from an
unseen country by which we may know
it ; as algebraic signs, by which we
can compute and know the proportions
of their qualities ; as a language, which
must be translated, before it can ex-
plain the actions of nature. The mind,
in this landscape, is taken as an unex-
tended centre, ready to go forth amidst
the surrounding scenery ; perceives itself
amidst the algebraic equations, the sim-
ple quantity which never varies ; and
when it philosophises converts the ideas
of its own operations into those analyti-
cal forms of expression, to which it is
obliged to have recourse when it would
adequately comprehend the interactions
of the powers of nature.
Visible figure is thus truly nothing
more than a conscious line of de-
marcation between two colours, and
so must itself be colour ; figure must
ever comprehend visible extension ; and
visible extension does not take place
without colour : nor can I conceive of
262 THE UNION OF COLOUR
perceiving it externally and immediately
without it ; for extension without colour
is complete darkness.*
Now, when the soul goes forth to
that, which the understanding may be
supposed correct in considering a per-
manently existing object, does it go
forth to colour and extension? There
is no philosopher of the present day
who would not answer, that it does
not go forth to colour, but that it most
certainly goes forth to extension. Now,
I say, that in this respect colour and
extension must stand or fall together ;
every argument of Dr. Reid's philoso-
phy applies equally to both, for con-
sidering them external; whilst also every
argument in considering secondary qua-
lities as mere affections of mind, caused
by permanent unlike causes, applies
equally to both ; therefore, I again
ask, Does the soul go forth to colour
and extension ? I answer, That it does
not go forth either to perceived colour,
* See Reid's Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 8.
AND EXTENSION. 263
or to perceived extension, but that it
does equally go forth to unperceived
colour, and to unperceived extension;
for that it attains unto, and forms an
immediate junction with those unper-
ceived permanent causes, or objects which
determine perceived colour and exten-
sion upon the mind ; and which unper-
ceived objects, although considered
themselves as coloured and extended,
are only so considered, because inca-
pable of being conceived of, save under
the forms of those sensations which are
always created by them, and which bear
equal varieties of proportions among
themselves ; and that however every
change of step may alter any colour,
figure, and perceived extension, yet those
permanent exterior existences are con-
sidered by the understanding, as they
truly are, unvaried in themselves. Thus
to endeavour to catch at unperceived
relations is a very difficult task for the
mind ; whilst fit expressions for them
are still more so.
The advantages resulting from this
264 THE UNION OF COLOUR
doctrine are, that it purports to be an
analysis of facts, which, when syntheti-
cally put together, will again accord
with nature.
Secondly, that it admits of examining
nature without scepticism; for the
landscape, the calculation, the language,
are supposed correct in every part,
either in respect to the representation of
the objects, the computation of the pro-
portional quantities, or the expression
of the facts.
Thirdly, a view is here taken which
may enable physiologists and physi-
cians, moralists and divines, parents
and instructors, better to observe, and
more wisely to act than they do, with
respect to the health, the opinions, and
the practices of those under their care.
Sensations are effects ; the same exter-
nal causes would yield the same in-
ternal sensation to each mind, if the
varieties were not in the individuals.
Sentient capacities seem also the result
of an uniform, permanent power in na-
ture. The varieties by every induction
AND EXTENSION.
265
we are capable of making, seem to de-
pend upon variety of organization,
either in its arrangement, or its action.
The former, whether in men or animals,
has its most permanent characters
stamped by the Deity. The latter is
as multifarious as food, medicine, and
climate ; the circulation of the blood,
the passions, the habits of education,
and the notions of individuals, can ren-
der it. They are wrong, therefore,
who, ignorantly taking no notice of
these things, expect the human will, to
be in all circumstances equal to self-
command. Men make excuse for their
actions in dreams and insanity, saying,
the essences of things are then different ;
but never consider, that every degree
and variety of their state of mind de-
pends upon analogous laws and causes,
which wisdom acting in time might
alter with advantage, but which after-
wards may lie beyond any human power
to ameliorate.
I say, that in this doctrine the synthesis
is equal to the analysis, because if a sen-
tient being were placed in the midst of
N
266 THE UNION OF COLOUR
various insentient qualities, capable of ex-
citing changes in the sentient being, the
sentient being would consciously per-
ceive the changes, would soon reflect on
them, would soon perceive the relation
of cause and effect, i. e. objects, or
some changes of mind, without which
others would not happen, and so would
refer its own changes to causes ; self,
would therefore appear as a general
capacity for any sensation, united to a
body, i. e. a sphere of certain limited con-
sciousnesses; and objects independant of 'self \
would appear to be the causes of specific
sensations in particular ; without which
self in general might continue to exist.
Thus all things would justly be consi-
dered as out of the mind which were not
in any given state of sensation ; but the
objects which existed in relation to the
senses would also yield a proof, (by
their regular return on the irregular ap-
plication of the organs of sense,) that
they permanently continued to exist
under certain defined and regular forms.
It is these continuous existences which
are called the objects of nature. In all
AND EXTENSION". 267
this the mind, as I think, from very
early infancy, perceives the true rela-
tions of things, with almost as much
ease as it perceives the sensible qualities
of things. Along with this there would
arise an intimate association of the sensi-
ble qualities with the ideas of their per-
manent causes; an action of the mind,
which leads to the illusory belief of a
corresponding external union. A notion
not easily, and which ought not too
hastily, to be broken up.
The only reason why pain and pleasure
do not seem to exist in the objects capable
of yielding them, but to reside within
ourselves, is because in those cases there
is not a permanent association.
Beauty and deformity are (except by
some philosophers) considered to exist
external to the mind ; yet are no more
than sensations of satisfaction or disgust,
which some unknown, external causes
create, and which are transferred upon
those causes, and seem at a distance,
on the surface of bodies, just in the manner
in which Mr. Stewart speaks of colour,
as seen united to extension at a dis-
n2
268 THE UNION OF COLOUR
tance, and which I conceive admits of a
similar explanation to that which I have
endeavoured to give of that phenomenon.
In like manner love, as long as it lasts,
considers its rapture to be caused by the
merit of its object, but when distaste ar-
rives it is found to reside in a selfish sensa-
tion; and by a new delusion, the object
of its former passion, is now thought
equally by its demerit to deserve a con-
trary emotion.
But the whole of the matter is, I re-
peat, a mystery ; an " unknown lan-
guage' is not that in which to think, with
much ease and satisfaction. I take the
subject in its full amount to be " one of
those secret things which belong to the Lord
our God." The deep consideration of
it is, however, well fitted to afford the
conclusion, that apparently like objects
may in every sensible quality be simi-
lar, and yet they may essentially differ
in their remote causes ; i. e. in those ag-
gregates or objects which contain their
proper effectual causes, and therefore
ought to be examined upon their own
grounds. There may be no perfect
AND EXTENSION. 269
analogy between any complex objects
in nature ; therefore, to understand
them aright there ought to be a com-
plete analysis of every part of them.
Whilst it must nevertheless be owned,
that an exact examination of objects
made by experiment, (or nice obser-
vation,) is a true source of the demon-
stration of similar qualities for the future
in like circumstances. In both these
respects modern philosophers err ; con-
sidering partial analysis as affording
ground for analogical conclusions, which
without unwarrantable scepticism, or
weak hesitation, are not open to ob-
jection :* whilst at the same time, no
principle is supposed sufficient to explain
the doctrine, that where there is a com-
plete similitude known, or supposed, in
the formation of two individuals, there
is any necessity there should be a com-
plete likeness in their qualities or
effects. An association of ideas is thus
erected into a fit means for the know-
* As in the conclusion that because some reli-
gions are false, all are so — some miracles ill sup-
ported, and alleged to have taken place upon fri-
volous reasons ; all are on the same foundation.
270 ON COLOUR AND EXTENSION.
ledge of existence ; whilst the deduc-
tions of reason are considered as in-
adequate to their discovery.
I have attempted to reverse this order,
and to show that an association of ideas
will never prove any other existence than
that of an association of ideas, but that rea-
son has power to deduce the knowledge
of an universe, existing independantly
both of ideas and their associations.
The consideration of this subject also
may show modern philosophers two
principal errors in their doctrine of
causation ; the adoption of which con-
fuses the otherwise luminous pages of
Mr. Stewart ; for it proves, first, that
cause is not an arbitrary antecedency of
sensible qualities in the mind, but an
efficient concomitancy in external nature ;
as also, that the greater uncertainty of
physical when compared with mathe-
matical science, arises from the superior
difficulty of detecting the presence of
exactly similar objects or causes, not of
demonstrating their like effects if found :
but this latter remark deserves further
consideration.
271
ESSAY V.
THAT MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRA-
TION, AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION,
ARE FOUNDED UPON SIMILAR PRIN-
CIPLES OF EVIDENCE.
Since writing the essay on causation,
I find that my views with respect to its
nature, accord less with general notions
than I was then aware of. I became
acquainted, indeed, during its progress
in the press, with some remarkable
passages in the writings of Mr. Dugald
Stewart, perused many years before,
although then obliterated from my me-
mory, but was unwilling to oppose a
living author of such celebrity, although
my notions were not altered by his ob-
servations : the first passage to which I
allude, is the following : — *
" From these observations it seems
" to follow that our expectation of the
"continuance of the laws of nature,
* Mr. Stewart's first essay, p. 138.
272 ON MATHEMATICAL
" is not the result of the association of
" ideas * nor of any other principle
" generated by experience alone ; and
" Mr. Hume has shown with demon -
" strative evidence, that it cannot be
" resolved into any process of reason-
" ing, a priori ; till, therefore, some
" more satisfactory analysis of it shall
" appear than has yet been proposed,
" we are unavoidably led to state it
" as an original law of human belief/'
There is a note annexed to this
passage, containing a quotation from
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, upon the
article Experimental Philosophy, which
renders it still more evident, that my
notions venture to interfere with almost
universal opinions, as to the nature and
manner of causation.
It is as follows : " Experimental phi-
" losophy seems at first sight in direct
" opposition to the procedure of nature
" in forming general laws. These are
" found by induction from multitudes
" of individual facts, and must be
* Alluding to some previous observations on Mr.
Hume's notions.
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 273
" affirmed to no greater extent than the
" induction on which they are founded.
*' Yet it is a matter of fact, a physical
" law of human thought, that one sim-
M pie, clear, and unequivocal experiment,
" gives us the most complete confidence
" in the truth of a general conclusion
*' from it to every similar case."
" Whence this anomaly ? It is not
" an anomaly, or contradiction of the
" general maxim of philosophical in-
" vestigation ; but the most refined ap-
" plication of it. There is no law more
(( general than this; that nature is con-
" stant in all her operations. The ju-
" dicious and simple form of one ex-
** periment, ensures us (we imagine) in
" the complete knowledge of all the
" circumstances of the event. Upon
" this supposition, and this alone, we
" consider the experiment as the faith-
" ful representation of every possible
" case of the conjunction. "*
The passages which in this sentence
appear to me exceptionable, are, " There
s The confusion of mind arising from considering
cause as essentially an antecedency, instead of a
n5
274 ON MATHEMATICAL
'Ms no law more general than this, that
" nature is constant in all her opera-
" tions ;" and " that it is a physical
" law of thought to believe that the
" results of any experiment will hold
" universally."
Both of these phrases are of ambi-
guous import ; for nature is so far from
being constant in her operations, that
single cases of exception occur to
otherwise invariable courses of regularly
antecedent and subsequent objects :
thus we not only can " imagine,'" but
we experience a change in the course
of nature, as far as all outward appear-
ance and modes of detection can go.
On the other hand, her real course, in
the operation of similar cause, must be
concomitancy, and of making- no distinction between
its nature and operation, and our ability to detect
its presence, is transfused into all modern writers on
Cause. The value, however, of the abstract doc-
trine of efficiency in cause is of great moment ; for
it enables us to refer like effects to like proximate
causes, (whatever variety may creep in amidst ex-
terior aggregates), as also to depend usually on the
regularity of nature, as itself an effect resulting
from an equal cause.
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 275
necessary and universal; one unequivocal
experiment (if such can be made) be-
comes therefore an example of all others
of a like kind, and thence forms the
datum for an universal premiss, in which
all similar particulars are involved.
To believe such, does not require a
" physical law of thought," (the very-
terms of which phrase imply, that the
belief of the mind, although imperious,
may yet leave its object without proof
for its truth,) but is founded in a de-
monstrative species of evidence, namely,
in the mental perception, " that it is a
:' contradiction, qualities should begin of
" themselves ;" " that changes are there-
"fore changes on the things that are;"
;< that similar interferences will make
" similar changes ;" " therefore, that when-
'' ever things are under similar inter-
fi ference, they lie under a similar change;"
" so that thus, an exact experiment is in-
" dependant of time ;" and, therefore,
when repeated, must be a similar object
repeated, and not a different one, or one,
which is possible to be affected by that
time, whether future, or past ; whether
276 ON MATPIEMATICAL
present, or distant ; which enters not into
its composition.
A yet more obvious disagreement,
arising in like manner from the different
view I take of causation, is to be found
in the two following passages of Mr.
Stewart,* in which it affords me a satis-
faction to perceive that my ideas on
this subject coincide with those of La
Place :—
" The slightest acquaintance with
" mathematics is sufficient to produce
" the most complete conviction, that
" whatever is universally true in that
"science, must be true of necessity;
" and, therefore, that a universal and
" a necessary truth are in the language
" of mathematicians, synonymous ex-
" pressions. If this view of the matter
" be just, the evidence afforded by ma-
" thematical induction must be allowed
" to differ radically from that of phy-
" sical ; the latter resolving ultimately
" into our instinctive expectation of the
" laws of nature ; and consequently,
* See Elements of the Philosophy of the Human
Mind, vol. 2, chap. 4. sec. 4. pp. 455, &c.
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 277
* never amounting to that demonstrative
' certainty which excludes the possi-
1 bility of anomalous exceptions."
" I have been led into this train of
' thinking, by a remark which La
1 Place appears to me to have stated
' in terms much too unqualified : ' Que
' ' la march e de Newton dans sa de-
' ' couverte de la gravitation universalle
' ' a etc exactement la meme que dans
' ' celle de la formule du bindmeS
■ When it is recollected, that in the
* one case, Newton's conclusion re-
' lated to a contingent, and in the
4 other, to a necessary truth, it seems
' difficult to conceive how the logical
' procedure, which conducted him to
' both, should have been exactly the
' same. In one of his queries, he has
' (in perfect conformity to the principles
' of Bacon's logic) admitted the pos-
' sibility that ' God may vary the laws of
' ' nature, and make worlds of several
* ' sorts in several parts of the universe.'
" ' At leasts he adds, ' / see nothing
' ' of contradiction in all this.' Would
1 Newton have expressed himself with
278 ON MATHEMATICAL
" equal scepticism concerning the uni-
" versality of his binomial theorem, or
" admitted the possibility of a single
" exception to it, in the indefinite pro-
" gress of actual involution ?"
" In short, did there exist the slightest
" shade of difference between the de-
" gree of his assent to this inductive
" result, and that extorted from him
" by a demonstration of Euclid ? Al-
" though, therefore, the mathematician,
" as well as the natural philosopher,
" may without any blameable latitude
u of expression, be said to reason by
•' induction, when he draws an infer-
" ence from the known to the unknown,
" yet it seems indisputable, that, in all
" such cases he rests his conclusions
" on grounds essentially distinct from
■' those which form the basis of expe-
" rimental science."
The passages of the " Essay on Cause
and Effect," which I would select in oppo-
sition to those of Mr. Stewart, are those
which presently follow. They are in-
tended to show, first, that the science of
mathematics is truly but one branch of
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 279
physics : for that all the conclusions its
method of induction demonstrates, de-
pend for their truth upon the implied
proposition, " That like cause must
have like effect ;" a proposition which
being the only foundation for the truths
of physical science, and which gives
validity to the result of any experiment
whatever, ranks mathematics as a species
under the same genus ; where the same
proposition is the basis, there is truly
but one science, however subdivided
afterwards.
Secondly, That, when objects are formed
the same upon one occasion as another,
their qualities, properties, and effects, will
he similar. It is this proposition on
which mathematical demonstration, and
physical induction equally, and only,
rest for their truth. There is no dif-
ference ; objects are what their forma-
tions render them, whether in the
shape of mathematical diagrams, or
other aggregates in nature. Thus they
are intended to show, that the laws of
causation form the base on which ma-
thematical certainty is built; and that
280 ON MATHEMATICAL
the reason why some other branches of
science are less secure in their conclu-
sions, is merely because of the difficulty
there is in tracing the original forma-
tions of the objects* without inpugning
in the smallest degree, the universality
and necessity of the axiom, that if cause
in any instance be like, the effect must
also be like.
Thirdly, They are furthermore intended
to point out the fact, that as we know
nothing of objects but the enumeration
of qualities, so the reasoning which con-
cerns the qualities contained in phy-
sical objects, must fundamentally be of
the same kind, as that concerning the
quality termed quantity, whether it be
expressed by abstract numbers, or by
mathematical diagrams. f
* Or in finding a criterion whereby to detect aft
unobserved " secret power" creeping in amidst the
most unequivocal determination of similar " sensible
qualities."
f This I believe is the old Pythagorean doctrine,
and which I am sorry Mr. Stewart considers but " a
dream." Pythagoras used to say, " Leave but one
quality out of the definition of a pear, and the ob-
ject is not a pear."
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 281
1. " All mathematical demonstration is
" built upon the notion, that where
" quantities, or diagrams resemble each
" other, the relations which are true
" with respect to one of each kind,
" will be true with respect to all others
" of a like kind; only because there is
" nothing to make a difference among
" them. So, if in all past time such
" 'secret powers' could be shown ne-
" cessarily connected with such sensible
" qualities ; yet, in future it could not
" thence be proved to continue so, un-
" less supported by the axioms, that like
" causes must exhibit like effects, for
" that differences cannot arise of them-
" selves."
2. "To represent the relation of
" cause and effect, as, A followed by B
" is a false view of the matter; cause
" and effect might be represented
" rather, as A x B = C, therefore C
" is included in the mixture of the ob-
" jects called cause. If C arise once
" from the junction of any two bodies,
" C must, upon every like conjunction,
282 ON MATHEMATICAL
" be the result ; because there is no
" alteration in the proportion of the
" quantities to make a difference ; C is
" really included in the mixture of A
" and B, although to our senses we are
" forced to note down (as it were) the
" sum arising from their union after the
" observance of their coalescence.'"
3. "In like manner the result of all
" arithmetical combinations are included
" in their statements. Yet we are
" obliged to take notice of them sepa-
" rately and subsequently, owing to
" the imperfection of our senses in not
" observing them with sufficient quick-
" ness, and time being requisite to
" bring them out to full view, and ap-
" parent in some distinct shape. In-
" deed, my whole notion of the rela-
" tion of cause and effect is aptly ima-
" gined by the nature of the necessary
" results, included in the juxta position
iC of quantities. But, as long as cause
" shall be considered only as an antece-
" dent, the future can never be proved to
" be included in the past, which yet is
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 283
' truly the case. For when it comes
' to be observed, that cause means, and
* really is, the creation of new qua-
■ lities (arising from new conjunctions
' in matter or mind) then it is per-
' ceived that the future is involved in
1 the past ; for when existing objects
* are the same, they must put on simi-
' lar qualities, otherwise contrary qua-
' lities or differences would arise of
1 themselves, and begin their own exist-
' ences, which is impossible, and con-
* veys a contradiction in terms.* All
' that experience has to do is to show
' us, by what passes within ourselves,
6 that there is a contradiction in the
' supposition of qualities beginning
* their own existences, and a contra-
' diction is never admitted in the re-
' lation of any ideas that present them-
1 selves."
" No mathematical reasoning can
- ever be driven further back than by
* showing that the contrary of an as-
* See the " Essay on Cause and Effect,'* pp
141 143.
284 ON MATHEMATICAL
serted proposition is a contradiction
in terms. Fire and wood must, in-
deed, be antecedent to combustion,
but it is in the union of fire and wood,
there exists immediately combustion as
a new event in nature; also in this
union there exists the similar cause
allowed by the data ; whilst combus-
tion is termed the effect of the union
of fire and wood, but however
termed an effect, is in fact, a new but
similar object as heretofore ; a simi-
lar mass of qualities in kind, which
cannot, therefore, be a differe?it mass
of qualities in kind. Equals added to
equals upon any two occasions, the whole
must be equal : Add equal qualities to
equal qualities, the sum of the qualities
must be equal upon every repetition of the
junction; and the sum must be the
same result taken twice over, not two
different, or possibly altered sums. It
may be seen, therefore, upon ma-
thematical principles, that a difference
in the result of equal unions, can no
more arise out of the mixtures of any
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 285
" other quantities of objects, than from the
i( junctions of those of numbers.'"
Thus it may be seen, that in the
study of mathematical science, the
scholar is supposed to know the general
axioms, " that qualities cannot begin
their own existences, and that the form-
ation of things being supposed equal, the
properties are nothing else but those re-
suits-, included in their formation, and,
therefore, cannot at the same time both be
SAME and DIFFERENT ; AND THERE-
FORE, THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION
IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SCHOLAR AS
THE BASE ON WHICH THE TRUTH OF
EVERY THEOREM IS SURELY BUILT.
In this point of view, the demonstra-
tion, by means of reasoning on a dia-
gram, is but the " one simple and ju-
dicious experiment," which proves the
relations of every other formed after a
similar fashion in every different time
and place. Could these maxims of
causation be altered ; could qualities
begin of themselves ; could (therefore)
like cause produce other than like
286 ON MATHEMATICAL
effect; all the axioms, diagrams, and
demonstrations might stand as they do
in the books of Euclid, without any
avail as to their application to other
diagrams of a similar kind and their
properties ; and for this plain reason,
because, although the objects were
formed similar to others, their qualities
might differ of themselves. We might
have the radii of circles, for instance,
forming themselves unequally, although
it were granted their boundary line was
made a true circle by its usual mode of
formation. Thus the doctrine of neces-
sary connection is the result of perceiving
that two or more individual objects, or
quantities, which are like each other,
are to all intents and purposes with
respect to any relations which may
arise respecting them, identically the
same, and may be always considered as
the same individual objects or quantities
repeated as many times : instead of as
many various although similar objects.
It is such a perception as this, in which
consists the essential power of abstrac-
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 287
tion: an abstraction which Bacon, New-
ton, Berkeley, all must have allowed,
or there could have been no science ;
and did virtually, and truly allow,
notwithstanding some cavils on that
head.
The relations of the simple impres-
sions which influence the minds of
children, or peasants, nay, even of
brutes, enable them to perceive, that
like things are equal to the same things
repeated, and that they have no relation
to time. The past, therefore, governs
the future, because no interval of time
can prevent the same thing from being
the same. Inferior understandings, in-
deed, and perhaps all men, consider
things to be like, or the same kind of
object, upon too partial an observation
of their qualities or methods of forma-
tion ; still they expect like causes to
have like effects, or like objects to
have similar qualities in future, when
they do consider them as like, only
because no interval of time can make
any difference in respect to them ; and
288 ON MATHEMATICAL
there is no other difference supposed or ob-
served.
In the mathematics, diagrams are
formed by ourselves, and we may there-
fore be always sure of our future and
universal conclusions ; because we frame
an hypothesis, and examine by one ex-
periment, (i. e. one experience,) the re-
lations which arise ; and the same data
being given to all future ages, there is
nothing supposed which can make any
difference amidst these relations; for
all particular instances are included in
the first experience made. The notion
of time is left out of consideration, for
it is observed to have nothing to do
with the circumstance of one example
being capable of proving the relations
of all that are like it in every time and
place ; as each may be considered to be
identically the same.
This is the reasoning, therefore, or
intimate perception, which men and
animals have with respect to the course
of nature ; and I cannot avoid consi-
dering Sir Isaac Newton's theory as
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 289
something puerile and unphilosophical,
if it is to be understood in the sense
Mr. Stewart gives to it.
God no doubt may vary the laws of
nature, &c. that is, create, arrange,
alter the capacities of objects, by means
adapted to those ends. But to under-
stand God aright, he cannot work a
contradiction ; he cannot occasion the
same objects without any alteration
amidst them supposed to produce dis-
similar effects.
It is, therefore, no more an invasion
of the attributes of Deity, to assert
that he cannot alter an effect arising
from an equal physical cause, than
that he cannot render a triangle, at
the same time that it remains a tri-
angle, to be without the properties of a
triangle. The same kind of object is
the same kind of object, and its effects
are but qualities the result of its for-
mation, which being the same cannot be
different ; and that, whether the quality
resulting from its formation be a colour
or a proportion.
Mathematical science, therefore, and
o
290 ON MATHEMATICAL
those physical actions, which are termed
laws of nature, equally depend upon the
one only law,* " Like cause must exhibit
like effect;"' and this axiom depends on
the principle, that " No quality can be-
gin its own existence" For when the
inquiry concerning causation is pushed
back as far as it may, it will readily
be perceived, first, that if any parti-
cular quality were supposed to begin of
itself the following contradiction would
arise, viz. that the beginning of exist-
ence, which is a quality of being, could
belong to a being not yet in existence ;f
secondly, that in this respect all qualities
* Mr. Stewart considers the word law to be only a
metaphorical expression, E. P. H. Mind,vol.2,p.220.
I can only give it a rational meaning, by convert-
ing it into quality, property, or relation, in which
senses, when general, it forms a general efficient
cause, and when we detect by an exact experiment
a similarity of qualities, we cannot but expect simi-
lar effects, because we must expect same things will
be same, independantly of time and place. It may be
called a physical law of thought thus to believe,
but I must believe as much of any data in physics,
and cannot believe more in mathematics.
f See essay on the relation of cause and effect,
p. 34, " Let the object, &c."
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 291
are upon the same footing, and that no
variety of accident can make any differ-
ence in the universality of that truth.
The faculty of abstraction, is truly the
origin of all science. By abstraction, is
meant the consideration of any quality
apart from others with which it may be
usually united, in order to notice what
inferences may be drawn from its nature.
Taking that quality apart, therefore,
viz. the commencement of existence, we
perceive that every imaginable being
is on the same footing with respect
to it, namely, that it is a contra-
diction to suppose it the quality of a
being not yet in existence : — " That
existences cannot begin of themselves,"
is thus an universal perception, and
which ought to govern every deduction
of philosophy.
Nor can I agree with Mr: Stewart,
that children and brutes do not readily
abstract ; for, I consider, that an intui-
tive perception, or ready observation,
(whichever it may be termed) that the
intervals of time, or the multiplication
of the individuals, prevent not objects
o 2
292 ON MATHEMATICAL
if they be of the same kind known, or
supposed, from being like others of a
similar kind, (with respect to their fu-
ture untried qualities,) to be a perception
which belongs universally to animate be-
ings. Objects, I grant, are considered too
readily as similar ; for nature is so re-
gular as to the union of similar secret
powers, with similar sensible qualities,
that she is almost imagined incapable of
being otherwise, until found so ; but
however irregular she may occasionally
be found, she never inspires the notion
of being at a contradiction with herself.
Mr. Stewart's notions with respect
to the general nature of causation,
setting aside the particular view he
took of it, as being dissimilar to mathe-
matical induction, (as well as those of
Mr. Hume, Dr. Reid, and others,) are
expressed more eoncisely and less am-
biguously than in any other passage in
these following words.
" From experience we learn that
" there are many events which are con-
" stantly conjoined so that the one in-
" variably follows the others ; but it is
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 293
" possible, for any thing we know to
" the contrary, that this connection
" though a constant one, may not be a
" necessary one. It is possible, for any
" thing we know to the contrary, that
" there may be no necessary con-
" nections, and we may rest assured
■' that if there are such we shall never
" be able to discern them."*
It is against such opinions that the
" Essay on Cause and Effect" was im-
mediately directed ; it is intended there-
by to prove that the sort of experience
called experiment, will show, that there
exists efficient cause between the objects
of nature, because it shows that there
are objects without which others will not
exist, and with which they will exist ;
that the same kind of experience, being
mingled with an abstract and demon-
strative reasoning, enables us to know
that the manner of efficient cause, is not
by arbitrary antecedency and subse-
quency of event ; but by mutual and
simultaneous affections and interactions of
* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human
Mind, vol. 1, chap. 2, sec. 2.
294 ON MATHEMATICAL
particles or qualities : whilst a similar
mode of reasoning on experiment, also
leads us with equally demonstrative
evidence to the conclusion, that there
must exist " an universal necessity of
connection" between any given cause
and its effect.
In short, causation is necessary not
arbitrary ; and though the nature of any
particular effect requires to be ascer-
tained by experience, yet it is reason
must showr its necessary connection with
its cause, as opposed to its arbitrary or
accidental connection with it ; its imme-
diate inherence in its cause, as opposed
to its mere subsequency to it ; and the
knowledge of its invariability of connec-
tion for the future, as opposed to the
mere experience of its conjunction in
past time. Thus although experience
is required to show, " that blue and
yellow mixed in their particles, will
form the colour termed green : yet that
experience must be reasoned on before it
can show, that by, in, and with the mix-
tures of particles, there exists imme-
diately green as a new quality in na-
AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION. 295
ture;" or such a set of altered particles
as shall determine green when meet-
ing with the eye and mind. The aid
of reason is also equally needful, yet
sufficient to show, that the connection
between the mixture of such particles,
is necessary and invariable. In like
manner, one experience shows that
ten taken ten times over, yields one
hundred ; but it is reason which proves
that this result coalesces in and with its
cause, and that in every step of its
progress : and that if it once coalesces
it must necessarily and invariably do so
always.*
* " Things are what their enumeration of qualities
make them ;" in the abstract sciences, we can limit
these ourselves, and therefore can predicate the
properties of any given subject in them univer-
sally, but physical objects of experiment cannot
be detected with equal certainty. This is the
whole difference ; for in any case where we cannot
show the reason of any regular appearance in the
sciences respecting quantity, a strictly demonstra-
tive proposition cannot be enunciated concerning it,
and an universal induction of a constant fact
could not thence result.
296
ESSAY VI.
THAT SENSIBLE QUALITIES CANNOT
BE CAUSES.
Bishop Berkeley has incontestably
proved this proposition, and Mr. Hume
has made it a main ground of his doc-
trine on causation. But these phi-
losophers either did not perceive, or
did not choose to allow the whole in-
ferences from the doctrine ; for Berke-
ley, perceiving that " the ideas and
sensations of sensible qualities" could
not be the external acting causes of
nature, that they could not stand out
and be independant of the mind again,
after being once formed there, in order
to mix with or affect any other object
in nature ; and yet, knowing that men
SENSIBLE QUALITIES, &C. 297
would still consider extension, that is,
matter as an object having operative
cause in nature, and taking notice him*
self, that such combined sensible qualities
as are called objects did truly invaluably
forerun other combined sets of sensible
qualities, considered as their effects ; was
forced to explain such regular ante-
cedents and subsequents as ordained by
God in that arbitrary fashion, for the
wise and good purpose of affording us a
set rule and method, by which to guide
our conduct.
Mr. Hume adopts this idea, and
thence deduces his whole doctrine;
showing, that combined masses of sen-
sible qualities, called objects, are only
the forerunners of other combined
masses of sensible qualities, and not
their producers; and hence he infers,
that there is no productive principle,
that there is only antecedency and sub-
sequency of events of an arbitrary kind ;
and the mind is, therefore, free to con-
sider a change in the course of nature as
possible.
o 5
298 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
These notions are also adopted by-
Mr. Stewart, Dr. Reid, and others ;
but their fallacy may be discovered
by considering that extension, motion,
figure, colour, taste, &c. cannot be car-
ried out of the mind to interact with
other extension, motion, figure, colour,
taste, &c. Certain sensible qualities
must necessarily, no doubt, forerun cer-
tain other sets of sensible qualities.
Some objects determined to the senses,
will invariably be antecedent to others ;
but such sequences are only successive
effects, from one common, exterior, un-
known cause in nature, existing unper-
ceived by the senses, and meeting suc-
cessively with various organs of sense,
adapted respectively to the perception
of qualities ; fire will always burn, and
bread nourish ; but, what do we mean
by Jire, and bread ? The sensible qua-
lities of these will neither burn nor
nourish. This, at the first reading,
may appear a strange opinion ; yet the
consideration of complex notions, as
though they were simple, is at the
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 299
foundation of the difference of the ideas
between philosophers and the vulgar on
this head ; the vulgar, however, appear
to be nearer the truth than the philo-
sophers ; these latter, considering ob-
jects as only sensible qualities, will not
allow them to be more than ante-
cedents ; whilst the vulgar conjoining
them with the ideas of the conti-
nuous exterior causes in nature, and
considering that the amassed sensible
qualities are those very continued exist-
ences, formed after a certain fashion
exterior to their senses, do consider
them in that state acting in, and with,
and meeting as necessary, operating,
and productive principles, with other
objects, which they alter.
In a science of analysis undertaken
in order to correct our opinions, and to
improve philosophy for practical pur-
poses, it is requisite to separate these
conjoined circumstances, and show, that
it is merely the unknown powers of
nature, the exterior qualities which are
correspondent to the sensible qualities,
300 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
which can ever interact with other ex-
terior qualities, in order to any alteration
in nature. It is on this point, where
Berkeley being puzzled by his own
doctrine, runs into a gross contradiction
with himself.
As I find I have neglected to notice
this extraordinary paragraph in its pro-
per place, I shall not scruple to notice it
here.*
" But say you, it sounds very harsh
" to say, we eat and drink ideas, and
" are clothed with. ideas; I acknowledge
" that it does so ; the word idea not
'f being used in common discourse, for
" the several combinations of sensible
" qualities which are called things. But
" this doth not concern the truth of the
" proposition, which, in other words,
"is no more than to say, We are fed
" and clothed by those things which
" we perceive immediately by our
" senses."
" The hardness, or softness, the co-
" lour, taste, warmth, figure, and such
* Sec. 38, Principles of Human Knowledge.
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 301
" like qualities, which combined toge-
" ther, constitute the several sorts of
" victuals and apparel, have been shown
" to exist only in the mind that per-
" ceives them ; and this is all that is
" meant by calling them ideas. If,
" therefore, you agree with me, that
" we eat and drink, and are clad with
" the immediate objects of sense, which
" cannot exist unperceived, or without
" the mind, I shall readily grant, it is
" more proper and conformable to cus-
" torn, that they should be called things,
" rather than ideas."
But who is there of the smallest ca-
pacity for analytical philosophy, who
could agree with him, that we eat,
drink, and are clad, with those sensible
qualities which can only exist in the
mind ? Do they come out thence again,
to be tacked on our bodies, or poured
down our throats ? Do we eat the
sensible colour white, and swallow the
consistency which appears to the touch
of the hand? Does truly any sensa-
tion of the colour, figure, and extension
302 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
of white drapery, which exists in one
man's mind, cover the lifeless insentient
body of another ? This is surely a doc-
trine which has justly provoked the ri-
dicule of mankind.
But Berkeley here pushed himself to
a notable dilemma, for he was either
obliged to admit the very doctrine he
combated, namely, that ideas exist,
exterior to mind and body, and in that
state perform the various operations of
nature ; or, secondly, that parts of the
mind, that is, the ideas of the mind ;
that is, mental things performed them ;
in other words, all things being sensible
qualites, "ideas in the mind;" some
ideas, clothe or feed other ideas ; i. e.
some parts of the mind clothe other
parts of the mind ; some parts of the
mind swallow other parts of the mind ;
but all these propositions mean no
more than that the actions of some
parts of the mind interact with other
parts of the mind. A notion so con-
fused that nothing can be made of it,
and moreover, contrary to what he
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 303
elsewhere asserts, namely, " that the
mind is simple and indivisible" — " that
ideas are inert beings, having no power
or activity, and cannot be causes."
There was but one way left in which,
with any consistency, he could get out
of the difficulty, namely, by saying, we
eat, and drank, and were clothed with
God, the only being external to ideas,
which he admits; — a strange and mon-
strous thought ! I cannot reflect that this
sentence is in his book without pain ;
whoever shall study it, as it deserves,
for the sake of unravelling the paradox,
may, peradventure, find the clue to a
better theory, and may come to per-
ceive, that in nature there must neces-
sarily be exterior qualities correspond-
ing to, and as various as those ideas
with which the mind is impressed ;
and to which exterior qualities, sensa-
tion is not necessary. God is not found
by regarding him, as an active spirit to
raise ideas in us, at our board, at our
toilet table, by the side of our hearths.
To imagine that he is swallowed in
304 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
gluttony, or drunk for satisfaction of
thirst or intemperance, is not the hap-
piest way to demonstrate his being.
Neither do our own minds, or any parts
or " ideas in our minds," or the " ideas
in other men's minds," perform these
offices for us.
By denying abstractions, Berkeley de-
nied analysis — by denying analysis, he
truly kept up the associations of the
vulgar, who conjoin the sensible qualities
exterior causes create, with those causes
themselves ; — the very error he wrote to
combat.
Now it is the formation of the par-
ticles, (whatever particles may be,)
which renders exterior objects such as
they are, and of any certain definite
constitution ; and this formation we
can trace in, and by the means of sen-
sible qualities, as signs of the things
that are hid. It is the exterior unknown
particles of fire, it is a certain principle
disengaged and elicited by certain de-
fined means, which rendering by its
appearance certain perceptions to the
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 305
mind, will, when in connection with the
live flesh, disperse its particles with
violent pain ; or meeting with the un-
known powers, whose sensible qua-
lities, when formed, are termed wood,
disperse the particles of that substance
without including in the action the idea
of pain.
In like manner, " It is not whiteness
" and consistency which nourish ; it is that
'* which is sown, reaped, kneaded, and
" baked, which seen or unseen is fitted
" to nourish."* The appearance of fire,
it is true, will antecede the burning of
the hand, if seen before it is touched ;
but its appearance, and its power of
disceptibility, are but successive and
conjoined effects ; and in the latter in-
stance, if bread be seen and touched
before it is eaten, the colour and con-
sistency will precede its nourishment ;
but they are but conjoined and succes-
sive effects. Such action of cause and
effect must be the same throughout all
nature.
* See the " Essay on Cause and Effect," p. 121,
306 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
Thus, I consider it to be the want of
separating our perceptions from their
causes, which has given occasion to the
false notion, viz. that of the successive
effects perceived, the antecedent are causes
and the subsequent are effects.
A, after A is formed, and determined
upon the senses, when it is followed by
B,* cannot be B's cause in any sense
whatever ; but if A and B have been
determined to the senses by any exter-
nal object in nature, A will be the
effect of that external object acting on
one sense, and B of the same object
acting on another sense ; and so long
as this object acts on these senses shall
A be followed by B, and the appear-
ance of one will ever guide rational
minds to expect the appearance of the
other, f without expectation being so
great and mysterious an act of the
mind upon such occasions, as Mr. Hume
supposes.
* See Dr. Brown's Essay on Hume's doctrine.
f Mr Hume says, " I ask for information," &c.
See sec. 4, " Sceptical doubts," &c.
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 307
I find several men of science agree
with me in thinking that this view of
the matter may be considered as of
practical importance. It bears immedi-
ately upon every part of physiology,
and very materially upon the treat-
ment of mental and bodily disorders,
upon the nature of chemical actions,
&c. as it opens a different view of the
nature of the action which goes on be-
tween matter, (as it is termed,) and
mind.
The ancients, in order to explain the
mystery of this phenomenon, invented
the notion of sensible species ; but the
modern phrases, of perceiving things,
or knowing them by the ideas of them,
imply no more than that we know cer-
tain definite varieties of mind, must be
occasioned by equal varieties in ex-
ternal nature. Most men, however, are
not able to conceive otherwise than that
those changes of mind, called primary
qualities, exist by themselves externally.
Now the moderns have found by ob-
308 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
scrvation and experiment, that by the
means of every organ of sense, there
is truly an interaction between the cor-
poreal part of the senses, and the
external objects of nature, whence it is
matter of surprise to me, how it can be
still maintained as a point of the
highest perfection in philosophy, to
be able to explain the nature of external
perception.
Now, I dare venture to say, however
bold it may appear, that if the doctrine
I have proposed upon causation be
ever received, it will help to throw
light upon this subject, hitherto sup-
posed to lie beyond the reach of human
discovery.
From a practical knowledge of cause
and effect, we measure the heavens, and
foretel their revolutions ; — if a scientific
knowledge of its principle be obtained,
we may perhaps be enabled to under-
stand and imitate nature, better than we
have hitherto done.
In the modern metaphysics " things
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 309
that go together are defined and- es-
teemed to be causes and effects," and,
at the same time, are considered
as not necessarily connected* which is
a contradiction to the understanding.
But when a rigorous analysis of those
complex notions which are formed
and associated by nature takes place,
proximate cause and effect will be per-
ceived to be synchronous, and to be
nothing more than a change of qualities
from the interferences which take place
amidst ' the qualities of different ob-
jects.-}- There seems to me little
difficulty in apprehending different parts
of the human frame, the external ex-
tremities of the organs of sense to
interact with the particles of external
nature and become changed thereby ;
which frame being sentient must con-
sciously notice these changes, and which
changes can neither be like external
* See D. Stewart, E. P. H. Mind, vol. 2, p. 222,
&c. Lawrence's Lectures, pp. 79, 81.
t This I have spoken of at large in the '■ Essay
on Cause and Effect."
310 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
nature, nor the parts of the human
frame — nor like the principle of sensa-
tion, soul, mind, spirit, or by what-
ever name may be designated the ca-
pacity for sensation in general, and con-
sciousness.
Now, indeed, the nature of body and
soul is supposed to be so well known,
that the body is considered to act "be-
fore the soul and upon it" and vice
versa, " the soul before the body, and
also upon it," and contradictory inex-
plicable propositions are framed, con-
cerning essentially different natures, mu-
tually affecting each other in some
manner beyond our scrutiny ; for though
some action must take place in some
manner, yet philosophers are very apt
to rej ect every proposed manner as equally
nugatory and absurd ; so that virtually no
manner of action whatever is supposed pos-
sible. But let it be considered, that the
qualities of body and mind are equally
unknown, save that mind is a capacity
or cause for sensation in general, when
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 311
that capacity shall meet with some
other object to draw it forth ; (for in
sound sleep there seems no inherent
sentiency, though there be animation ;*)
and body, a capacity fitted to determine
the particular feelings, or perceptions,
of extension, colour, smell, taste, &c.
upon the capacity for sensation in ge-
neral ; — then there appears no more
contradiction to me, that they should
thus act in, and with each other, than
that any one event or object in nature
should take place according to the con-
dition of its essence.
For there must always be a natural
necessity in the interchange of qualities
according to their original formation ;
so that the contradiction would be to
imagine them otherwise than they are,
when once experience informs us of
their appearances : therefore, muscular
action, nervous influence, and in short,
all actions of the human frame ; all the
actions of nature, are to be explained
* See Locke.
312 SENSIBLE QUALITIES
after one and the same method, namely,
by conceiving cause and effect as syn-
chronous in each step of the series of
actions * which take place, from the
first junction or mutual affection of the
external senses, with the particles of
external bodies, to the last sensation of
animated consciousness.
Nor is this idea a mere arbitrary hy-
pothesis ; the knowledge of causation
is got by a strict analysis, as well as the
knowledge of the dissimilitude there
must necessarily be, between any men-
tal sensations, and any external qua-
lities whatever ; by which discoveries
the synthesis is afterwards formed, which
shows that a successive series of unions,
* To prevent the trouble of the reader in look-
ing for the argument in the first essay for the proof
of the simultaneous action of cause and effect, let
him reflect, That every object would remain as it
existed at any given moment unless it were inter-
fered with ; and an interference cannot be either
before or after itself; but must be in and with the
same moment of the change occasioned by it.
CANNOT BE CAUSES. 313
and mutual affections of qualities,* will
be equal to the formation of sensation and
muscular action.
* It is not meant that qualities must always
unite, but that they mutually affect each other;
for whatever may be the nature of their interaction,
the argument equally holds good. No arbitrary
law can create a mutual interference of qualities.
Indeed, I have in vain endeavoured to. find what
philosophers exactly mean by the word law ; the
only rational signification is that mode of being,
or action, or relation of qualities, which as Mr.
Locke says, " renders an essence that which it is
and not another." But it appears to me, as though
they mean it to signify an arbitrary rule which mat-
ter would observe without there being a necessity
for it in any physical cause. This is impossible.
314
ESSAY VII.*
THAT CHILDREN CAN PERCEIVE THE
RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,
ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR BEING CA-
PABLE OF A LATENT COMPARISON
OF IDEAS.
First principles are the perceptions of
the corollaries, inclusions, or necessary
relations of our simple impressions ;
* I am aware that many ideas are repeated here
which have been mentioned before. I can only
plead the following as an apology for the tautologies
which occur; namely, that the substance of these
minor essays were addressed to several friends who
considered some objections overlooked in the larger
essays, and who permitted the insertion of the an-
swers they approved of, and which they considered
useful — a repetition therefore of some ideas was
hardly to be avoided, even by casting them in a new
form.
CAUSATION
315
and infants who have not a capacity
fitted to generate such perceptions, are
born idiots.
Idiotcy appears to be little else, than
an incapacity for further perception
than what resides in the immediate
impressions created by the use of the
five organs of sense, and the power of
motion.
Now the necessary connection of
cause and effect, resolves itself into the
identical proposition, that " same things
are same;" and children perceive the
relation of ideas which determines that
conception upon the mind, and depend
upon it, in all their understandings ;
for children are too simple to perceive
any difference between effects and qua-
lities ; and although I must allow that
they do not, cannot argue formally on
the subject ; yet, I am fully persuaded,
their understandings take notice of,
(i. e. their latent powers of observation
enable them to perceive,) certain simple
relations included in those ideas of sen-
sation, which are determined to their
p2
316 CHILDREN PERCEIVE
minds by the organs of sense.* And
this they very soon do, as readily as
they distinguish by which organ it is
that any new impression of sense is
conveyed. It is not therefore neces-
sary to have recourse to any instinct or
principle of nature, which we know
nothing of, in order to explain the
source of those ideas which govern their
expectations.
To the question which inquires,
" Whence it is, the child supposes a
candle will burn his finger upon a
second trial, as upon a previous oc-
casion ?"-}- I answer, that the child
considers, upon the second appearance of
a candle, that the candle is a candle.
He knows nothing about " secret
powers," " methods of formation," Sec.
but owing to the sensible qualities be-
ing precisely alike, he considers the
object presented to him to be a similar
* M. Destutt de Tracy says, " Un enfant spper-
coit un rapport, comme il appercoit une couleur."
-f* See Hume's Essays, vol. 2. sec. 4. p. 40.
CAUSATION. 317
one to that, which he formerly observed
of the same appearance ; he therefore
expects it will prove itself the same in
all its qualities. The burning of his
finger he considers to be as much a
part of the same whole, as the light
which shines before him. There is
thus a secret reference made with more
or less distinctness to those exterior
causes of its figure, motion, and bril-
liancy, which are associated with these
qualities— their effects ; thereby forming
one whole : and as these exterior
causes, were * on a former occasion
capable of burning the flesh upon the
application of touch, so they must
again be considered as capable of that
further quality, or effect, which must
necessarily belong to them.
No child or ignorant person sup-
poses that it is the motion, figure,
brilliancy, or colour of fire, (when sepa-
rated from the outward permanent
* To dispel this association was the object of
Berkeley. Its intimate indissoluble nature formed
the foundation on which Hume reared his doctrine
of causation.
318 CHILDREN PERCEIVE
causes of these qualities,) which effici-
ently governs the burning of the flesh ;
for that these antecedent qualities after
being determined upon the mind, are
the only causes of any subsequent burning,
is a discovery which they leave to philo-
sophers to make ; but they conceive
that some object, which is not in them-
selves, and which affects their eyes
with figure, light, &c. will also affect
their touch with the painful sense of
burning. They conceive that an ex-
terior brilliant object is what they see ;
and that they see it because it is bril-
liant and like what they see ; they also
think the same object is a burning ob-
ject, and will therefore burn them.
There is thus a false association made
no doubt in conceiving the archetypes
of sensible qualities to be the perma-
nent causes of the sensible qualities,
the effects ;* — but still their expec-
tations depend upon the notion, that
when a part of the whole effects belong-
* It is this association which Mr. Stewart, Dr.
Reid, and indeed, almost all men, still make con-
cerning the primary qualities.
CAUSATION. 319
ing to one similar exterior cause or ob-
ject takes place, that the remainder will
do so, if nothing arise to prevent it.
Thus it is really the case, that
children possess a truer philosophy than
that contained in the modern theories,
concerning cause, viz. " that invariable
antecedency of sensible qualities is the
definition of cause;'" for they consider
the successive sensible qualities which
arise from the application of our different
senses to the same exterior object, to
be merely successive effects, on account
of that object meeting successively with
different senses.
But to prove that the child, as well
as the peasant, (and even the philoso-
pher when withdrawn from his books,)
considers the successive effects im-
printed on the senses, as truly but con-
comitant effects arising from one com-
mon object, meeting with various hu-
man senses ; it may be observed, that
if any one were to shut his eyes for a
moment, being aware at the same time,
that a candle which he had imme-
320 CHILDREN PERCEIVE
diately seen placed before him, was
neither removed nor extinguished ; he
would expect upon re-opening them to
see its light, &c. again. Why ? for
when his eyes are shut the whole qua-
lities of the candle become but as so
many future effects ; and thence such
an expectation lies open to Mr. Hume's
query ; namely, " Why he expects in
any case similar sensible qualities to be
followed by similar sensible qualities?"
for in this case, the darkness upon the
shutting of the eyes is the similar sen-
sible quality which may be supposed to
have taken place upon a former occa-
sion ? I answer to this query, that the
expectation of seeing the candle upon
opening the eyes, when it is known,
not to have been either removed or ex-
tinguished, is because, Like causes (or
objects) being supposed and granted as
present; like effects (or qualities) are
known to be only capable of existing.
The child, &c. upon such an occasion
would consider there was a similar ob-
ject present, and which he would im-
CAUSATION. 321
mediately perceive could not be a simi-
lar object, and yet a different one ; and
which nevertheless would be the case,
could it do other than yield those future
effects, of its light, brilliancy, motion,
and colour.
Expectation of future sensible qua-
lities, is thus founded upon the notion
of a similar object being in existence,
when it is perceived to be similar, as
far as concerns each impression made
upon each organ of sense ; for although
some unperceived cause might alter the
exterior object as a whole, yet this
is not much taken into the account, for
it is perceived, that if an object were
really the same, it would necessarily
appear the same;* whilst also many cir-
cumstances secretly influence the judg-
ment of even very young children on
this head, — i. e. as to whether appear-
ances are entirely to be depended upon ;
* Similarity of appearance proves the presence
of like proximate cause ; other things therefore be-
ing equal, it proves the presence of a really similar
object.
p 5
322 CHILDREN PERCEIVE
but however this may be, children's
expectations are founded upon their
conceiving a similar exterior cause or
object to be placed before them as here-
tofore, and knowing and perceiving as
well as adults do, " that equals must be
added to equals in order to render the
whole equal,"" they suppose when parts of
certain wholes are present, that the re-
mainders will also recur upon similar
occasions ; otherwise there would arise
a difference, without any reason they
could suppose for such an occurrence :
and children never imagine that changes
of qualities can arise without a reason
for them ; or that qualities can begin of
themselves without a producing prin-
ciple ; or that there can be an uncaused
change in the course of nature. These
ideas appear to them to involve an im-
possibility ; and indeed appear so to
all, for I much doubt, although Mr.
Hume said, " We could at least imagine
" a change in the course of nature,"
(without a cause for it) whether he ever
was able to stretch his fancy so far.
CAUSATION. 323
I grant that children, as well as
others, too frequently consider objects
as similar, upon insufficient data ; for
when things appear like, and the cir-
cumstances in which they are placed
seem also to be similar, the imagination
does not easily suggest a possible va-
riety ; for which, however, there may
be some unperceived reason. Never-
theless, when any thing occurs different
to that which was expected, such a
change is supposed to be owing to
some sufficient cause or reason, and the
objects which yield such a difference
in their effects, are considered as dif-
ferent objects. But the contradictory
notion is never held by infants, who
have not the misfortune to be born
idiots, that objects can be similar ob-
jects, and nevertheless their exhibitions be
different.
Thus no interval of time, can have
any relation to any supposed difference,
and the expectations of the future are
thus involved as identical with the know-
ledge of the present. Time enters not
324 CAUSATION,
into the ideas of the axiom— that equals
added to equals, the whole must be equal.
" Add equal qualities to equal qualities
" (of whatever nature they may be) the
" sum of the qualites must be equal
■' upon every repetition of the junction,
" and the sum must be equal to the
" same results taken twice over, and
" cannot possibly be two different or
" altered sums."* Objects are but the
same groups of qualities meeting to-
gether, and are therefore, to be con-
sidered as the same aggregates repeated
over again. Thus children, peasants,
and even brutes, perceive, that similar
objects being supposed to meet, mix,
or in any way affect each other, no
interval of time which may elapse be-
tween the repetition of such mixtures,
could prevent their being truly, the
same identical objects in nature.
* See " Essay on the Relation of Cause and
Effect," pp. 54, 55, &c.
32;
ESSAY VIII:
THAT HUMAN TESTIMONY IS OF SUF-
FICIENT FORCE TO ESTABLISH THE
CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES.
Mr. Hume says,* " I flatter myself I
" have discovered an argument, which,
" if just, will with the wise and learned
" be an everlasting check to all kinds
" of superstition and delusion; for so
" long as the world endures will the
" accounts of miracles be found in all
" history, sacred and profane." Now
this argument which Mr. Hume flatters
himself he has discovered, is contained
in the opinion he has formed on the
nature and reason of our belief in caus-
ation.
* See Hume's Essay on Miracles, 1st paragraph.
326 THE CREDIBILITY
In his sections on the subject of the
necessary connection of cause and
effect, he has endeavoured to prove that
custom is the only ground of our belief
in cause as a " productive principle ;"
or of the necessary connection between
effects and their causes.
The manner he applies this notion to
miracles is as follows : " The reason
" why we place any credit in witnesses
" and historians is ?iot derived from
" any connection which we perceive (a
' ' priori) between testimony and reality,
" but because we are accustomed to find
" conformity between them." — " But
" when the fact attested is such a one
il as has seldom fallen under our obser-
" vation, there is a contest of two op-
" posite experiences, of which the one
" destroys the other as far as it goes,
" and the superior can only operate
" on the mind by the force which re-
" mains."
The answer I would make to this
statement, is in like manner a result
from that view of causation which I
OF MIRACLES. 327
have already placed before the public,
and which, I trust, may in some de-
gree have helped to weaken the force
of Mr. Hume's sophistry on this mat-
ter.
I have there shewn, that although, a
priori, we know not what particular
effect may arise as the results of any
given cause ; yet that it is a general pro-
position capable of demonstration, " that
every effect must have a cause," and there-
fore that whatever may be the effect
which takes place in such case, the
connection between it and its cause, is
a necessary connection, and it must neces-
sarily, (in like circumstances,) invariably,
and universally inhere in its cause.
Now it is a natural consequence result-
ing from the experience we have of the
value of truth amidst the transactions of life,
that mankind will speak the truth in all
cases, when it appears useful and ac-
cords with their interest to do so ; as
well as that in all other cases where
the contrary consequences appear, men
will be strongly tempted to falsehood ;
328 THE CREDIBILITY
being only prevented from using it by-
observing that a superior value is con-
tained in observing a general rule pre-
scribing truth indifferently, whether for
or against their interest. It thence
follows as an axiom, that we place
dependance on the veracity of men, in
all cases were we cannot distinctly per-
ceive any motive to falsehood ; and in
like manner that we proportion our
jealousy of the truth of their assertions,
according as we may suppose them
influenced by any circumstance of self-
interest. This being the case when
they relate " marvellous events" we must
inquire if there be any motive to self-
interest likely to tempt them in any
particular given case to falsify ; to in-
vent as fables what they detail as
facts ; remembering always that nature
is so far from keeping up any constant
analogy in her works, that the very
aversion to believe in excepted cases to
those of experience, arises from that
puerile adherence to a customary asso-
ciation of thought, which made " the
OF MIRACLES
329
Indian Prince1' a child rather than a
philosopher, " who reasoned justly' (ac-
cording to Mr. Hume's argument) when
he refused to " believe the first relation
concerning frost."
There is, no doubt, a necessary con-
nection between similar qualities in
union, but not unless there be similar
qualities present in order to unite ; there
can be no necessary connection if cir-
cumstances be dissimilar. All laws of
nature are comprehended in one uni-
versal law, that similar qualities being
in union, there will arise similar re-
sults ; a miracle, therefore, is ill defined
by Mr. Hume, when he would express
it as "a violation of the laws of na-
ture," because there is always under-
stood to be a power in some superior
influence in nature, in the presiding
energy of an essential God, acting as
an additional cause, equal to the alleged
variety of effects.
This observation enables me further
to comment on the next important sen-
timent of Mr. Hume's on this head ;
330 THE CREDIBILITY
and which, indeed, contains the sum of
his doctrine upon it.
" Let us suppose that the fact af-
" firmed instead of being only mar-
" vellous, is really miraculous ;" ("for a
" miracle is a violation of the laws of
" nature;") " then it follows, that as a
" firm and unalterable experience has
" established the laws of nature, the
" proof against a miracle from the na-
" ture of the fact is as entire, as any ar-
" gument from experience can possibly
" be imagined."
Now let us examine this statement
with nicety, and with the greatest care
observe to what this famous doctrine
amounts, which had sufficient attraction
in it to draw the opinion of many from
the belief of Christianity.
First, This statement contains a false
assertion ; an assertion contradicted by
" the slightest philosophy." Our expe-
rience never established, nor can ever
be the measure of the laws of nature ;
if by such laws he meant the original
OF MIRACLES. 331
inherent qualities of the " secret
powers" and capacities of bodies and
minds ; the mysterious influences of
distinct masses of things, antecedent to
their operation upon our senses. Our
experience neither created nor arranged
them, such as they are when external
to us ; and, therefore, never can be the
measure of what alteration might take
place under certain altered circum-
stances exterior to the senses. Nor can
our past experience ever acquaint us,
what latent influences, what new un-
seen events, what " secret powers"
might be drawn from the mysterious
storehouse of unperceived nature to
alter our experience in future.
There may be no perfect analogy in
nature, unless it be that there arise
exceptions to hitherto universal expe-
rience in all classes of things, with
which we are acquainted.
The tale of the Indian Prince, who
refused to believe a natural occur-
rence which passed the limits of his
own experience, may be told of our-
332 THE CREDIBILITY
selves ; — we deem some limited obser-
vation we make, the measure of an
universal fact; — we draw general con-
clusions from particular premises ; until
extended knowledge acquaints us with
exceptions, and sometimes with single
and most important exceptions to other-
wise universal facts. It therefore be-
trays a want of profundity in reflec-
tion, as well as of acquaintance with
the sacred writings, to define a miracle
otherwise than as an exception to the
apparent course of nature, — than as a
marvellous, because an extraordinary
occurrence.
Let the reader mark here, how Mr.
Hume can shift his argument to serve
his purpose.
We have but just read in his pre-
ceding pages, " That we might sup-
" pose nature to change her course
" without a contradiction;" — " That it
" is acknowledged on all hands, there
" is no connection between the sensible
" qualities of things, and those secret
" powers on which the effects truly
OF MIRACLES. 333
' depend ;" — " That we know not those
' secret powers nature has in store ;"
' and that our mere experience of a
' few sensible qualities cannot acquaint
' us with those unperceived laws which
* truly govern the effect in every case ;"
' — That nature being supposed hitherto
1 ever so regular, does not prove that
' for the future she may continue;"
' — That henceforth snow may have the
* taste of salt, and feeling of fire ;
' rose trees may blow in December
' frosts, and a pebble may put out the
1 sun."
All this he advanced without any
distinct notions of that operation and
manner of efficient cause, which might
enable him to distinguish what was
true from what was false in this hete-
rogeneous mass of contradictory pro-
positions, brought forward in order to
support the conclusion " that custom
is cause" Then considering that con-
clusion as well established, he suddenly
turns the tables in the essay on mi-
racles, arguing that as custom alone is
334 THE CREDIBILITY
cause, it alone can be the reason of our
belief in testimony, and of our sup-
posing " there is any necessary con-
" nection between the custom of be-
" lieving in testimony, and the reality
" of the events testified ;" therefore
he would further infer, " that the course
" of nature which can thus be imagined to
" change without a contradiction, those
" sensible qualities" which " have no
" connection with the secret 'powers which
" determine effects," is nevertheless to be
the measure of future expectation ; expec-
tation which cannot be altered in its
experience, without such a " violation of
the laws of nature" as infers a contra-
diction !
In the reasoning I have employed,
in the essay on causation, I have en-
deavoured to show, that there is but
one law which can experience no
change whatever ; namely, that similar
qualities in union necessarily include
similar results ; therefore the apparent
course of nature of which the senses
alone can take cognizance, may, with-
OF MIRACLES. 335
out a contradiction change ; and there-
fore, every single exception to nature's
apparent course, is a " marvellous event"
upon the truth of which we may admit
and examine evidence, inasmuch as such
event, and such testimony, do not in-
volve a contradiction.
The definition, therefore, of a mi-
racle is " an exception to natures apparent
course"*
Whether the testimony to prove an
event alleged, be credible or not ; and
if it be credible, in what manner
the event proves a doctrine, are two
questions beside the main point of in-
quiry, which is, * Whether an inter-
ruption to natures apparent course can
take place?' which confusion of three
questions involved in one, is the reason
that an unsatisfactory answer is gene-
rally made. This view of the subject
* The word miracle, in its derivation, signifies
only a wonderful thing; that is, something at which
we wonder, because contrary to our usual expe-
rience, or in other words, an interruption to that we
conceive the course of nature.
336 TH^-CREDIBILITY
did not occur to Mr. Hume, if we may
judge from his incomplete analysis of it.
Therefore, there are really three ques-
tions involved.
First, Whether the apparent course
of nature can be altered ?
Secondly, Whether the evidence pro-
duced to prove such an alteration be
credible ?
Thirdly, If it be credible, in what
manner the miracle itself becomes
evidence of any particular doctrine, &c/f
Now, first, that the apparent course
of nature may be altered ; that a sin-
gular exception to hitherto universal
experience may take place, has been
proved by means of the doctrine of
efficient cause, not only here, but more
at large in a former essay ; and it may
be added, that when men are not jea-
lous on account of consequences, they
are not in' the least indisposed to admit
evidence to the truth of such " marvel-
lous" and singular occurrences.
OF MIRACLES. 337
The possibility of an interruption to
nature's undeviating method, places
therefore a religious miracle as far as
its possibility goes, precisely upon the
same footing as any other singular
event for which an adequate cause is
supposed, although it be undiscoverable,
and renders the miracle equally fit to
be an object of investigation as to the
fact of its existence, with any singular
event.
Secondly, If the testimony to mar-
vellous events be made under such cir-
cumstances, that no sufficient motive can
be imagined to tempt the witnesses to
falsehood; if the events be such as
would rather induce a cowardice of
assertion concerning them than the
contrary, then the evidence should be
considered as worthy of confidence, and
the facts honestly related.
Thirdly, The manner in which mar-
vellous events prove a doctrine is as
Q
338 THE CREDIBILITY
follows : The events in question being
alleged to occur by the operation of a
cause known to be inadequate to the
effect ; the mind is thence forced to re-
fer to an adequate cause, and rests in the
notion of superior power being present,
and in action.
The command of apparently a human
voice bids the dead arise, and they do
so. The spectators thence infer that
necessarily " one greater than Moses"
or any human legislator is present, in
order to be acquainted with the pos-
sibility of the action, and the powers
to enforce its accomplishment. Hence
it follows, that such events are needed
in order to give authority to certain
doctrines, and under such circumstances,
however marvellous they may be, as
exceptions to nature's course in fact,
they are nevertheless probable events ;
because as means necessary to an end,
they obey that analogy of nature,
which consists, in using necessary
means towards every event that is
OF MIRACLES. 339
brought about ; they are, therefore, to
be regarded as exceptions probable to
take place, and the evidence of them is
therefore to be received and examined,
by the rules of evidence upon ordinary
cases.
When a doctrine is either a wicked
or foolish doctrine, such events are so
improbable to occur as connected with
it, that the same evidence will not an-
swer, and I will venture to add, has
never been offered.
Therefore it is, that the nonsensical
differences in the Church of Rome,
cannot be supposed as worthy of being-
settled by miracles; none, also, who
allege miracles to have been wrought on
account of such trifling disputes, or
other matters equally insignificant, lived
the lives, died the deaths, or preached
the doctrines of a Paul, Peter, or
John.
The testimony of those who assert
miracles to have taken place in order
to establish some favourite dogma of
Q2
340 THE CREDIBILITY
their own, without the sacrifice of any
interest in consequence, is liable to the
strongest suspicion of being the result
of self-interest and fraud.
To prove a revelation it is necessary,
first, That there should be miracles which
testimony alone can be the means of
recording. Secondly, That they should
be such in which the senses cannot be
mistaken. Thirdly, That there should
be some notable overt acts of the wit-
nesses, of sufficient self-denial in their
sacrifices, in order to prove they believe
in their own assertions.
It is in respect of the two latter par-
ticulars in which all spurious miracles
are found to fail. They are either
matters in which the senses of men
might be imposed upon by the artful,
or such asserted facts, whose truth
never cost the bloodshedding of those
who professed to have been their eye
witnesses.
Such distinctions as these if better
analysed and arranged than I can pre-
OF MIRACLES. 341
tend to, would sink into utter disgrace
Hume's childish comparison of the mi-
racles of the New Testament with those
of the Abbe" Paris, and others of a si-
milar description.
It was my original purpose in this
Essay only to attempt a refutation of
the argument, which Mr. Hume built
upon his doctrine of causation ; but as
there are two objections frequently
made to a supposed method of reason-
ing, in relation to the miracles, which
may be thought to bear upon some of
my observations, I may be permitted to
notice them also.*
First, It is objected, " That to say,
the doctrine proves the miracles, and that
the miracles prove the doctrine, is to argue
in A CIRCLE.
To this objection I would simply
reply, that it possesses no force, when
the questions to which it relates, are
properly distinguished in their con-
ception, and separated in their state-
* See pp. 339, 340.
342 THE CREDIBILITY
ments. The questions therefore which
are proposed ought not to be,
1st. Whether the doctrine be true?
to which an answer in the affirmative
may be supposed as returned, — because
the miracles alleged to be worked in its
favour prove it ; — and,
2ndiy. Whether the miracles alleged
to be wrought in its behalf be true1. —
to which also an affirmative is given ;
and that, Because the excellence of the
doctrine proves them so. But
1st. Whether the doctrine be such as
would justify the interference of Deity,
if such interference could be proved?
and
2ndly. Whether there be sufficient
evidence to prove the fact of alleged
miracles, in order to sanction a doctrine
which when independantly considered
appears to be worthy of a divine au-
thor?
When these two latter questions are
answered in the affirmative, no illogical
answer in a circle is given to them, as
any one may plainly perceive, however
OF MIRACLES. 343
little skilled in the technical rules of
reasoning. No doctrine indeed can
prove the existence of miracles, but it
can be of sufficient use and importance
to render itself worthy of being autho-
rized by their interference, thereby
placing the 'probability of such a fact
taking place, and the evidence required in
consequence, precisely upon the same
footing as that of any evei4 in nature,
where means are necessary to be used in
order to the attainment of any given end.
The excellence of a doctrine therefore,
merely proves, that it might be of God,
but miracles are wanted to prove that
it is of God ; when therefore miracles
are proved by the evidence of the hu-
man senses, or by veracious testimony,
they establish the authority of the doc-
trine, which however wise, important,
or useful, would not otherwise be bind-
ing on the consciences of men.
The second objection is, " That as
martyrs have believed false religions, there-
fore the sufferings of other martyrs cannot
afford the proof of a true revelation."
344 THE CREDIBILITY
This objection arises from an erro-
neous view of the nature of the cir-
cumstance proved by martyrdom. It
is not the truth of a revelation, but it
is the sincere belief of the martyr in
his own profession; the circumstance
of martyrdom affords a proof against
hypocrisy, not against enthusiasm, or
delusion. Now to have a proof that a
man is not an impostor, is a great
point gained; for if he deliver a doc-
trine, of consequence, it obliges every
honest mind to open his books and ex-
amine it with impartiality ; and to con-
sider seriously, whether with respect to
those events which he professes to have
witnessed, his senses, and his under-
standing could have been deceived as
to their real occurrence.
To me it appears impossible that
the first Christian preachers could be
impostors, when I read of their suffer-
ings; or that they could be deluded
when I read the history (for instance)
of the raising of Lazarus ; and if but
one miracle be overwhelming in its
OF MIRACLES. 345
evidence, the rest which are associated
with it in the same cause, are included
in that evidence, and yield the same
additional force in their testimony to
the senses, and to the judgments of
those that witnessed them, (and by
parity of reasoning, to those who hear
of them afterwards,) as do the frequent
return of the external objects of sense,
support the belief of that independant
existence, of which the first vivacious
impulse on the senses had originally
created the impression.*
In short, if the Gospel be a mystery,
yet that it should be untrue would be a
greater; — however, what I have said
with respect to martyrdom as appli-
cable in the way of forming an argu-
ment, is only needful for succeeding
generations. It is necessary for us
who live at this day, that the Apostles
should have suffered, and have sealed
their books with their blood.
* See 1st Essay, C. 3rd, ft on the Independancy of
E. Objects," p. 78, " Thirdly," &c. comparing that
sentence with C. 1st, " on Continuous Existence,"
p. 13, "For the mind/' &c.
346
ESSAY IX.
ON THE OBJECTION MADE TO FINAL
CAUSES AS ENDS, ON ACCOUNT OF
THE EXISTENCE OF PHYSICAL EFFI-
CIENT MEANS.
Those who conclude that a final cause
is not wanted for the phenomena of
the universe, because there are phy-
sical causes in action, efficient to the
production of each object, draw their
conclusion wider than the premises
will warrant. They forget that in
doing so, they overlook one effect
which they have to account for, namely,
the appearance of contrivance in the
universe — this being beyond a chance
coincidence of effects, arising out of a
determination of motion that had no end
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 347
in view. There is therefore, an origi-
nal direction of motion given to sepa-
rate portions of different kinds of mat-
ter, coalescing to one apparent end ;
the cause of which direction they never
arrive at by ever so many steps backwards
from motion caused by previous motion ; —
nay, could they even come at the ori-
ginal direction in each case, and could
they even perceive that a material mo-
tion prevening, acted as the first sen-
sible propellant, it would not follow
that mind were not truly the final, i. e.
the only efficient cause in that case ;
— for, mark what it is to be a final
cause when it acts in ourselves ; — it is
to be that perception of future qualities,
and that intention to create them, which
forms the efficient cause of the direction
of motion upon those qualities which are
already in existence : — To be a final cause
is to perceive a future possible quality,
capable of being gained by that means
in our power, called the direction of
motion. But to perceive is a mental
quality ; yet is it a quality which whilst
348 OX THE OBJECTION
it is not to be descried by any sense or
instrument, chemical, or mechanical, in
our power, nevertheless intimately
unites in and with the action of the
brain, which action might be discerned,
and would, therefore, be considered by
incomplete reasoners as the true pre-
vening motion which alone determined
the next in order, towards the supposed
end. Yet perception of happiness, or
utility, and the chosen direction of the
eye, the ear, or the arm, in conse-
quence, is not the mere action of the
brain, the nerves, and the muscles.
According to the language of some
modern writers, we might, after be-
holding a well constructed ship in full
sail upon the waters, and examining
each part in relation to the wind, and
the waves, and the point at which it
appeared destined to arrive; consider
these aptitudes as accidental and unde-
signed, in order to prove which, each
motion might be traced backwards as
resulting from the necessary physical,
mechanical actions of matter, until we
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 349
arrived at the original materials from
which the vessel was framed, along
with those other actions of matter, viz.
of the muscles, the nerves, and the
brains of the human beings concerned
in the arrangement. But we know by
experience, this will not explain the
whole objects which have been in action
on the one hand ; nor on the other,
could we descry, by the nicest instru-
ments we possess, the power of sen-
tiency as a physical cause, changing
all the various material beings con-
cerned in the formation of the magni-
ficent object before us; — going on its
way in its grand and easy motion. It
is not possible a priori, therefore, among
our own contrivances, to discover by phy-
sical examination when it is that re-
flection, determination of reason, or
passion, have interfered to alter the
things we see ; the powers of mind are
one with the visible affections of
matter, they inhere as one physical
cause along with them ; the one power
may be discerned by the senses, but
350 ON THE OBJECTION
the other cannot; and is only to be
known by experience of what passes
within ourselves. To know whether
the action of mind m any case be the
director of motion upon the things
already in existence, we must examine
some given state of their being ; and
comparing them with such things as we
know to be governed, arranged, and
adopted by mental qualities, judge
with discretion and impartiality, whe-
ther they be of a like kind. We must
judge of the probability whether they
be designed aptitudes, where per-
ception of possible qualities had di-
rected the motions of matter towards
their accomplishment, or whether such
appearances were the mere accidental
results of the necessary efficient causes
of undesigned interactions of material
qualities.
In human affairs to judge properly
in many cases, whether intellect has
been at work or not, requires extra-
ordinary powers of understanding, —
higher faculties of mind than the ab-
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 351
stract sciences stand in need of. The
knowledge of human nature, " which
though no science, fairly worth the
seven," is nothing but the penetration
which enables us to discover the in-
tentions that govern the motions of
ourselves and others. In many cases
it may be difficult to say, whether any
design whatever has been in action, and
in many more of what number and
kind were the ends designed ; certain
it is, that in productions of the highest
order, or in very involved operations,
design is not apparent to some meaner
capacities. The master pieces, for in-
stance, of music, sculpture, or painting;
the delicate workmanship of a time-
piece ; the simple positions of the parts
of a telescope ; the wonders of the
steam-engine; — might any or all of
them upon being presented to an Es-
quimeaux Indian, merely occasion him
to stare with an undefined astonish-
ment ; or if closer examination and re-
flection suggested that they were pro-
ductions of more accomplished beings
352 ON THE OBJECTION
than himself, upon the friendly, or un-
friendly exercise of whose powers, his
well-being might depend, his anxiety
might endeavour to hide itself under
some such words as these : " Ces
merveilles meritent bien sans doute
1'admiration de nos esprits refiechies:
mais elles sont toutes dans les faits ;
on peut les celebrer avec toute la mag-
nificence de notre langue ; mais gardons
nous bien d'admettre dans les causes
rien d'etranger aux conditions neces-
saires de chaque existence." " Nulle
part sans doute les moyens employ6s ne
paraissent si clairement relatifs a la fin ;
cependant ce qu'il y a de sur, c'est que si
les moyens n'avaient ici resulte neces-
sairement des lois generates, ces creatures
n'existeraient pas."
If in any case we mean to exercise
an unbiassed judgment, whether a men-
tal foresight and design have been in
action, we must begin a posteriori to
consider the object, and examining
some pieces of apparent workmanship,
ask, if they are instruments and organs
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 353
fitted and designed to ends or not ? and
if they do seem to be such, we ought
to judge they are so ; and if they are,
no mechanical, or physical actions of
mere matter will account for the men-
tal quality of design. There must, no
doubt, in every step of progress be
efficient material causes for each various
state ; but amidst those material ac-
tions somewhere there must have been
perception of possible qualities, and
direction of motion in consequence.
Amidst the apparent contrivances
which mortal beings have had no hand
in arranging, it appears impossible to
descry, or detect, the point where mind
perceived possible qualities, and directed
the aptitudes of various motions, but
that mind must be the cause of that
which the understanding concludes to
be contrivance, is an argument, though
short of demonstration, yet of the
highest analogical proof ; and one which
determines our conduct in human affairs
invariably, and irresistibly. The ori-
ginal intention, with its effect, the imme-
354 ON THE OBJECTION
diate direction of motion, may have
commenced in the eternal mind at the
beginning of this universe, or it may
have existed through eternity, coeval
with and essential to the Deity : As
to which of these, we have no possibility
of preferable conjecture ; but the eye,
and the heart, and the brain in animals ;
the sun, the earth, and the moon,
amidst what is termed inanimate exist-
ence, and all things of a like kind must
all have been matters of contrivance.
If any man looking at these, and the
like objects with me, denies this, I
need not compare my ideas with him.
—Now all the efficient causes in the
world put together, will not account
for a mental result. We must have
the efficient cause for the disposal of
existences which are instruments and
means to ends. We must have intention
of such, perception of qualities, direction
of motion.
I consider, therefore, first, the ap-
pearance of design, that is to say, that
which reason after examination admits
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 355
to be the appearance of design, as the
only proof of design ; it is the only-
proof of it in human contrivances ; and,
secondly, that the argument is futile
which would attempt to show, " That
" the physical actions of matter being
" sufficient to account for the mere
" physical results which accompany
" such apparently designed results, the
" efficiency of intention in the direc-
" tion of motion on matter, is not
" needed." Because admitting for the
sake of argument, there is no design,
then the physical actions of matter
must be allowed to account for, or be
deemed the whole cause of the ap-
parent contrivance ; yet, on the other
hand, admitting for the sake of argu-
ment, that there is design, still all the
physical actions of matter must be same,
and yet could not be deemed the
whole cause of this apparent con-
trivance, for by the terms of the pro-
position, design is admitted as one.
The efficiency, therefore, of physical
cause is evidence neither for nor against
356 OX THE OBJECTION
design, but leaves it open to proof by
analogy or otherwise.
Thus the examination of the actions
of matter a priori, can never in any
case form a criterion, whether de-
sign, mental perception, has been in
action or not. Therefore, whether a
circumstance be designed or not, must
always be examined a posteriori and
be judged of by a sound mind, ob-
serving its analogies, its tendencies, its
bearings upon others, &c. If these
favour the notion- of design, we must
conclude that the mental perception,
which is the only efficient cause equal
to that beginning and direction of mo-
tion which can accomplish contrivance,
has been in action. Detected, or detect-
able, physical efficients prove neither one
side of the question nor the other ; be-
cause in both cases they are equally
wanted towards the mere physical results
taken notice of : the only difference is,
that in the one case there must have
been a point where some mental per-
ception directed the motions of mat-
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 357
ter: (an event not detectable amidst
those motions ;) on the other, motion
of matter must have directed the mo-
tion of matter through all eternity, —
leaving its beginning and direction to
have existed without any reason or in-
tention whatever, although wherever we
turn our eyes, different and independant
kinds of matter coalesce to useful and
important results.
Lord Bacon has been quoted as au-
thority for rejecting the doctrine of
final causes, as though he supposed it
unnecessary to explain the motions of
nature, and as fitted only to deceive
the mind from physical inquiries. All
that Bacon meant to say, or indeed did
say, was, that it was equally ignorant
and vulgar, idly to give design as the
only reason for the physical properties
beneath our view ; for the interaction
of different kinds of matter; and thus
prevent the analysis by experiment of
their physical properties, in different
situations with respect to each other,
as well as in relation to our senses.
358 ON THE OBJECTION
Lord Bacon was a severe theist, and
never imagined for a moment, but that
a God had designed and arranged to
given ends the whole of what we see
around us. Lord Bacon, for instance,
would have thought it ignorant, idle,
and vulgar, were the physical causes of
heat inquired into, to have it an-
swered, that it arose from the spark
intentionally communicated to a heap of
wood. Nevertheless he could not deny
in such a case, that the intention to
create a partial fire, and the means
used towards it, were the one its final
cause, the other, its efficient causes.
Bacon admitted the mental ruler of
motion in the immense ends con-
templated in the universe, and the wise
and efficient means which must have
been used towards them.
But to say the truth, I much doubt
if Bacon, or Newton, or any philoso-
pher, has sufficiently considered the
manner by which a final cause truly
becomes an efficiently physical cause
for the beginning and direction of mo-
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 359
tion. No doubt it is an answer " bar-
ren" of every idea capable of yielding
a notion that the question is properly
understood, when the reason for the
voluntary compounding of any aggre-
gate of materials is given as a satis-
factory answer to an inquiry into the
nature, and the number of the materials
used for such an aggregate ; or, if the
ends to which any parts have a ten-
dency as means, be assigned as the
given, physical efficient for each step
of the means towards that end. On
the other hand, all things in a strictly
philosophical sense, form one nature,
and it is impossible to see the operations
of nature in a clear point of view,
unless the manner be clearly perceived,
by which final causes become identical
with those which are efficient.
A final cause properly signifies the
mental perception of an attainable end ;
the contemplation of a certain number
of qualities, the determination of whose
existence is known to be in the power
of the efficient agent, by his voluntary
360 ON THE OBJECTION
direction of the motion of those already
present with him. Thus a final cause is
the efficient cause that determines the will ;
and which will, is the efficient cause
that determines the direction of motion
upon matter in any given case.
In this sense, the whole forms one
compound physical efficient cause, with-
out which every endeavour to explain
the diffei^ent directions of motion which we
perceive in the world would he nugatory.
We might, for instance, in vain lay out
to observation every material motion,
which could be detected by the senses,
or by the nicest experiments, and all
the general laws as they are called of
physical attributes, whether mechanical
or chemical, in order to account for the
powers by which a bird at first exerts
herself, and for the path in which she
directs her flight ; if her perception of
the intention to build her nest, and of
the place where the materials lay; if
the inherent nature she possesses of a
capacity capable of perception ; if the
interfering causes capable of exciting
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 361
it, were omitted in the examination of
the physical causes for the beginning and
direction of her motions. In this sense
final is nothing more than a name for a
compound set of physical efficient
causes, undetectable by the organs of
sense, but known of by experience of
their very essence and primeval nature in
themselves, and by reason and analogy to
be exercised in other similar beings, as
alone capable of yielding those appear-
ances of contrivance and design of
which we take notice, and of forming
the conception of those wise ends we
every where perceive around us, and
which appear to be gained by appro-
priate, various, complicate, and elective
means.*
If we direct our views from the con-
templation of the ends attained by ani-
mated nature, and look abroad upon the
material motions, and the effects which
they determine in the inanimate uni-
verse, we also every where perceive
* See Recapitulation.
R
362 ON THE OBJECTION
appearances of designed ends to have
been held in view, and of means of
accomplishment to have been used to-
wards them, incomparably more nume-
rous, more difficult of arrangement, and
of a larger comprehension than these.
It is in vain therefore, to invent the
word attraction, as though it were alone
sufficient to express the whole of the
physical causes known for the begin-
ning and direction of the motions we
see. It is a word as well suited as
any other to express the effect 9 the di-
rection of the motion of bodies towards
each other, according to those laws of
velocity which given densities observe ;
but to imagine there is a certain given
physical quality in all matter, which
makes it endeavour to draw other matter
at a distance towards it, which in its
turn possesses the physical quality to be
drawn in that direction, is to invest mat-
ter by the deceptious use of a meta-
phor with a mental quality, while yet
no consciousness is supposed. It is in
this sense a mere hypothesis ; no organ
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 363
of sense ever detected it; no experi-
ment ever found it; no reasoning
ever deduced it from admitted pre-
mises ; the laboratory of the chymist
never elicited it from any convincing-
trial ; — on the contrary, so far as the
conception of the mind can frame
such an one, let it be done. — Let two
balls be supposed, of the relative sizes
and densities of the sun and moon; —
and to be placed at the same relative
distance in a state of complete rest in
an exhausted receiver, with empty space
alone between them ; is it imagined for
a moment they would ever begin to
move, and direct their motions towards
each other after any law of attraction
whatever? They could not, — for the
causes being efficient to rest, they could
not be also efficient to motion. And if
it be said the bodies were not or could
not be at rest, then they were in mo-
tion— but motion is not attraction, and
the motion supposed, still lies in need of
being accounted for, both in its begin-
ning and direction.
r2
364 ON THE OBJECTION
It may be thought bold to venture
any objection to the Newtonian theory;
let it, however, be remembered, that I
am speaking of Bacon's method of
philosophizing. He wished to introduce
observation of, and experiments upon
nature, before he assigned physical and
proximate causes for any given fact,
instead of hypothetical occult modes
of action; or the ends, instead of the
means. I therefore say, that the New-
tonian doctrine of attraction is contrary
to Bacon's mode of philosophizing ; I
am aware the Newtonians shift their
ground when it is said, " the principle
stated for the motions of the universe is
but an hypothesis;" they retort, "the
word is merely used as standing for the
effect, for the motions we see, and the
laws they observe ;" to which sense I
am willing the word should be applied ;
— but in the original Newtonian mean-
ing, it signifies a quality, an attribute of
all matter as matter, by which it begins
and directs the motions of bodies ac-
cording to their densities, at a distance
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 365
from each other ; and that they can do
this with empty space alone between
them. To which doctrine I would op-
pose, that the existence of such a qua-
lity is a mere hypothesis, not to be
detected by observation of the senses,
or by the experiments of the laboratory,
or imagined by a mental conception of
possibilities.
The beginning and direction of mo-
tion among what we term inanimate
bodies has still therefore to be ac-
counted for ; and I much doubt whether
any notice of the senses, any trial of
the receiver, the retort, or the cylinder,
any mental conception of a possible
experiment, will yield to us the true
knowledge, of the causes for the be-
ginning, the direction, and the con-
tinuance of the magnificent operations
we have it in our power to contemplate,
rather than to understand.
The most that I would contend for
on the subject is this, that we should
reason with impartiality from what we
know, to what we know not. To con-
366 ON THE OBJECTION
sider things as probable to be like,
which appear so; to refer such like
effects to like proximate causes, how-
ever such proximate causes may be
united with different aggregates of
qualities ; — with beings not in relation
to our senses or experimental observa-
tions.
Keeping to so simple a mode of rea-
soning as this, the ends, and apparent
contrivances we perceive in nature must
have had their final causes ; must have
been effected by reason of the mental
perceptions which yielded to some
mind those results of the understand-
ing, and that determination of will,
which were necessary to discover and
to direct all the efficient motions towards
the phenomena in the universe.
When so much of intention must
have had its share of physical impulse
in some time and place, whilst the na-
ture of matter in general, and different
kinds of it in particular, is for ever
hidden from our scrutiny, and on which
such intention must have operated ;
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 367
how is it possible that we should ever
arrive in this world by the few inlets
of knowledge we possess, at the true
causes for the whole physical pheno-
mena in the motions we perceive in any
given case. Attraction is a word fitted
to keep the Deity for ever out of view ;
and I freely confess it often suggests to
my mind an idea as ludicrous, as the
supposed quality to which it is applied
appears to be futile. It suggests
qualities in matter which are only
consistent with a capacity for sen-
sation; and when it is used with re-
spect to inanimate objects is but of me-
taphorical application. Its direct mean-
ing expresses a mental perception, a
determination of the will, governed by
the approbation of qualities belonging
to the object of attraction.
To transpose therefore, the word which
is expressive of this kind of drawing to-
wards each other, to the motions of mat-
ter, as though the conversion of a term
could suggest any defined idea of the
true nature of governing causes, is merely
368 ON THE OBJECTION
to hide an unproved hypothesis by
means of a metaphorical allusion. — The
assignation of this occult quality, as
forming a component part of the very
essence of matter, has afforded to
atheism its most powerful refuge.
When other arguments have failed, the
attractions and repulsions* of matter,
elective attractions, &c. are assumed as
efficient causes in each step of the pro-
gress which forms an animal, or that
governs the motions of a planetary
system, and no other is supposed re-
quisite to account for those grand and
beautiful designs. f When such an ex-
perimentum crucis shall be made, as
that parcels of matter of different bulks,
shall at a distance from each other,
* When bodies start off from one another, then
attraction as a quality of matter as a component
part of its essence, is obliged to be given up ; and
the repulsion of particles (its very contrary) is as-
signed as the efficient cause of the particular mo-
tions of matter so affected. In what sense then is
it possible that attraction can be called a general
quality or law?
f I allude here to a well known French author.
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 369
with empty space alone between them,
and being forcibly placed at rest for a
moment, be afterwards left at perfect
liberty, without any foreign impulse on
either towards motion, and without their
being affected by the motions of the earth,
of which they are forming a part ; when
in such a case, they shall bound towards
each other, then shall I believe in an
inherent quality as capable of such a
propulsion, but till then, I feel it to be
impossible : — I say forcibly held to rest,
because, if attraction be the quality
described, all things would ever be
running towards each other, and even-
tually form but one being, unless there
were opposing forces, which must in
their turn have an extraneous cause.
Also if the inherent capacities of matter
are equal to motion, they cannot like-
wise alone be equal to rest. And if
equal to rest, they cannot alone be
equal to motion ; because I trust, that
I have proved, that every various effect
must have its cause. i\.n exact experi-
ment, however, could never be made,
r5
370 ON THE OBJECTION
because the earth's motion must affect
all the bodies on it — and the forced rest
would only be a relative state. The
moment the balls were left at liberty,
they must be acted upon in some way,
by the swift motion of the greater ball
on which they were called forth to ex-
hibit their minor movements.
But it must be rest which is the na-
tural state of matter, and it must be
motion which requires an extraneous
cause : — because rest does not suppose
motion, but motion implies rest ; —
for the difference between the times of
the respective velocities of any two
given bodies, over a given space, is
equal to the rest of that which has
been the slowest, during the time of the
difference. Rather, therefore, than re-
fer the beautiful arrangements of the
heavens and the earth to the occult,
unproved qualities of attraction and
gravitation, I would chuse to consider
the beginning and direction of their mo-
tions to causes analogous to those with
which I am acquainted. Then it is that
TO A FINAL CAUSE. 371
a grand feeling bursts upon the mind. —
A cause in action like in kind to that
which I know of, but different in degree,
and which may account for the origin of
all the motions in the universe, and all
their directions towards the designed
ends, which in every various manner
take place in the infinite and eternal
universe — such an adequate and efficient
cause as this suggests a conception
commensurate with the Deity it demon-
strates, and compels an unlimited wor-
ship of his unbounded essence.
372
ESSAY X.
THE REASON WHY WE CANNOT CON-
CEIVE OF SENSATION AS EXISTING
NECESSARILY, AND CONTINUOUSLY
BY ITSELF.
Section I.
The general power of sensation contrasted with
that which is particular : — its connection with
immortality.
It is difficult to perceive the ground of
our belief in the continuous existence
of something, the subject matter of
all changing sensations, and why that
something must be other than conti-
nuous sensation itself. I believe this
opinion is not owing to any unreason-
able or accidental association of ideas ;
but to have its ground in those simple
modes of the understanding which are
OF MIND. 373
only of difficulty in the detection, be-
cause they are too simple to be capable
of much analysis, and have from the
most early habits of thought, become
so much a part of our very being,
that they do not admit of the recol-
lection of their commencement. Never-
theless I consider the fact as indis-
putable, namely, that we cannot con-
ceive of sensation existing in, and by
itself, and therefore, that there must be
a cause for this opinion. # Let us en-
deavour to find what it is, and whether
when found, it can be substantiated by
reason, or, whether it must be rejected
as some fallacy, generated rather by an
association, than conducted from a com-
parison of ideas.
The first and original reason for this
opinion, is justly founded in that notion
which forms the primeval law of the
understanding, ' that no quality can begin
its own existence.'
* Mr. Reid and Dr. Stewart regard this idea as
an ultimate fact, or instinctive belief.
374 ETERNITY
Had there been but one simple qua-
lity in existence, and that at rest, no
other could ever have been deduced
from it : for there could have been no
interference, no producing cause, where-
by another might have been created.
Now, although we do in our experience
know of a stream of conscious sensa-
tion kept up at intervals for many
hours, and therefore it might be sup-
posed that we could imagine such in
a superior nature, to be continued with-
out sleep; and thus sensation, simple
sensation, exist in and by itself with-
out interruption ; — yet let it be remem-
bered, that during any state of con-
tinued conscious sensation, the whole is
compounded of parts of different kinds :
there exists a succession of different
sensations, (simple or compound,) each
of which in its turn vanishes ; therefore
as each vanishes, all vanish, and sensa-
tion could have no reason for its exist-
ence, unless a continuous being existed,
indifferent to sensation, capable of
being excited when interfered with, by
OF MIND. 375
appropriate qualities fitted to produce
it. — Such a being is the subject of suc-
cessive sensation, — such is a capacity
for sensation, — such is mind. The in-
terfering beings may be called organs
or any thing else ; but the continuous
capacity for sensation alone is mind.
Its nature we cannot tell. Its essence
cannot be matter, or the quality of solid
extension simply, because all matter
does not feel with the same interfer-
ences. If a stone be thrown from a
height, it does not suffer pain ; but
if there be a quality so far inhering as
a dormant capacity in all matter, that
being placed under certain supposed
conditions, and fitly interfered with,
it will feel ; still that continuous capa-
city to sensation is a being properly
termed mind ; — If on the contrary, it
be a quality which has its own ap-
propriate extension as ready to be
interfered with by fit organs, much
more does it seem to merit that appel-
lation, as one used in contradistinc-
tion to every other kind of extension
376 ETERNITY
whatever : — In either case, the organs
or qualities which excite a variety of
sensations, are no more the one conti-
nuous being which feels, than the hands
of a watch that mark the hour, form
the essence of time, or than the instru-
ments which serve to keep alive a par-
tial flame, are of the nature of eternal
heat.
It is here that the materialists err, —
they can make no distinction between
the nature and use of those organs
which are necessary towards the elicit-
ing each sensation in particular, from
the continuous power which must exist
as a totally different being, as a com-
plete variety of essence from that of
the solidity, the extension, and the ac-
tion of such interfering organs. — These
may be wanted either as interferers, or
as instruments fitted to generate some
peculiar quality of matter in a more
appropriate relation to the capacity of
sensation than themselves, but they
are not the m}'Sterious eternal power
of feeling, which has been conveyed to
OF MIXD. 377
each animal as its inheritance from the
commencement of its species ; and
which as a continuous existence must
be an eternal power in nature, and as
immortal for the future, as it must
have been without beginning in the
past.
It may be modified by methods of
infinite interferences — but its essence is
one, and for ever. Memory of sensa-
tions in the rounds of time may be ob-
literated or retained, according to the
mysterious and occult laws which go-
vern the interferences ; — but the capa-
city, the being, which can respond to
joy or sorrow ; can be lofty or de-
graded ; can be wise or foolish ; can be
" the first-born of all things," or the
crawling insect ; can " understand" the
imaginary motions of " fluxions," — or be-
ing fastened to the rock, possess no
powers of motion, even of the simplest
kind, whereby to resist or escape the
influence of the surrounding wave ; — this
subject matter for each variety of sen-
tient perception, or action, must for
378 ETERNITY
ever exist: it may, for aught we can
demonstrate, retain its individual con-
sciousness of personality, communicated
to it by particular interferences as in
man, or be lost in the eternal ocean of
mind : it may, under such modifica-
tion, be improved and go on in a state
of moral amelioration from the smallest
touches of instinctive affection towards
the first of its own kind which it ac-
knowledged, to the perception of all
the charities of friendship, and kindred,
as preliminary to the consummation of
angelic love hereafter ; or be absorbed
amidst the properties only subservient
to animal existences. — Still the in-
visible, but demonstrated existence,
must live for ever ; it may be interfered
with more or less, — it may be modified
more or less, by all kinds of organs
and their powers ; — but its essence is
one, and for ever.
The proper question, therefore, con-
cerning the immortality of the soul, is
not whether it can survive the body as
a continuous existence — for it must be
OF MIND.
379
eternally independant of any parti-
cular set of organs in past, as in future
time. — But the inquiry should be,
whether when the organs which are in
relation to any individual capacity, un-
dergo the change called death, if the
continuing mental capacity become simple
in its aptitudes again, or, whether it
remain so far in an altered state by what
it has gone through in the present life,
that it continues as the result of that
modification ? Whether from any other
interfering powers than those of the
visible body, memory and sense shall
be elicited ; or whether a total variety
from any memory shall be the result
and consequence of its former state, —
analogous to the powers of knowledge
which foetal consciousness yields to in-
fancy, and infancy to manhood, without
conscious memory occurring as an in-
tervening cause ? — Whether as a dor-
mant capacity it remain unexcited and
unconscious of existence during eter-
nity, or, whether amidst the infinite
changes of duration it shall start into
380 ETERNITY
life, under the modification of appro-
priate interfering qualities ?
The latter supposition is a resurrec-
tion from the dead, is the life of the
same mind anew excited ; whilst the
'previous suppositions imply those states
of mental existence so much discussed
by the different sects of philosophers :
for almost all men and nations have
perceived with more or less distinct-
ness, that the subject matter of their
changing sensations could never die.
That a total obliteration of feeling
should take place when there is a ca-
pacity for it, is contradicted by the
analogy of nature, though we may not
be able to demonstrate the contrary ; —
powers of change amongst organs per-
petual motions in nature fitted to act as
interferers, are around and about us vi-
sibly, and invisibly.
Also, by the laws of the same ana-
logy every thing is progressive ; every
thing, (whether designedly so or not, is
not now the question), is a means to an
end. That moral capacities and im-
OF MIND. 381
provements ; superior benevolent feel-
ings of some above others ; the higher
acquirements of intelligence ; the com-
pletion of virtuous habits, &c. should
have no connexion with that portion of
the eternal mind which has been al-
lotted to the species called man in the
ages of futurity, seems contradicted by
that analogy.
This argument appears to me to be
as far as philosophy is capable of
going. It demonstrates the essential
eternity of all mind ; it renders pro-
bable any given state of it, as con-
nected with any after state in the re-
lation of cause and effect ; whether
with or without the revival of memory,
and thus must to every candid inquiring
mind offer a very strong presumption
in favour of the testimonies of tradition,
(to call revealed religion by no higher
name, for the present.) If any one
should conceive the analogy of nature
not to be maintained by the supposition
of the possible extinction of memory
in after life, let it be recollected that
382 ETERNITY
the infant remembers not its state be-
fore birth, nor the young child the state
of infancy, nor the full grown man
that of the very young child ; yet that
each of these mental states improves
by what it has learnt in knowledge,
(if not in virtue,) from that which im-
mediately preceded it :- — All the ideas
of simple, sensible qualites ; of colour,
figure, sound, and taste ; of heat and cold,
hardness and softness, smoothness and
roughness ; of rest and motion ; — all
axioms termed " mental laws of belief'
as well as many which are the founda-
tions of science ; such as, ' There must
be existence in order to feel;' ' Things
do not make themselves ;' ' We our-
selves and the causes of our feelings
are not the same beings ;' ' The whole
is greater than its part ;' ' Equals added
to equals the wholes are equal,' — with
the converse of that proposition; the
original feelings and all the principal
associated emotions of self-love ; the
chief features of the grammar of a lan-
guage, with names assigned to most of
OF MIND. 383
the objects of sense, and many abstract
ideas ; in short the foundations of all
knowledge, and the ability to express it,
are acquired at a time, which does not
by any method transfer the memory of
the impressions by which the know-
ledge gained was acquired ; although
its result, the memory of these ideas,
be united to every new impression
which then arises.
Therefore, in like manner as the child
must assuredly be born though the foetus
know it not, and man be in possession of
ideas whose source is hidden from him, so
may there in succeeding ages arise from
the ashes of this, another universe con-
nected with it as its natural effect and
consequence : — Then every sentient
power it may elicit, every single thought
each various being may possess ; every
capacity which shall then be demon-
strated, may be the results of the pre-
sent universe of thought, will, passion,
suffering, or joy ; ignorance or know-
ledge, virtue or vice, faith or profane-
384 ETERXITY
ness ; and that perhaps without any
acquaintance being imparted to it of
the former state on which its then des-
tination shall hang. On the other hand,
we are all aware of the analogies in
favour of conscious memory hereafter,
from the conscious memory of man
through youth and manhood, of trans-
actions during those periods.
Under the balance of these analogies
the testimony of scripture in favour of
the renewal of conscious memory is as
a casting die, which to any man who
reasons as a philosopher, must affect
his judgment.
I am convinced there are many whose
understandings take this view of the
subject, notwithstanding they may per-
mit themselves considerable latitude in
their reflections on it. As for myself,
though I think that, independant of the
inference ' from scripture, the reunion of
memory to future consciousness pre-
sents no philosophical difficulty, yet I
could be well content in the trust that,
OF MIND. 385
the inquiry for truth should be rewarded
by the rinding it, whether the present
labour in its search be remembered or
not ; that the charity which sympa-
thizes in witnessing pain, should be en -
larged only to promote or to delight
in the perception of pleasure, whether
former misery be obliterated from the
fancy, or not ; — that an instinctive de-
votion towards God should meet with
higher demonstrations of his presence
than our faint conceptions here are
able to embrace, though the satisfaction
arising from the comparison should
be then denied ; and that the conflict
here with doubt, difficulty, suffering,
temptation, and the observation of epl,
should terminate as well as the memdry
of it, in the personal consciousness,
and the notice of surrounding happi-
ness ; in a secure and perpetual pos-
session of truth ; in the love and the
enjoyment of the practice of every
noble and kindly virtue.
386
ESSAY XL
ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF MIND.
Sensation as a simple quality contrasted with that
of solid extension. — Its power to begin and direct
motion. — Application to Deity.
But there is still another reason for
considering sensation as a simple qua-
lity incapable of existing in itself and
by itself \ which is, that though it does
not occupy space as solid extension,
yet it has a necessary relation to space,
by requiring space in which to exist.
In this light each particular sensation
must be the unextended quality of
some kind of extension, whether con-
sidered as empty space, or as solid mat-
ter ; or as some form of extended being
not detectable by any organ of sense.
If for argument's sake, there should be
IMMATERIALITY OF MIND. 387
supposed to exist one hundred square
feet of empty space, and ten sensations
at any moment within that boundary, —
those ten sensations would appear as
a component part, or affection of
that space during such time, and they
would together form one being. If
again during each succeeding moment
for an hour, ten sensations of a different
kind from the ten preceding ones,
should successively arise, that space
would as the substratum, or continuous
existence of which the sensations were
the varieties, be the subject matter of
which they were the changes. Now
instead of empty space, of nothing,
which never could be rendered a some-
thing fraught with every changing sen-
tient quality by any interference what-
ever,— let there be that mysterious
something capable of feeling, offering no
solidity to touch, no impenetrability to
resistance, no colour, nor sound, nor
taste, smell, or other quality to the
observation of any sense ; — let it be
equally as extended as empty space, as
s2
388 IMMATERIALITY
little of matter as that unresisting,
equally diffused medium would be in
any given place — but let the capacity
to feel exist in its own extraordinary
essence ; let such be within the given
compass of any individual organization,
and this substance would exist as the
capacity of an individual mind. Its
power may be perfectly simple, or it
may possess fit aptitudes to retain the im-
pressions once made on it, independantly
of the organs; but certain it is that its
simple perceptions of happiness or utility
direct the motions of matter, and that
the union of sentient and insentient qua-
lities is so intimate as to coalesce, and
together to form the physical efficient
cause of the beginning and direction of
motion amidst the powers of nature ;
and that in a manner which is not ca-
pable of being discovered by any sense,
or instruments in our power : — so per-
fectly one * is it, indeed, with the powers
of matter, with whose mechanical actions
* See note, p. 312.
OF MIND,
389
it interferes, that were it not for thei r
own experience, our modern atheists
might deny its perception of ends, and
its direction of means, as final and
efficient causes amidst the motions they
witness.*
Let not any one think from what
I have advanced that the mind and
consciousness of Deity are put in doubt
by this reasoning; so far from it,
the ideas really contain a demonstra-
tion of his essence, and the steps to-
wards it are few, and short, — since we
perceive instruments in existence which
are means to ends, there must be the
director of motion, the perceiver of ends,
the former of instruments in the uni-
verse ; — perception of ends and direc-
tion of means, are mental qualities ;
are the properties of the continued
existence, called mind ; mind therefore
must have been at the fountain head
of these contrivances ; but not a mind
whose existence is more invisible than
* See preceding Essay, p. 360, also, the following
Essay, pp. 404 and 405.
390 IMMATERIALITY
that of our own minds to each other;
although experience informs us, that
the great, the universal mind which
must have executed these works is
not united to any small defined body
with which we can become acquainted
by our senses ; therefore it is a hidden
mind, although we know of its exist-
ence, by means of reason. As mind,
its eternal continuous capacity is de-
monstrable by the same argument as
that of all minds. The capacities
for being must be eternal ; — changes
may vary, but the subject for changes is
eternal, and can have derived its original
essence from no previous change.
The universal mind, the infinite space
for his residence, the amalgamation of all
possible qualities in nature in One Being
necessarily existing, — the capacity of
perceiving all ideas executed in his own
mind by the eternal, necessary, and es-
sential union of such qualities as are
fitted to the consciousness of all future
knowledge, the circumference, towards
which is propelled every direction of
OF MIND. 391
motion which forms the creatures,* —
this is God, as far as our natures can
contemplate such an awful, infinite, and
invisible being.
Let it not be retorted, that it is easier
to conceive of all the little changing
beings we know of, as existing without
a creator than of such a being ; for I
answer, it is not easier so to think ; the
one side of the dilemma involves a con-
tradiction, the other does not ; the one
is to imagine the existence of a series
of dependant effects without a conti-
nuous being of which they are the qua-
lities, and is equal to the supposition
of the possibility of every thing spring-
ing up as we see it, from an absolute
blank and nonentity of existence ; the
other is the result of referring like
effects to like causes. The one is to
regard each little being we know of, as
the strange appearance of contrivance
without design, and of being at once a
series of changes in relation to no end,
though apparently directed to it ; the
* See Paley's Theo. pp. 301, 302.
392 IMMATERIALITY OF MIND.
other is to believe in the infinite uni-
verse of mind, matter, space, and mo-
tion, eternally and necessarily exist-
ing : generating the creation of all minor
existences in every form and kind that is
possible, through the rounds of cease-
less time.*
* See note on matter, p. 401.
The author hopes it will be understood that the
object of these latter essays is to answer certain
atheistical opinions to be found in various writers ;
and not to arrange a system of theological philo-
sophy, or to attempt an improvement of those stronger
arguments in favour of Deity, which have been
advanced by abler hands.
393
ESSAY XII.
OX THE UNION OF MIND WITH ORGA-
NIZATION.
I have not advanced the opinions con-
tained in the two preceding Essays,
without being aware of an objection
made by Atheists concerning the nature
and existence of Deity ; they say that or-
ganization is necessary as a cause for the
existence of the minds we know of, and
therefore it must be necessary to the ex-
istence of the eternal mind, which is to
imagine the Being, who has so arranged
matter in order to a given end, to re-
quire a similar arrangement for the
existence of his own being. Such an
objection arises from a very partial obser-
s 5
394 UNION OF MIND
vation of the nature and use of organi-
zation in animal frames ; as well as from
a very inefficient examination of the
nature and manner of causation, and
especially in regarding time as neces-
sary to the essence of cause as a 'pro-
ducing 'principle.
Now, with respect to the use of orga-
nization, it is plain that no given indi-
vidual organization produces its own
powers ; each animal derives them, whe-
ther of sensation or action, from its pa-
rents ; and if each, all are beings derived
from some other powers in nature than
their own inherent properties, after they
have been so derived : life, sentiency,
and capacity to action, being given in
and with the organs in relation to some
other powers in nature capable of acting
along with them, in order to the con-
tinuance of these powers, — organization
then, no doubt, will be requisite as a
part of the whole causes necessary to-
wards such continuance of life, sensa-
tion, and action ; but the organs are no
more the powers of feeling than the
WITH ORGANIZATION. 895
strings of an instrument are music, or
than the clock, which is made in rela-
tion to time, is time itself.
But let us see what the organs do.
If physiologists say right, the forma-
tion of each animal exists previous to its
separate sensation, life^ or action. These
powers being also communicated in a
manner independantly of such arrange-
ment, the organization of each animal is
not the cause of the arrangement of its own
organs, nor of the first excitement to life,
action, and sensibility. What then is the
use of the organs ? Not to yield a crea-
tion of original powers, but by their sepa-
rate action (when excited) to be enabled
by their relation with surrounding ap-
propriate qualities of matter, to divide
off from the parent stock, and become
separate individual living beings.
The organs are, to the capacity of
sensation, what the organs of a musical
instrument are in relation to the air. In
unison with it, they can make delicious
music, but there can be none without
both.
396 UNION OF MIND
In like manner, animal frames, contain-
ing within themselves as a component part
of their existence a capacity for sensation
in general; and the power of inward motion
being originally communicated to them
by another source, are enabled, by their
relation with the atmosphere, or other sur-
rounding qualities, to keep up the motion
which perpetually varies the perception
of the original capacity to feel.
In other words, the arrangement and
first action of the organs, and the animal
power to feel, are given properties to
each, and therefore to all men and
animals, antecedently to their own ac-
tion, in conjunction with the atmosphere
under which they first draw life. Thus
organization does not give any original
powers, but merely its action changes the
action and perception of those powers.
The question therefore, with respect
to Deity, is, Does the eternal necessary
essence of mind require organs to give,
or to change perceptions ? It does not
follow, because minor beings, derived
essences, scions from the great root of
WITH ORGANIZATION. 397
existence, require organs in relation to
surrounding matter, to keep up or alter
their perceptions, that therefore the un-
derived Being, the necessary eternal
mind, requires them. Changes, effects,
require their proper causes, but not the
mighty Being, which is no change, no
effect, WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT.
It is a state of mysterious thought, no
doubt, which enters into the awful sanc-
tuary of Being, so far removed from
apprehension by the infinitude of every
quality which belongs to it ; but I will
venture thus far to say, that in finite
creatures each particular sensation is a
given state, — is a complete union of the
essence of mind with any other qualities ne^
cessary to excite it.
Time, without a doubt, is necessary
to the continuance of existence ; but it is
not in relation to the coalescence of the
qualities which form any particular
given existence. Whatever the organs
are, they are but qualities, in relation to
mind, or the power of feeling, with which
398 UNION OF MIND
they unite in order to perception. But
the amalgamation of such properties, is
sentiency, properly so called — is one
being, one power, and the changes of it
are still but its continued properties.
Now, in the Eternal Essence which
began not, and in whom must have re-
sided the original capacities for all qua-
lities, there must have essentially exist-
ed, not only mind or a capacity to feel,
but that coalescence of qualities which
must have formed his magnificent and
innumerable perceptions. Here, in each
animal, the first perception is given, and
the organs, in relation to the surround-
ing medium, keep up a play of motion
which interfere with, and change the
circumscribed capacity to sensation. But
there, underived, by eternal self-exist-
ence, there must be the necessary union
of similar qualities in a like nature of
existence in as far as it is 'perception;
but unlike in every other respect, by all
the difference between God and man —
between essential, and dependant being;
WITH ORGANIZATION. 399
between the small circle allotted to the
exercise of each animal sensorium, and
that which is as unconfmed as infinity.
The organs, I repeat, are necessary
to circumscribe individual capacities to
sensation ; but the organs of themselves
can create no original powers.
All changes are but the little begin-
nings of new forms of existence, derived
from the Universal Essence which began
not to be. All motions derived from pre-
vious motion form together but one ac-
tion put forth originally by the essential
poiver to begin motion, itself no motion.
To suppose otherwise, is to imagine it
possible for all which we at present see,
to be of itself capable of arising where
there was nothing but a blank. The mind
feels that such an hypothesis involves a
contradiction ; that the idea contains an
impossibility.
All changes must therefore be effects
caused by an Eternal Essence, holding
within itself the principle of change, it-
self no change from a former being, and
thus essentially holding in unison by
400 UNION OF MIND
the mysterious nature of his essence,
(which renders it that which it is,) such
qualities as are fitted to give forth
those changes which form the crea-
tures. As these manifest contrivance,
and are fitted as means to ends,
so that essential union of qualities must
have embraced perception as its neces-
sary, eternal, underived situation, — and
when it perceived that it was possible
to make man in his own image, he per-
ceived that by uniting a finite portion of
mental power with the arrangement of
that which was material, under an in-
ward motion which preserved their
union, and placing such amidst the con-
ditions of air, earth, water, and food,
there would thence arise a definite por-
tion of perpetuated combined sensations,
of which knowledge of ends, selection of
means, perception of moral relations,
direction of motion, would be among the
most important. He created organs
which might be the means of transfusing
those qualities into minor portions of
mind, by whose junction finite per-
WITH ORGANIZATION
401
ception might take place ; qualities like
in kind, but not in degree, to his own,
which already united and filling infinity,
could stand in need of no organs in
order to their determination. — In like
manner, (if I may venture an imperfect
illustration) we, when we would apply
the powers of heat, light, or electricity, to
some circumscribed end, adapt there-
unto those forms of artificial arrange-
ment not required by the original essences,
and which exist at large in the universe,
uncircumscribed by space or duration.
It is an attribute of Deity, therefore,
which affords the subject matter and ca-
pacity for all changes ; he is the beginner
and director of motion, matter, *mind, and
consciousness — universal, and eternal,
and necessary, in the comprehension of all
possible qualities ; whilst each individual
being, considered as apart from him,
* i. e. Mattel^ antecedently to our perception of
solidity and resistance ; the original principles pre-
vious to the undergoing any change which might
determine it to appear under the form of either pri-
mary or secondary qualities to animal senses.
402 UNION OF MIND, &C.
must be regarded as containing in its
degree, some portion of its celestial
origin, though incapable of diminish-
ing the plenitude of his infinity, or sub-
tracting from the splendour of his in-
communicable majesty.
403
ESSAY XIII.
ON THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, AND
THE INTERACTION OF MIND AND
BODY.
Although an increased attention has
been given to the doctrine of the as-
sociation of ideas as being sufficient to
account for most of the operations of
mind, yet its nature has been looked upon
as too simple and philosophical to re-
quire much scrutiny; whereas, that very
power of association appears to me the
most difficult of comprehension in na-
ture ; for how shall any given idea be
supposed as associated with some other
idea, which idea is not yet supposed to
be in existence ; one idea only present
in the mind, a single simple perception,
merely, cannot suggest an after per-
404 INTERACTION
ception, for the suggestion is the per-
ception of the suggested idea itself.
The association of ideas can truly
therefore, be nothing more than a com-
pound idea ; than one being of thought,
— a conception of different qualities in
unison. As a state of mind, as a given
sensation, it must be immediately united
with the action and with the state of
the material organs which excite it,
and coalesce therefore as one with it :
thence merely forming one being, one
given state of being.
When such relates to the putting a
design in execution, it must unite within
it, perception and will, and whatever
material qualities co-exist with those
affections of mind ; yet it is the mental
qualities of knowledge, and choice,
which begin and direct the motions
towards the end in question.*
* In cases of design there had been no matter
nor action at all without it in each of those
cases ; and therefore there had been no phenomena
whatever -present for our physical atheists to ex-
amine ; whereas in cases of design when these are ad-
OF MIND AND BODY. 405
This united state of matter and mind,
which together comprehend knowledge
and will, being given, is a given state
of conscious being, and as such must
be abstractedly considered of as at
rest ; for if it were in motion it would
be an altering state of given being which
is a contradiction.
Therefore perception and design of
mind begin, and direct motion on
matter ; the qualities are together ; the
mind perceives its design, and directs
mitted a posteriori by arguments from analogy ; there
must exist two species of action, 1st, The occult be-
ginning and direction of motion on matter, inconse-
quence of the perception and desire to attain certain
ends, with which the experience of theists acquaints
them in some instances, and their understandings
conclude to exist when presented to them by forcible
analogies ; and 2ndly, those physical propellants in
every step towards them which theists and atheists
alike agree are necessary, as physical means to their
appropriate ends, and which resolve themselves into a
continuance of those motions on different independant
kinds of matter, which finally result into some use-
ful end. Theists say that such are parts of the
whole causes necessary towards them ; and atheists
say, they are the whole that are wanted.
406 INTERACTION
Its motion ; but the mysterious law, or
natural power which is a material pro-
perty and executes the motion, is hid-
den from its observation, although it
should react upon it, whether by pain or
pleasure, in each conceivable variety.
Now as like causes have like effects,
the essence of the beginning of motion
amongst bodies, must I think be the same
as that between mind and matter; — mo-
tion of one body may carry motion to
another, — that is, qualities must meet
to interfere, but the quality which
goes by the name of impulse, or impact,
and resists the impenetrability of mat-
ter, must I conceive be always the same
proximate cause when considered as a
physical cause — for let it be remembered
that although we are conscious of per-
ceiving qualities, and directing motion,
yet we cannot be conscious of the mere
physical part of the cause which is in
action, because the material part which
is united to consciousness is necessarily
in itself unconscious.
But there appears to me no mystery
OF MIND AND BODY. 407
in this union ; nor indeed in any ; all
things are united, and form one whole in
their mutual interactions according to
their natures. Time is necessary to
continue existence but not to the action
of causation considered independantly
of such continuity.
408
ESSAY XIV.
OX THE REASON WHY OBJECTS APPEAR
SINGLE ALTHOUH PAINTED ON TWO
RETINAS, AND WHY THEY APPEAR
ERECT ALTHOUGH THE IMAGES BE
INVERTED ON THEM.
It has long been a matter of great
surprise to me, that so much obscurity
should hang over all attempts to explain
the fact of our seeing objects single
when there are two pictures of an
object, one on each retina : for upon
examination of the only reason why
we distinguish one object from another
in any case, it may be plainly per-
ceived, that it entirely arises on ac-
count of a colour different from that of
the object itself forming a line of de-
SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE. 409
mar cation around its edges; and that
therefore, it would be impossible in the
nature of things, but that two or
twenty, or any number of objects
painted upon as many retinas could be
seen other than single, provided the
same line of demarcation alone is painted
on them. For what is it makes the
visual figure of an object, but a line
of demarcation between it and some
surrounding object of another colour?
Now, when the sense of colour is
precisely the same, however often re-
peated, (if the repetition be but at one
and the same moment of time,) there
can be but the sense of that colour alone ;
for there is no line of demarcation 'pre-
sented which can give the notion of
two objects.
If there be more than one object
painted upon each retina, as many will be
perceived by the mind, because there
will be a line of demarcation painted be-
tween them, but there cannot be dupli-
cates of these perceived; because al-
though upon each retina there is painted
410 SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE
a line of demarcation between two or
more objects, and so the same is pre-
sented to the mind ; yet there is no line
of demarcation presented between the dupli-
cates, which could possibly render four
or more objects to the mind.
If that circumstance which alone
forms a sense of the distinction of figure,
is not presented upon either retina, how
shall there be any means of its per-
ception because there exists two re-
tinas?
The puzzle arises from our con-
ceiving in the imagination of the space
between the eyes, existing between the
images of the two objects; but this
space and the figure of it does not pre-
sent itself upon the retina. The two
objects on the retinas, can only then
have the nature of a superposition of
figure ; the feeling to the mind is one,
and the line of demarcation which shows
figure can be but one.
On the other hand, when a different
mass of colouring is painted upon the
two retinas, objects may be seen as two
ALTHOUGH PALNTED TWICE. 411
or more though single ; because there
will necessarily appear to the mind some
extra colouring between the edges of
the figures, which is the only circum-
stance as has been said, that gives the
idea of two figures of a similar kind.
Dr. Reid has employed a great deal
of reasoning to show first, that where
objects are painted upon what he terms
corresponding points of the retina, there
is single vision ; and when upon
points which do not correspond there
is double vision; — and secondly, to re-
solve the connection of these facts into
" an original law of our constitution."
Now it is evident from what I have
said, that when objects are painted
upon corresponding points,, — that is5 a
similar*point of colouring taken as a
centre in each retina; — it is a law,
(as it is called,) i. e. it is in the very
nature of things, not of our constitu-
tion, that they must appear to be single
— because the circumstance which can
at any time present two similar figures
412 SEEING OBJECTS SINGLE
does not take place, namely, the pre-
sentation of extra colouring between the
edges of the two figures. If for in-
stance, in any ordinary case, without
reflecting upon the retinas, and the
painting of images on them, two
black spots are seen, they will appear
thus, (••) that is an interval of
a different colouring will appear be-
tween the two spots ; but if 500 spots
are painted of the same colour, upon
as many retinas, without such an inter-
val of different colour between them,
upon any of the retinas, there can only
be seen one spot, for then the effect, the
sense of two spots cannot take place,
because the cause, i. e. the different
colouring between them, does not take
place.
A similar mistake as to the sim-
plicity of the phenomena takes place
when the mystery is presented of ob-
jects being painted inverted on the re-
tina, and yet seen as erect ; there ap-
pears a contradiction in nature, that
ALTHOUGH PAINTED TWICE. 413
on the one hand, the painting on the
retina should be the cause of vision,
and represent the relative position of
external objects as they exist to the
touch, and yet the painting of these
objects be a variety from that relative
position. Now the real fact is, the
painting of objects, though they be in-
verted, does not alter the painting of
their relative positions ; the ivhole co-
louring of all within the sphere of
vision, maintains precisely the same
position of things towards each other :
but it is the appearance of an opposite
position of things, i. e. an opposition of
the relative colouring of things, which
only can yield the idea of inversion
of images : — Thus a candle would ap-
pear to be topsy turvey upon a table, if
the flame appeared to touch the table,
and the bottom of the candlestick
pointed upwards towards the ceiling ; but
if the bottom of the candlestick main-
tains its relative position to the table,
and the flame the same relative position
414 SEEING OBJECTS ERECT
to the heavens, and the table the same
to the earth, and the earth the same to
the table; then the whole, — from the
earth to the heavens, being painted in
an inverted position upon the retina*
cannot possibly occasion any sense of
inversion of images ; — because the sense
of the soul must be to perceive the
whole relative position of objects, pre-
cisely in that relation of parts they
appear to have to touch and motion.
Dr. Reid says, " When I hold my
" walking-stick in my hand and look at
" it, I take it for granted, that I see
" and handle the same individual object ;
" when I say that I feel it erect, my
" meaning is, that I feel the head di-
" rected from the horizon, and the
" point directed towards it ; and when
" I say that I see it erect, I mean that
" I see it with the head directed from
" the horizon, and the point directed
" towards it. I conceive the horizon
"as a fixed object both of sight and
" touch, with relation to which objects
BY INVERTED IMAGES. 415
" are said to be high or low, erect or
" inverted, and when the question is
" asked, Why I see the object erect
" and not inverted ? it is the same as to
" ask, Why I see it in that position it
" really hath ? or, why the eye shows
" the real position of objects, and
t( doth not show them in an inverted
" position ?" The whole answer is too
long to quote, it may be seen, sec. 12,
chap. 6, of " Inquiry into the Human
Mind."
Suffice it to say, that it is an in-
genious labour to account for a fact
not appearing as a contradiction to
nature, which fact never takes place —
namely, " that the (visible) horizon is
taken as a fixed 'place in relation to which
objects are erect or inverted;" for when
the whole is within the sphere of
vision, then the horizon is equally
turned upon the retina ; and the stick
maintains on it the same relative posi-
tion ; — whilst the soul can only have
the sense of one piece, (or canvass,) of
416 SEEING OBJECTS ERECT.
relative colouring, which upon motion,
or touch being applied to the corres-
ponding external varieties, will reply
to those actions in the same relative
proportions.
THE END,
LONDON :
IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND.
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